Yes, he expected them to capitulate.

Stalin did not want war, and the transportation disruption was a calculated move; having air lanes was written in the treaty, but a similar provision for land traffic was not.

By "practical" analysis, Stalin should have won. Even before the Blockade happened in June 1948, there was pressure to arrange a transfer of Berlin. In a teleconference April 1948 between Gen. Bradley (Chief of Staff of the Army) and Gen. Clay (US military governor of West Berlin) Bradley argued the US should "announce withdrawal and minimize loss of prestige rather being forced out by threat." Clay's position was similar to how he wrote later that

If we mean that we are to hold Europe against communism, we must not budge. We can take humiliation and pressure short of war in Berlin without losing face. I believe the future of democracy requires us to stay here until forced out. (From Clay's Decision in Germany, page 361.)

When the Blockade started, General Clay began the airlift, and Truman signed the orders after the airlift had already started. There was still a debate among his advisors if the airlift should be ended, but Truman asserted his intention to stay.

In short: Stalin's mostly accurate idea of what the Americans in general would think was undercut by Clay and Truman's stubbornness, and they were the two that mattered.

A CIA dispatch from Berlin marked 6 August 1948 is revealing.

. . . the Allied airlift has caused astonishment to the Soviets who are presently scanning the press and radio experts on public opinion, especially in Britain, and are particularly anxious to know whether the parliamentary discussions include dissatisfaction with the exorbitant cost of supplying Berlin . . . They still think the Allies will have to discontinue the airlift because of its cost and impracticability.

The Soviets did not seem to factor the nuke in, even though there were previous calls within the US to pre-emptively strike (shut down by Truman). They hadn't expected anything other than winning.

Finally, it should be noted Stalin wasn't working with the best intelligence. Soviet intelligence officers feared to bring bad news to Stalin. It also meant after the Blockade had clearly failed, it went on for longer than it should have.

Sources:

Larson, Deborah Welch. "The Origins of Commitment: Truman and West Berlin." Journal of Cold War Studies 13.1 (2011): 180-212.

Miller, Roger Gene. To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949. Vol. 68. Texas A&M University Press, 2000.

Miscamble, Wilson D. "Harry S. Truman, the Berlin Blockade and the 1948 election." Presidential Studies Quarterly 10.3 (1980): 306-316.

Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey. Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War. Yale University Press, 1997.