The stagnation of Indian firearms technology was a question examined by historian Iqtidar Alam Khan (among others) and a good summary of the situation is found in a speech given by Khan entitled Indian Response to Firearms which was later published in the Proceedings of the Indian History Congress (volume 58).

Khan makes a case of a great stagnation in firearms technology occurring between 1600 and 1750 where only a few innovations from Europe and elsewhere were adopted and he contrasts this with earlier periods where Indian states had quickly and readily adopted techniques from the Middle East and Portugal. Khan argues that key European metallurgical techniques and innovations were not adopted by local craftsmen which hampered the production of cast-bronze and cast-iron guns. An example of this deficiency is drawn from a British report from 1777 on the cannons in the possession of the Nawab of Oudh/Awadh. 90% of his cannons were deemed unfit due to metal fatigue or rotten carriages while the serviceable guns were deemed too heavy (a 6 pounder was heavy as a British 12 pounder) or clumsy (due to inadequate carriages).

Another failure was the inability to widely adopt innovations in small arms technology such as the wheel lock and flintlock. These technologies were not unknown as evidenced by Mughal records, but the predominant firearm of this period was still the matchlock, why? Khan has several potential solutions to this problem – 1) musketeers were drawn from certain warrior communities which specialized as musketeers. Traditionalism and conservatism within these communities might have prevented the adoption of new techniques and technologies, 2) Traditionalism and conservatism in the cavalry-centric Mughal army (comparisons are made to several Western Asian/North African powers such as the Safavids and Mamelukes who displayed a similar antipathy towards firearms). Bruce Lenman examined the same question as Khan nearly 30 years before Khan delivered his speech and came to a different conclusion. He noted that Indian craftsmen often used labor intensive methods to produce few high-quality products such as musket barrels or wootz steel while British techniques focused on mass production. The latter philosophy could cope with the demands of outfitting a firearm equipped force (for example, the re-equipment of a brigade demanded some 5000 musket barrels and accessories).

To these answers, we can add Randolf G.S. Cooper’s as well. He notes that matchlocks were mechanically less complex and could be maintained and repaired with a minimum quantity of tools; they were also more resilient in the monsoon conditions of India and cheaper than their flintlock counterparts and naturally, they were not reliant on flints which needed to be imported from Europe. Locally derived agate could be substituted for imported flints but this material was difficult to shape and its material properties made it an imperfect substitute at best. Even with the widespread adoption of European military techniques and firearms after 1750 by powers such as the Marathas, Sikhs and Mysore, matchlock-men were retained to support their flintlock armed brethren as snipers. The South Asian matchlock had several peculiar properties that made it suitable for long range shooting – per military historian David Harding, these matchlock weapons had a small bore and thick barrel. This allowed the user to apply a greater powder charge which in turn led to a higher muzzle velocity, greater range (even for unrifled weapons!) and accuracy. In addition to the longer range, these firearms also fired a heavier bullet. In light of these advantages, the conservatism of the warrior communities might not be entirely irrational; indeed, when the matchlock armed Rohillas (allies to the Afghans) faced down the westernized Gardi troops (trained by a French trained officer Ibrahim Khan Gardi and equipped with flintlocks and bayonets patterned after French models) during the third battle of Panipat in 1761, the Rohillas managed to check their opponents. One other aspect of interest of this battle was the mass deployment by the Afghans of swivel mounted light cannons placed on the backs of camels. Masses of these guns could be shifted rapidly from one front to another unlike the clumsy indigenous cannons described above (such as those possessed by the Nawab of Oudh/Awadh) and they could maintain a comparatively high rate of fire. By the time of Panipat, these cannons had been used by a wide range of West Asian and South Asian powers and they were singled out by Iqtidar Alam Khan as one innovative exception to the pattern of stagnation noted above.

After 1750, with the progressive enfeeblement of the Mughal Empire and the rise of the European trading companies on the coasts as well as several dynamic local powers such as the Marathas, the material gaps between European and local firearms technology closed rapidly. As noted earlier, even by 1761, the Marathas had demonstrated their interest in European military techniques and had begun hiring mercenaries such as Ibrahim Khan Gardi well-versed in this form of warfare. These mercenaries such as the Savoyard Benoit de Boigne would introduce a slew of reforms in various fields ranging from administrative (standardizing tax collection to regularly pay and equip westernized troops) to technical (de Boigne would hire another soldier of fortune to introduce the latest European gun casting techniques and oversee the quality of outputs of the Maratha foundries). The end result was an opposition which could more-or-less match the weaponry and drill of the East India Company’s sepoys but which often had huge institutional deficits (in leadership, logistics and finances) which would ultimately doom their resistance.