Were men who volunteered in WW2 given preference in assignments over those who were drafted?

by acvdk

My grandfather often spoke of how he volunteered for the Army shortly after Pearl Harbor because, while he was eager to do his part, he didn’t want to “end up in the infantry” or “stuck on a boat” in the Navy. He figured he would be drafted anyway if he didn’t volunteer and his best chance of getting assigned somewhere preferential would be to enlist early, which he said was a common belief at the time among his friends. He ended up as a tank mechanic in Africa and Italy, spending the war mostly in the relative safety and comfort of rear areas, but I suspect he got this assignment primarily because he had strong technical aptitude and experience working at a service station (as well as building modular homes and working in the CCC) before the war and may not have had much, if anything, to do with him volunteering, and his beliefs were just bolstered by confirmation bias of not ending up in the infantry.

Did men who volunteered get any kind of preference for roles assigned, other than, of course, branch of service (eg Navy vs Army)? Was his belief that he would get a better assignment by volunteering early rather than waiting to be drafted founded in reality or just a false belief that was confirmed in his mind by a fortuitous assignment? Perhaps he also observed (without really knowing the reason) that those he knew who were drafted later in the war, were just more likely due to circumstance to end up as replacements for casualties and therefore inherently more likely to be assigned to combat roles?

He was American, but I would be interested to know if this was true in other countries as well.

the_howling_cow

but I suspect he got this assignment primarily because he had strong technical aptitude and experience working at a service station (as well as building modular homes and working in the CCC) before the war and may not have had much, if anything, to do with him volunteering,

Yes. Men who possessed civilian skills either directly usable or "convertible" by the Army were steered into assignments that could best use them, depending upon the specific skill (or a related hobby or ability) and the need for it at any given time. Later in the war, the importance of civilian aptitude decreased as more and more men were directed to combat replacement training centers. The Civilian Conservation Corps, even though the jobs created by it were civilian in nature, was militarily significant:

The military significance of the CCC was two-fold. First, the Regular Army contribution to this program required about one-quarter of the officer corps, mostly lieutenants and captains, in full-time administration of the camps. This loss of junior leadership, albeit temporary, affected all branches of the army across the United States....Additionally, the program was essentially a U.S. Army mission. The CCC was administered at the national level by a government bureau. Below that, however, the CCC was run by the nine corps area commanders. Each corps area was further subdivided into essentially state districts which were in turn run by various division, brigade, and in many cases, regimental commanders. Each of these commanders spent a significant amount of time inspecting and managing their respective districts. This meant that these leaders had less time available to train, and otherwise prepare, their units for war. When one considers the substantial contributions in personnel, time, and resources that the army made to ensure the success of the CCC, it is easy to see why Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff at the time, was so concerned about the further degradation of the army’s capabilities to defend America in time of war. The second significance of the CCC program to national defense was the call to active duty of thousands of Organized Reserve officers in April 1934 to take over the governance of the camps. For officers who possessed few opportunities to exercise effective leadership of men, the CCC camps provided an intangible, but nevertheless substantial, contribution to preparing thousands of junior officers of the Officers Reserve Corps for the leadership demands of military command. Additionally, the semi-military methods used to manage the enrollees and run the camps introduced hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of men who would enlist or be drafted for World War II, to a form of military order and discipline. In at least these two ways, the CCC was partially responsible for the U.S. Army’s ability to mobilize for World War II.

Did men who volunteered get any kind of preference for roles assigned, other than, of course, branch of service (eg Navy vs Army)?

Most notably, before December 1942, men could enlist as civilians directly into the Army (Army Air Corps) and be earmarked for examination for duty as an aviation cadet. After 5 December 1942, voluntary enlistment into the U.S. armed forces outside the authority of the Selective Service System was ended for men from the ages of eighteen to thirty-seven via Executive Order 9279. There became really no distinction between the terms "volunteer" and "draftee" except in semantics, and the two categories essentially became "putting oneself at the top of the list to be drafted" and "draftee."

Partially in order to constrain the continued poaching of specialized units for aviation cadet material, the major source for aviation cadets then became men newly inducted into the Army who expressed a desire to fly and were screened at reception centers.

At the same time as the signing of Executive Order 9279, the armed forces declared they would not accept men over the age of thirty-seven except in exceptional circumstances. The Navy and Coast Guard and Marine Corps essentially remained the only route for seventeen year olds to potentially see immediate active duty, as this age group was not subject to Selective Service or other restrictions; a legislative decision in May 1940 implicitly forced the wartime Army to hold seventeen year old volunteers in the Enlisted Reserve Corps until they reached their eighteenth birthdays, whereupon they were shortly called to active duty in the Army of the United States and sent to basic training.

Perhaps he also observed (without really knowing the reason) that those he knew who were drafted later in the war, were just more likely due to circumstance to end up as replacements for casualties and therefore inherently more likely to be assigned to combat roles?

Yes. The Army received the greater proportion of men inducted through Selective Service, and seventeen year old volunteers (and the few men thirty-eight or over) almost exclusively chose to enlist in the Navy rather than in the Army, with the majority of those in the Army going into the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve. The portion of Executive Order 9279 prohibiting voluntary enlistment into the armed forces was repealed in August 1945.

In June 1944 half the new men being received by the Army were 18-year-olds, three-quarters of all men received by the Army were being assigned to the Army Ground Forces, over 90% of inductees received by the Army Ground Forces were being assigned to replacement training centers, and 80% of men assigned to AGF replacement centers were assigned to the infantry and armored centers (about 75% and 5% respectively).