Short answer:

"I recognize that there may be an unhealthy dose of revisionism driving this question."

Yes, there is, and a lot of anachronism.

Your hypothesis is a misreading of Wilson and European history in the 20th century.

Discussion:

Hindsight is always 20/20, and in analyzing policy choices of people a century ago, you'll go very far wrong by looking at whatever turned out unfortunately and then concluding "ah, that should have been obvious, and this other alternative would have been better". Notice that this hypothetical alternative never is subject to the same analysis.

Wilson's policies, hostile to old empires and supporting national self determination were in no way "idiot[ic]" -- they were the reasoned and logical extrapolation of American statecraft going back to George Washington. It was Washington who identified the old powers of Europe and their imperial policies as antithetical to US interests; it was Monroe who set US policy against such empires in the Western hemisphere. And it was President McKinley who breached the longstanding American allergy to overseas involvements -- Wilson is not some naive idealist, but rather a proponent of a distinctively American view of the international order, one with more than a century of intellectual history. The Spanish-American War is also the proximate genesis of the idea that the old empires are senile and dangerous, a rickety structure to be torn down lest it cause more damage -- the Austro-Hungarian Empire was seen through this lens twenty years later.

Yugoslavia was a reasonable and historically awaited response to Slavic nationalism that could no longer abide an Austro-Hungarian monarch; that's the tension that started the War, after all (historians ocassionally refer to WW I with only a little irony as the "Third Balkan War"). The formal name of the entity -- "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" reflected an explicit acknowledgement of its constituencies. That a multi-ethnic Slavic state in the Balkans might itself have nationalist tensions that would tear it apart-- that was hardly a forgone conclusion in 1919, and indeed need not have happened but for subsequent unforeseeable events. For example: the stability of the Yugoslav state was compromised by the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, and the bitter experience of WW II (Chetniks/Ustashe); developments nor foreseeable nor indeed inevitable in 1918.

Similarly it's hard to argue that "because Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, therefore both would have been better off in the Austro-Hungarian Empire." I'd add here that you leave out one of the most important political changes in Europe in the second half of the 20th century, the European Union. For states like the Czech Republic, adherence to the EU made their union with Slovakia far less important for the problems of governance. So your "United States of Central Europe" more or less exists, albeit as a much broader European Union; there's nothing to suggest that a more geographically restricted union would have been anything better.

Your hypothesis, that somehow Wilson's objectives were to the advantage of the old Empires-- that would have been news to them. America's anti-imperialist project was regarded as fundamentally hostile to Empire, and was viewed without any enthusiasm in London and Paris. The Russians were involved in their own civil war, but the independence of the Balkan slavs from Austria Hungary was a political goal of the Tsarist regime prior to the War. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire is yet another axis of history that was largely independent of Wilson's agenda; Sykes-Picot, the Balfour Declaration, the expulsion of Greeks from Anatolia, these major events can't be laid at his door.

Finally, it's worth noting that people raised objections at the time of Versailles that the US hadn't gone far enough in promoting national self determination, and had gone too far in accommodating imperial Britain, notably in Ireland.

So you're really taking a look at everything that happened in 20th century Europe, and then cherry picking some aspect of Wilson's diplomatic agenda which you think is responsible, without considering other historical events or the practicality of hypothetical alternatives. So I'd send you back to the beginning: in 1918, Europe was at the end of a devastating war which had killed 40 million people and destroyed the order that had been established in Vienna a century earlier. A communist revolution was taking power in Russia, and could well have done in Germany; this all matters much more to what came next than Wilson's policies than Versailles.

Wilson's ambition, to create a "League of Nations" to replace Vienna 1814-15's "Concert of European [empires]" made sense as a framework for a world order. The old order had drowned itself in blood-- what should a new one look like? Wilson's conception -- resisted by both European powers and the American Congress-- was a logical response. He was no one's "useful idiot".

Sources:

Lynch, Allen. “Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of 'National Self-Determination': A Reconsideration.” Review of International Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2002, pp. 419–436.

THRONTVEIT, TRYGVE. “The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination.” Diplomatic History, vol. 35, no. 3, 2011, pp. 445–481.

Hopkinson, Michael. “President Woodrow Wilson and the Irish Question.” Studia Hibernica, no. 27, 1993, pp. 89–111.

Michail, Eugene. “Western Attitudes to War in the Balkans and the Shifting Meanings of Violence, 1912-91.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 47, no. 2, 2012, pp. 219–239.

Kernek, Sterling J. “Distractions of Peace during War: The Lloyd George Government's Reactions to Woodrow Wilson, December, 1916-November, 1918.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 65, no. 2, 1975, pp. 1–117.

Djokićć, Dejan. Pasic & Trumbic: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Makers of the Modern World: The Peace Conferences of 1919––1923 and Their Aftermath. Haus, London, 2010.

Remak, Joachim. “1914--The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered.” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 43, no. 3, 1971, pp. 354–366.