There is at least one other case: France in the early nineteenth century. After Napoleon was beaten for the second time, the other Great Powers (Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia) convened in Vienna and Paris to determine among other things how the revolutionary danger of France should be contained. Given that Napoleon had imposed harsh war contributions on Austria and Prussia, they had every reason to be vengeful, but in 1814 a spirit of magnanimity prevailed. After Napoleon’s return in 1815, this changed in part. After lengthy discussions in the summer and autumn of 1815, the matter was settled in the Second Treaty of Paris. France was to pay approx. 1900 million francs. That amount consisted of several points: 700 million for the upkeep of an occupation army led by Wellington, a small amount was reserved as ‘prize money’ for the victors of Waterloo, and 700 million was simply meant as indemnity. While Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, thought this would really be nothing as an operation of finance, it was for France. One French banker said there was not a single écu for loan in France at the time. The Great Powers therefore had to balance their desire for indemnity and/or revenge (especially Prussia’s) with their goal of containing revolutionary sentiments. Also, they were intent on helping France pay. In the end, the banking house of the Baring brothers was found willing to help (and made such good money out of it that French bankers started complaining soon after). Added difficulty was the fact that in 1815 the Tambora vulcano exploded, producing such a massive smoke cloud that 1816 would be a year without summer in Europe. It ruined harvests in France. Still, France managed to pay the price. Even more than was demanded at first because of several factors, and the occupation army left.

Sources:

Eugene White, ‘Making the French pay’

André Nicolle, ‘Comment la France a payé après Waterloo’

Daan den Braven, A just contribution