Logistics, logistics, logistics, and their actual objectives.

The entire reason for the IJN/IJA to invest a single body or minute on any place to the East of say, Java, was to defend those core islands of the Dutch East Indies, the Malaysian Peninsula, and the Japanese Home Islands. That was where the industrial raw materials like oil and rubber would come from, and be shipped to, in order to feed the on going wars on the Asian mainland. While further securing Japanese resource independence through occupied territory and exploitation of the citizens of them. And those rings of islands, the Marshalls, Marianas, Solomons, etc were a defensive ring. They would grind down an eventual Allied attack, by air and sea, and vicious fighting on the islands. Then once done the main Japanese Combined Fleet would sail to a grand decisive battle to break the back of the Allies. From there their demoralized state would ideally lead to a negotiated end of the war with Japan keeping the vast majority of their new holdings.

Things like landings further out from the island chains were simply tools to push that first perimeter out more or frustrate that eventual counter thrust. While landings in places like Australia, NZ, Fiji, or Hawaii were rightly considered by most in the IJN to be the fever dreams of the crazed.

But the seizing of that perimeter was run of a shoestring budget. The Army was uninterested in committing too many forces to the 'Navys' theater as it were, That they were able to achieve dominance over near 1/3 the surface of the earth with a ground combat element smaller than that which landed in Normandy on the first day is a huge military achievement. Resting on a complex timetable of mutually supporting naval forces, leapfrogging air support, and using near every available ship for transport and supply. Nor did this attitude really change, it took the Doolittle Raid to shame the IJA into committing a token force to land on Midway. And it was only into 1943 when the IJN had been gutted that serious Army redeployment took place from China and the Home Islands to the Pacific.

And that underpins the issue Japan had when trying to push outward. They couldnt keep those positions supplied. They didnt have enough transports, couldnt protect them in such an exposed position, and needed those resources elsewhere too. Its frankly debatable even if Japan could have done a good enough job keeping Midway supplied had they taken it in June 1942. It took every oiler the IJN could find to get the carrier off Pearl as another example, and there was even talk of abandoning one to its fate once it ran out of fuel to save some for the other 5.

For a similar bold undertaking here is a look at what would have been needed to follow up Pearl Harbor with a landing on Oahu with a chance of success.

However, in the interests of discussion, let us suppose that the Japanese actually contemplated such a move. I will grant that had three Japanese divisions magically appeared on the shores of Hawaii on the morning of December 7th, hard on the heels of one of the most shattering military defeats in U.S. history, it is unlikely that the U.S. Army garrison there would have been able to put up a cohesive defense. So the Japanese could, conceivably, have taken the Hawaiian islands under these particular circumstances. However, before we grant the Japanese the ability to commit to such an operation, we need to understand the opportunity costs of such an undertaking. As a first step in that direction, let's examine the scope of the ground forces Japan committed to overrunning the Pacific.

In other words, the Japanese had 11 divisions to play with to achieve their objectives in the Pacific. Next, let's examine what it takes to move those forces around. According to Mark Parillo, in "The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War", p.75, at the begining of the war Japan had roughly 6.5 million tons of shipping under her control. At the start of hostilities, the Imperial Army drafted 519 vessels of 2,160,500 tons, two thirds of which (1,450,000 tons worth) were intended for landing purposes. Of that, 1,350,000 tons was earmarked for the Philippines and Malayan operations. The Navy drafted another 1,740,200 tons, most of which was presumably devoted to sustaining the fleet in foreign waters. Thus, nearly 4 million tons of Japan's 6.5 million total tons of shipping was drafted for military purposes, leaving 2.6 million tons for the civilian economy (i.e. the people who make the guns and bullets). Not only that, but the civilian economy actually needed 10 million tons of shipping to supply it, the remainder having been made up before the war by cargo carried in foreign (mostly Allied) cargo ships. So in actuality, the Japan started the war 3.5 million tons in the hole. The Japanese economy was being expected to fight a major, multi-theatre war, while subsisting on 25% of its prewar shipping requirements! Taken as a whole, it is difficult to imagine how Japan could have freed up any additional shipping to increase the potential size of the amphibious pool. http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm

So every major undertaking the scale of something like landing in NZ meant robing further from the reason they went to war to start. Ensuring the had the economic freedom to act how they wanted politically and militarily.

While it is worth noting the military reality. From the Spring of 1942 on the Allies had a near continuous naval presence in the Coral Sea screening the lower Solomons, the remaining Australian held territory on New Guinea around Port Moresby, New Caledonia and Fiji both becoming home to major stop over ports and installations, and eventually New Zealand. This included the precious aircraft carriers of the USN, from Spring 1942 on there would always be 1 and often 2 or 3 there for the next 18 months. The lone exception being the aftermath of the Battle of the Coral Sea when they had checked further Japanese advances in that theater, and the aftermath then of Midway. Which was followed by a massive influx of US forces as the first major counterattack was launched at Guadalcanal to secure the US-ANZAC sea lanes of communication and approaches.

And a final note. Outside of direct quotes or addressing the content of those quotes/their context, you will rarely find 'Jap' used in any academic discussion, it being rightly treated as the ethnic slur it is in the overwhelming majority of its usage in the Western world, and thus shunned without good cause.

EDIT: A great intro read into the background and first 2/3 of the war in the Pacific are Ian W. Tolls Pacific Crucible and Conquering Tide. He is still working on the last of the trilogy.