Week 130

 

Instead of moving forward like I hoped, I succumbed to the impulse of revisiting the “crime scene” of “original Fascism”. I had already examined the process of foundation of the Fasci di Combattimento, as well as the influences behind the composition of the so called “program of San Sepolcro”, but I found a few things worth adding to the pile. While this revision doesn't change the substance of the arguments I used before – so that, if you are familiar with those, you won't find much in terms of novelty – I have expanded the coverage of the proceedings of the adunata and I have also attempted to develop certain points which had been left somewhat hanging during our previous weeks.

Which reminded me that I should, probably, dedicate some time to the internal political developments taking place in parallel to the quite labored Italian negotiations centered around the the Adriatic question. Meaning: the delivery (July 24^th 1919) and publication (partial, August 10^th – 11^th 1919) of the “Caporetto inquest”relation, with the public and subsequent parliamentary debate (September 6^th and September 9^th to 13^th 1919); and the approval of the electoral reform, with the introduction of the proportional system (August 15^th 1919 – and September 2^nd 1919).

 

The third week of July 1919 found Mussolini and his Popolo d'Italia in the middle of one of their short-lived “institutional” interludes. After the initial promises of relentless opposition to the designation of the “anti-national” and “anti-combatants” Ministry of Franscesco Saverio Nitti, resulting in a series of public rallies and vociferous press campaigns during the last days of June, and connecting to the climate of general public unrest marked by notable episodes of price riots, Mussolini had assumed a more moderate, and even conciliatory tone, when Nitti announced a series of measures destined to appease, for the time being, the popular demands. Furthermore the new Government had appeared committed to control the “solidarity strike” – the “scioperissimo” - announced by the Official Socialists, in solidarity with the international workers' movement and to protest the Allied intervention in Russia and Hungary, for the days of July 20^th and 21^st 1919.

It was the strike, and the campaign for an anti-(official) socialist front, therefore, which had to take precedence over other political considerations. Which is not to say that Mussolini's more moderate tone, besides the obvious editorial constraints, couldn't also depend on the situation of relative political isolation he had to face after the difficulties encountered by his previous political-public initiatives: going from his efforts to promote the formation of a common front of “democratic interventionism” (a theme which he persisted in relaunching until the electoral debacle of November 1919), to his unfortunate attempt to influence the deliberations of the Combatants Association in a more “national-interventionist” direction (which had almost cost him a new duel). As often happened, by mid July, rumors wanted him, once again, looking for buyers willing to relieve him of his newspaper.

While those rumors accompanied Mussolini throughout most of his pre-Ministerial career, it's certainly true that, by July 1919, the landscape of “democratic interventionism” appeared far from promising for the future Duce. It was – as noted by De Felice – the crisis of Fiume, with the subsequent occupation of the city and the renewed climate of “national” mobilization, which allowed Mussolini a chance for a breakthrough on the right wing.

In the meantime – on July 23^rd – the somewhat unsatisfactory results of the socialist strike, which had seen a massive but far from “revolutionary” participation, meant that Mussolini could at least celebrate the “Catastrophe of Italian Leninism” with the publication of a speech he had delivered in Milan, on the eve of the strike (July 19^th 1919), and which could serve now as a renewed appeal “for Unity and Action among left-interventionists”.

Mussolini had begun his speech with remarking, “with frankness close to brutality”, despite the atmosphere of camaraderie inspired by the circumstances, the need to acknowledge and to “solve certain personal and political positions”, unless they wanted their union to be “desolately sterile, instead of a fruitful one”. The assembly indeed saw the participation of members from a large array of interventionist groups opposed to the socialist strike: De Ambris' Unione Sindacale Milanese and Bissolati's Unione Socialista Italiana, the Fasci di Combattimento the Combatants Association, the Arditi Association and other veteran groups, the Republican Party and the Associazione Garibaldina. Yet, in their many shades, those groups “unanimously agree upon one important fact”.

In thinking that the Pus manifestation is a bluff, a blackmail, a farce, a speculation maneuver.

We also all agree on making a sensible distinction between socialist party and working mass. The socialist party has, until now, kept up the pretense of being a pure, a revolutionary organism, the protector and exclusive, authentic representative of the working mass. Nothing could be further from the truth!

We need to confront this straw man and, numbers at hand, see that, of 42 million Italians, the socialists members of the party are, as of July 1919, only 60 thousand, under the rule of a clique composed of the most mediocre bourgeois folk, in the most philistine meaning of the word. In the unbelievable and absurd circumstance of a triumphant Leninist revolution, these ten morons would become, the next day, the new ministers of the Italian Nation.

One thing is the socialist party; another the organized working mass; another yet the unorganized working mass which exceeds the other tow combined seven fold. We must refuse to approach the working masses with the slimy, histrionic attitude of demagogues.

Masses need to be educated, which means that they need to hear a frank word of truth. Many of those masses which are now being led by socialists don't deserve any flattery because they are masses of brutes spoiled and uncivilized thanks to the red church. Our interventionist comrades who have been forced to leave certain factories know it well. […]

The “frank” message for these masses – Mussolini explained, with an extensive citation from French syndicalist Alphonse Merrheim – had to be “Production! Production! Production!”.

“Our courage rests in telling relentlessly to the masses” - went the two paragraphs reproduced in bold - “that the revolution we need to make is the economical one, and that one doesn't make it in the streets, amidst delirious crowds, destroying for the mere desire to steal and destroy.”

“Our courage rests in saying that an economical revolution drives its nourishment from labor, and grows stronger, develops and is accomplished through the intensification of production, both in the field and workshops, thanks to a better use of scientific processes and production means.”

And – Mussolini continued – the various groups of “left-interventionist” agreed on another point: the Italian situation was

[…] critical, albeit far from a desperate one. […]

Starting with July 1^st we are insolvent debtors of England – Mussolini begun, summarizing, with varying degrees of accuracy, certain basic elements of the recent exposition of the Italian Finances – On July 31^st other financial agreements with the United States will expire. To salvage our situation we need to finalize a loan for 1 billion dollars (7-8 billions Lire).

Railroads have coal supplies for the next fifteen days. Foodstuff is enough for twenty days, more or less, that is until the end of the month. We need an immediate purchase of 2 million tonnes of foodstuff in order to prevent famines.

But these financial and economical agreements are subordinated to the political agreements we need to conclude in Paris.

The chance, almost certain, is offered to us of obtaining large concessions in Asia Minor, including the coal mines of Heraclea. […] We might also obtain oil fields in Armenia.

Such Eastern acquisitions are subordinated as well to the Adriatic agreements.

The solution of the matter of Fiume is already compromised by the negotiations of the previous delegation which had already accepted the principle of a free State. Yet Tardieu's project placed the future safeguard of the Italian character of Fiume in jeopardy since the Italian urban majority would have been overwhelmed by the Slav peasant masses. It is therefore a matter of limiting this danger to a minimum, by means of a new project replacing the conceit of free State with that of a free City, with narrow frontiers.

As for Dalmatia, we'll be able to save only the centers with Italian majority, with guarantees for the protection of the Italian minorities scattered across the other ones. […]