I've heard the term Thirteen Colonies used before, as a description of the thirteen colonies of the British Empire that would eventually declare independence and for the United States of America. But these colonies weren't the only British possessions in North America. There were also other colonies, like Quebec, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Rupert's Land. To elaborate on my question, was there some kind of British administration/law/common opinion at the time that separated the colonies that would become the United States from the colonies that would become Canada? If I had asked somebody from the time before the American Revolution what the Thirteen Colonies were, would they though some means identify the colonies that would become the United States or would they just have considered these colonies as no different to the colonies that would become Canada?
In short, was "The Thirteen Colonies" a term used at the time or was it retroactively applied to talk about the ones that formed the United States.
No, and it was almost 14, not 13. It could have easily been 16, too.
St John's was a tiny colony. Quebec and Ontario were primarily French, not Anglo, and were part of lands aquired in just 1763. Along with Ruperts Land, they were further away from the 13 colonies as well. England actually held over 30 colonies in the Americas in the early 1770s but over half were in the Caribbean.
The British had captured Nova Scotia in Queen Anne's War 50 years earlier. It was opened for settlement by New England colonists; Benjamin Franklin even bought some land there. Anglo Protestants also moved to settle there from Europe. When France was defeated in the fourth Indian war (Seven Years' War), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were combined as one colony by the British - it was primarily protestant, anglo, attached to the 13 colonies physically, and somewhat tired of British authority. But they had a major British Navy base in Halifax and an overly suspicious leader, Governor Legge. He was very concerned with rebellion and was recalled to England in 1776 (at the request of other prominent and loyal Nova Scotians), while still being paid, just to get him out of the colony. His replacement, one of the men who petitioned for his recall, worked with citizens to unite the colony much more than his predecessor. When things started to get violent and Boston was evacuated by the British, the loyalist citizens that went with the military were settled in Nova Scotia. New England privateers had been raiding Nova Scotia in night raids against the state and populace, making Nova Scotia much less sympathetic to America's cause. All of this combined helped Nova Scotians to not send representatives to our first two Continental Congresses. In 1775, a small group did address Washington, asking for an invasion of Nova Scotia by American rebels. He declined to help;
August 11, 1775.
GENTLEMEN: I have considered the papers you left with me yesterday. As to the expedition proposed against Nova-Scotia by the inhabitants of Machias, I cannot but applaud their spirit and zeal, but after considering the reasons offered for it, several objections occur, which seem to me unanswerable. I apprehend such an enterprise to be inconsistent with the general principle upon which the Colonies have proceeded. That Province has not acceded, it is true, to the measures of Congress, and therefore it has been excluded from all commercial intercourse with the other Colonies; but it has not commenced hostilities against them, nor are any to be apprehended. To attack it, therefore, is a measure of conquest, rather than defence, and may be attended with very dangerous consequences. It might, perhaps, be easy, with the force proposed, to make an incursion into the Province, and overawe those of the inhabitants who are inimical to our cause, and, for a short time, prevent their supplying the enemy with provisions; but to produce any lasting effects, the same force must continue.
As to the furnishing vessels of force, you, gentlemen, will anticipate me in pointing out our weakness, and the enemy’ s strength at sea. There would be great danger that, with the best preparations we could make, they would fall an easy prey, either to the men-of-war on that station, or to some which would be detached from Boston. I have been thus particular, to satisfy any gentlemen of the Court who should incline to adopt the measure. I could offer many other reasons against it, some of which, I doubt not, will suggest themselves to the honourable Board. But it is unnecessary to enumerate them, when our situation, as to ammunition, absolutely forbids our sending a single ounce of it out of the camp at present.
I am, Gentlemen, &c.
Go. WASHINGTON.
We weren't really doing great at that point ourselves. We would soon see Benedict Arnold, one of our best, defeated by smallpox and the British in Ontario (another colony not joining the rebellion), and now a colony that never showed for the Philly conventions wanted us to liberate them while they weren't trying to liberate themselves. Of course had they sent anyone to Philly in '74 Legge likely would have hung them. One can also see reference to naval imbalance and the inability to properly supply munitions to our own soldiers in Washinton's letter.
It's a funny thing: in 1775, Nova Scotia was basically asking to become the 14 colony. One year after Washington's letter, August 11, 1776, news would reach St Augustine in the British colony of Florida of the Declaration Of Independence. That night, citizens of the 14th British colony would hang Hancock and Sam Adams in effigy. They would remain loyal through the war. In 1783 it was technically returned to spain, not given to America, and wouldn't officially become a territory until 1821.
Had Pensacola, St Augustine, and Nova Scotia joined - something not too far outside of reality - we would speak of the "16 original colonies."
E: typo and timeline correction: Arnold invaded Quebec in Sept and Washington's letter was in August.