America's relationship with Chiang Kai-shek after the death of FDR suddenly turned lukewarm from the previous relations Chiang had somewhat enjoyed. FDR was actually sort of a sinophile. His grandfather had made his fortune in the 1800s selling tea and opium, and personal memoirs left behind from various US diplomats and politicians show that FDR believed China was the key to strengthening America's position in the world. Indeed America was one of the first nations to denounce Japan's annexation of Manchuria, though this didn't mean much to the angered Chinese nationalists. We're all aware of the extensive Burma Road, a British-American-Chinese operation maintained and fought over for years in the SE Asian theater.

Throughout WW2, particularly after the fall of Nanjing, Chiang acceded to his wife's plan to leave China and rally support among Americans. It wasn't such a bad plan anyway; she received her alma mater in America and spoke fluent English. She would act as one of her husband's primary diplomats to America for the rest of her life. While over there, she was received several times by the US Congress, and managed to actually convince a few senators and house members that undying support for the KMT would be necessary to first defeat Japan, then after 1945, the Communists. This group has become known as the China Lobby, a term which in the 1950s ended up becoming sort of pejorative. It mainly consisted of hardliner conservatives who sought to take a more aggressive stance against communism in Asia, even to the extent of funding the KMT's invasion of the mainland in the 1950s, a dream that quickly died out after the Korean War.

Back to 1945. Let's set the stage. In February of that year, the great powers got together and had the Yalta Conference. Relevant to our discussion, FDR had agreed, secretly, to recognize the USSR's Mongolian puppet, and Soviet interests in Manchuria, in exchange for the Soviet Union taking the fight to Japan. According to Jay Taylor in The Generalissimo, FDR felt he could straighten the issue out with Chiang, who he viewed as a friend, later on down the road. Additionally, the US believed that because of the damage sustained, the USSR would be willing to cooperate in the post war world as a "normal status quo power," i.e., a non-revolutionary entity.

The Soviet Union invaded Manchuria on the 9th of August, and met little resistance from the already battered and beleaguered Japanese. Just a week later, the nukes were dropped. By September, the USSR had control of Manchuria, and America had control of Japan and was sending Naval units to the coast of China. The Japanese have surrendered, ordered to leave all positions in China. Despite being whopped around for years, China's resilience had made it a mutual winner of the war through America, as well as the Soviet Union. Satisfied that the job was done, the US requested the USSR leave China. But the issue was FDR was now dead. And Stalin, who agreed to leave, wasn't necessarily in a rush to do so, demanding that the US leave China, while sending troops and captured-Japanese materiel to the Red Army. Stalin and Mao kept in regular correspondence, and the agreed upon measure was that there would be a war, and they would win.

When Truman ascended to the presidency, the warm relations Chiang enjoyed with FDR had faded away and became quite cool. Truman and the rest of his administration had zero interest in helping China militarily. The China Lobby had only boasted a few members, and held no real influence. American diplomats were also of a mind that Mao could be dissuaded from siding with Stalin. They believed that if they approached things diplomatically, avoiding conflict, Mao could be convinced to rejoin the Chinese political scene, and the CCP and KMT would share power like the Republicans and Democrats, holding elections to see who gains a majority. They severely underestimated the situation.

1945, Japanese Surrender and Post-war Uncertainty

In August 1945, America agreed to help Chiang secure Japanese-abandoned areas in Eastern China by airlifting troops there after Stalin sent new, alarming, terms to America about the surrender of Japan. Unfortunately for the pacifist-hopeful Americans, Japanese commanders in provinces like Jiangsu had already been reporting that CCP troops were attempting to take over the cities they were suppose to be leaving. Japanese General Okamura actually reported that over 7,000 Japanese troops died fighting the CCP after the war's end, as they refused to hand over cities to the communists. Within a year, the CCP expanded its territory from 57 to 310 counties, mainly in the Northeast. Still, the US airlifted over 400,000 KMT troops to key areas East, but there was serious political backfire. General Wedemayer, a staunch anti-Communist who was advising Chiang, was forced to reject some transportation requests the KMT issued for reasons of "non-interference." But just as it seemed war was going to break out once again, Stalin ordered Mao to halt expansion.

The sudden order to halt CCP expansion led Americans to believe that the USSR was willing to come to the bargaining table over China. Truman wasn't interested in China, but he knew it would be politically disastrous for it to fall under communist control while he was president. In fact, Mao had agreed to meet with Chiang in late 1945, and did indeed stay in Chongqing, the temporary capital of the KMT, for six weeks. The meetings were mediated by Patrick Hurley, US ambassador to China for the time. During this time, the CCP dropped their demand for a coalition government and agreed to hold consultative conference to decide the election in a national assembly. Things were looking good as far as the Americans were concerned; Truman still had no interest in being dragged into a war in China. But Stalin and Mao were still persistent in secret. On September 18th, Mao proclaimed "We must stop the civil war and all parties must unite under the leadership of chairman Chiang to build modern China." According to Chiang's diary, on October 9th, Mao's last day at Chongqing, he pleaded with him to abandon armed force and compete on political grounds. While the Americans may have been fooled, it seems Chiang wasn't. George Marshall, US war hero and savior in the West, was once again called into service to find a diplomatic solution in China. It was to be Marshall's biggest failure. In Manchuria, Lin Biao had raised up to 200,000 CCP troops.