Week 127

 

Rejoice! Our coverage of the many diplomatic troubles, endless inconsequential turns and political inconveniences surrounding the Adriatic question is – temporarily, at least – coming to an end. Not the end of the Adriatic question, but a decent point to end this first extended stage of attempted negotiations between the Italian Government, the British and French, the US, and last with the wild card of D'Annunzio's Command in Fiume. A troublesome circuit of telegrams, half motions, dubious propositions, resulting in underscoring and as a matter of fact increasing the general perception of Italy's political and social instability, leaving Nitti's Government not only unable to deal with a situation in good measure out of their reach, but manifestly and quite unfortunately so. With the obvious consequence of contributing to the impression of a general political impasse which, despite Nitti's early attempts, was soon to assume the institutional form of the so called “parliamentary paralysis” after the dramatic (for the liberal system, that is) outcome of the elections of November 1919.

After all – one may say – when there isn't much you can do, you don't usually do much. And, as we saw last week, by the end of October the desperate Italian attempts to produce a change of heart in the State Department of the US had failed, despite the more or less committed support of the French and British; on the 29^th D'Annunzio himself had received direct confirmation of this fact, thanks to the questionable assistance of publicist Orazio Pedrazzi, evidence to him that his strategy was not only working, but indeed the only possible one.

The vast majority of the Italians – he wrote to gen. Badoglio (in the night, received by Badoglio in the morning and sent to Nitti on November 1^st – 14.00 pm) – including ministerial press, regard as pointless and humiliating to us these last minute talks between our minister and Mr. Polk who, as you know, doesn't even have the support of his fellow delegates.

The only way out we have left is the one I offer, that which is demanded of us by the circumstances and by our honor. I think it's the one which earns the consensus of the nation. And I am confident it will have your authoritative support as well […]

Anyways, I repeat exactly what I said before in all frankness. Under no circumstances, for the sake of no intermediary or delegate, I will agree to reopen negotiations that I think useless. If my proposal was rejected, and if the Government continued to seek accommodations which I don't accept and which the people of Fiume don't accept, then I'd have to retake my freedom of action, full and unrestrained.

I wish you […] to take these considerations to those who are called to deliberate […]

And, by this point, the Italian extraordinary military commissary of Venezia-Giulia, gen. Pietro Badoglio, appeared to concur in good measure with D'Annunzio's assessment of the Italian situation and of the possible short term impact of further negotiations. As he had written to Nitti on the 31^st summing up the contents of his meetings:

D'Annunzio wants facts, not words, no matter how appeasing they might be (and these last ones weren't even that).

With Polk's promised new attempt – promised, once the Italian Government was able to guarantee him the immediate execution of the new terms, with D'Annunzio orderly delivering Fiume to the Italian forces – being “uncertain” or better “seriously destined for failure”, there was no longer a way of changing D'Annunzio's mind or the state of things within the Adriatic port town.

Any talks with D'Annunzio – Badoglio continued his report for the Prime Minister – aimed at having him reconsider his deliberations, is by now pointless. And therefore this is my formal statement that I am not going to try any new attempt with him in such direction.

From this point onwards to the elections of November 16^th – despite Nitti's immediate but tenuous attempts to reignite the fire of the diplomatic steamboat – the Italian efforts appeared destined to lag, struggling to consolidate their (very few) remaining assets and displaying very little confidence in the possibility of finding a composition within the next two weeks. On a somewhat more positive note, according to Badoglio, the confirmation of the failure of the Italian Government to find an accommodation with the Allies and Associate and, on parallel, to ensure D'Annunzio's observance of the new terms to be drafted between Paris, London and Washington, with the consequent extension of the irregular occupation regime in Fiume, meant that what had been treated, at first, as an internal matter to be handled by the Italian Government, was now evolving into an international matter. And with D'Annunzio's occupation acquiring, after seven weeks, a character of legitimacy of sorts, it was to be expected (or so Badoglio believed) that the Poet himself could wish to stabilize his position, containing or moderating certain excesses, and perhaps becoming, in the end, of some assistance for the Italian aspirations, due to the ultimate convergence of his goals with those of the Italian Government.

D'Annunzio by now understands that he has set himself up into an international question and that consequently he mustn't do anything which may weaken the Country. And therefore he declared that he won't attempt strikes against my troops any longer, nor try any expeditions towards Italy.

The overall situation – as resulting from the declarations made by S.E. Tittoni and from the deliberations consequently taken by D'Annunzio – appears to be as follows:

The Italian Army hold the armistice line from Carinthia to the sea and in Dalmatia.

D'Annunzio holds with his troops the city and neighborhoods of Fiume (the old zone of inter-Allied occupation).

The Government declares that it doesn't accept the Adriatic solution proposed by the Americans.

It's obvious that this situation determines the need to make deliberations in agreement with D'Annunzio for the defense of that portion of frontier with the Yugoslavs which is now being held by troops under my command, and to establish the attitude of the Army in the circumstance of a Yugoslav attack on Fiume, and last to ascertain a possible future way out.

In consideration of which, the news of Tittoni's illness (the Italian foreign minister was in bed with a flu) with the consequent postponement of the meeting (between Nitti, Tittoni and Badoglio) which had previously been arranged for the morning of Monday 3^rd of November, were somewhat of a further annoyance. Badoglio nonetheless insisted not to change his plans for a return to Rome to discuss the matter in person with the Prime Minister at least.

In my absence – Badoglio insisted – I have D'Annunzio's assurance that nothing is going to happen from his side. Therefore I can take a short leave without concerns.

 

For his own part, prime minister F.S. Nitti had not yet given up on the remote chance of a successful Allied intervention. Only two days earlier, he had secured the promise of a new telegram from Lloyd George to Wilson (the British had confirmed to Imperiali that both a message of instructions to Lord Grey and Lloyd George's telegram had been sent on the 31^st of October) and wasn't ready to give up on it – indeed, with a great deal of optimism, he explained Badoglio that this new intervention “leads us to believe that we may have a positive response” concerning the Italian project for Fiume. The issue was now to carefully operate in order to undo the damage produced by Pedrazzi's intervention.

We must carefully return the situation to where it was before – he wrote to Badoglio on November 1^st (14.20 pm), pushing him back to action – and [to the fact] that our project, which the citizens of Fiume as well agreed was extremely advantageous, earns general consensus. We need to considerately redo our work in order for D'Annunzio himself to become comprised of these views which are the most favorable to the Italian thesis. Here elements from Fiume all agree that this is the best solution. After Lloyd George's intervention, I hope Wilson accepts.

Nitti appeared significantly less confident in his subsequent communication to Tittoni (15.30 pm)

I hope the action of the Allies produces an effect, especially if they want to focus on the Yugoslavs. Do you think we should follow your line and have [the Allies] approve your project?

In the meantime, Nitti had approved the publication of a “terrific appeal” sent by D'Annunzio “to the US Senate and Congress”. D'Annunzio had asked, by means of Badoglio, to “let the message through without the intervention of censorship”.

Since the message is phrased in a respectful manner (Badoglio assures me of that), I agreed. If I refused, I'd have produced the opposite result, as the appeal would have been sent through foreign Countries and my refusal would have had the only effect of souring [the public and relations with Fiume].

Of course, D'Annunzio demands the annexation. We must keep reminding that the citizens of Fiume themselves not only agree with our project but regard it as the best possible one. I am speaking, of course, of the most notable personalities. Therefore I think better we return to your program, departing from which was perhaps a bad idea.