Week 125

 

The fourth week of October 1919 – after the first of a series of informal meetings between the Italian Extraordinary Military Commissioner in Venezia-Giulia, gen. Pietro Badoglio, and the self-appointed Commander of the volunteer occupation forces in Fiume, Gabriele D'Annunzio, which had taken place in the small town of Cantrida on October 20^th – was spent in the attempt to finalize the negotiations on the Adriatic question which the Italians had painstakingly set in motion in Washington and, at the same time, in the belabored effort to persuade D'Annunzio to step aside and deliver the city back to the care of the regular Italian troops. If the first proposition rested on the dubious perspective of Secretary of State Lansing choosing to accommodate for the new Italian demands in order to facilitate a resolution of the crisis of Fiume – a move which implied a degree of discontinuity, albeit on a rather minor issue, with Wilson's previous explicit deliberations – the second one required a persuasion action aimed not only at the citizens and notables of Fiume but at D'Annunzio himself. In order for him to accept the modest results which the Italian Government and Foreign Office might have been able to produce, D'Annunzio had to believe that no larger or more substantial results were at hand, and furthermore that he could reasonably step down, after declaring for the unconditional annexation and promising to die in Fiume rather than surrendering the city, with his prestige and reputation intact and the chance to present the Italian diplomatic results as his own personal achievement (a point, this one, which the Allies and Associate would have certainly taken issue with), while, conversely, a prosecution of his adventure was only destined to give rise to internal unrest, damaging to the very national ideals he wished to serve, and eventually tarnishing his moral and political legacy as well.

These, quite unsteady, points were those on which the Italian authorities attempted to leverage in order to find a way out of the difficult situation, and to do so in time to safely handle the national elections of mid November 1919. It goes almost without saying that D'Annunzio was extremely reluctant to accept either argument.

No one is in favor of the annexation program – Nitti stressed again in his reply to Badoglio (October 21^st at noon) – not even the most excited ones. I can tell you privately that, during the Council of the Crown, I asked if there was anyone in favor of the annexation and every one of them, from Salandra to Barzilai, spoke against it. […]

To speak of annexation is disingenuous, and D'Annunzio is being misled. On practical grounds Italy wouldn't just break all relations with Her allies, but would find Herself in an untenable situation. Our economical state is of extreme severity and I fear new and severe unrest due to prices rising.

Financial situation is most alarming. We are pressing the issue with the Allies but not everything is up to us and we must conduct ourselves with moderation and care in order not to rush ahead towards our ruin.

D'Annunzio and his friends should be comprised of this conceit of our real situation. The unrest that some wish to spread within the Country has a chiefly electoral purpose. […] To provoke disorders means going against our national interests as well as against the very cause of Fiume.

But, while D'Annunzio's attitude towards the informal proposals of the Italian Government (delivered through Salata and Badoglio) was still a matter of uncertain speculation, the Italian authorities had to face the quite serious issue that those “minimum demands” which might have been enough to satisfy the notables of Fiume were far from sure to obtain Washington's approval. Indeed half an hour later – 12.30 pm, October 21^st – Tittoni sent word from Paris admitting that the Italian proposals were still (at best) under consideration, so that there was no foreseeable time frame for a definitive reply, nor any certainty of a favorable outcome.

Both Badoglio and Salata are informed of our last proposal concerning Fiume and the Adriatic question. Such proposal is not, as of now, at a final stage; since, as it is known, Lansing reserved himself to inform us of his deliberation.

It is therefore impossible to authorize Badoglio to offer D'Annunzio any guarantee of the execution of the aforementioned proposal. Nonetheless it's pleasing to see that Badoglio has been able to have an exchange of views on the matter […] and such an exchange could be profitably continued indeed on the ground of the proposals currently submitted to the attention of the American Government, in order to demonstrate to D'Annunzio that it is materially impossible to obtain more.

As to the attitude of the Allies, it's best for D'Annunzio to be informed that the French Government truly appears at present inspired by very friendly intentions, but that the degree of support they, as well as Lloyd George, can offer us with the Americans is to be understood in so far as our Allies absolutely rule out the possibility of coming into conflict with the US over the matter of Fiume. Nor one should be led to believe that such deferential attitude towards the American Government is exclusive to the issue of Fiume; rather it informs the whole policies, broadly speaking, of France and Great Britain towards the US.

 

In substantial agreement with our introduction, Badoglio wrote to Nitti from his front line Command in Abbazia (October 22^nd – midnight) in order to update the Prime Minister on the recent developments with D'Annunzio (Badoglio had already informed the Government on the previous day that he was expecting a reply in short time).

There is no doubt that D'Annunzio asked for time in order to make a decision, and that he is currently weighting his options.

It is necessary for him to be convinced of: 1) Impossibility of annexation; 2) His action obtained the maximum possible result in favor of Fiume; 3) Prolonging his initiative goes to the full detriment of Italy and Her institutions of which D'Annunzio claims to be most observant; 4) Maximum conditions achieved must satisfy citizens of Fiume.

I gave disposition for local action to be performed to this end. Yet, upon advice of someone very close to D'Annunzio, it would be helpful in the meantime some influential friend of his may write him secretly appealing to his honor and duty with confirmation of points stated above, of course very tactfully especially for point four. The person volunteering this suggestion named Tittoni but I don't know how close he may be to D'Annunzio and whether it may be appropriate given his high official position. […]

And, indeed, D'Annunzio sent word to Badoglio on October 22^nd – the substance and tone of the message, albeit quite cordial towards the Italian commander, were such as to leave little hope of an imminent change of heart. Not only was D'Annunzio clearly aware of the intent of the Italian Government to somewhat undermine his position, but he appeared as committed to slowing their advances as they were to hasten the pace of a resolution. Aside from citing imminent “new information” from his international sources, such as to provide him, no doubt, with confirmation of the favorable perspective of his initiative, with the US military aide allegedly encouraging the Italians to just “declare the annexation, and God help you!”, D'Annunzio plainly contrasted in his words Badoglio, “his dearest and most beloved commander”, with “the men in Rome, who stand between Italy and Her future”, showing no sympathy for their efforts and no desire to facilitate their diplomatic initiative.

The government tries to wear me down and belittle me. I fight back with the same methods. […]

Of course, all this is painful, and my heart bleeds. But my cause is a holy one.

I read in the newspapers that the project of free State moves forward by one judgment and another. […] Please, forbid the Government and the Conference from taking a deliberation contrary to our will. The consequences would be irreparable. […]