There were three separate plans for an Axis invasion of Malta; an Italian one formulated in 1940, a German one in 1941, and a joint German-Italian one in 1942 respectively. These were of varying levels of seriousness, with the 1942 plan being the most well-developed.

Pre-war Italian planning had identified the need to neutralise Malta, but no detailed plans had been carried out to do so. War plans were made at a strategic level, and the precise methods for capturing Malta were not specified. It was only in the spring of 1940 that the first invasion plan was put together, by the staff of the Italian Navy. This plan assumed that Malta was heavily defended, and that Anglo-French naval forces would soon arrive to relieve the island in the case of an extended siege. This meant that an overwhelming force had to be landed quickly - some 40,000 men were projected as being needed. The Italian Navy had no landing ships or craft, so they would have to be landed from steamers that could be run aground on beaches. The landing was to occur on beaches in the north of the island, supported by the guns of the Italian fleet and by hundreds of aircraft from Sicily (including the use of chemical weapons). Six hundred paratroopers would be dropped on the south of the island, as a diversion. The main landing force would quickly move to overwhelm the main British defensive line, the Victoria Line. This was a 19th Century fortification, running along east-west along an escarpment, that cut the island in half - once the Italians had broken through it, there was little stopping them from capturing Valletta and the airfields at Luqa and Ta'Qali. However, the plan was flawed. The Italian Army had no troops trained for amphibious operations, especially not against a dug-in opposition. The Navy had no training either, nor the landing ships they saw as necessary for an invasion. The Air Force had deployed for operations against Yugoslavia, and was not in a position to attack Malta.

As such, Admiral Cavagnari, head of the Italian Navy, rejected the possibility of attacking Malta at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on the 5th June 1940. However, General Badoglio requested a reappraisal of the plan, which the naval staff completed on the 18th June. This revision reduced the number of troops necessary for the attack to 20,000. It also reduced the pressure on the Air Force, simply calling for the maximum possible support, rather than specifying numbers of aircraft. While the plan was fairly complete, the planners also noted that Britain had reduced the significance of their base at Malta - the Mediterranean Fleet had withdrawn to Alexandria and Gibraltar, while the RAF had reduced its commitments to the island. They concluded that siezing the island would be more effort than it was worth. It could simply be neutralized by air and naval attacks. It would then fall after final victory had been achieved in North Africa. This was presented by Cavagnari as final proof that there was no need to invade.

Attempts to neutralise Malta through air attack started almost immediately on Italy's entry to the war. They redoubled when Germany shifted Fliegerkorps X to the Mediterranean in January 1941. This experienced anti-shipping force began heavy attacks on shipping to Malta, scoring an early success when they heavily damaged HMS Illustrious. They then moved to an intensive bombing campaign against the island, especially against the airfields and Valetta's dockyards. However, this saw little success, with aircraft, ships and submarines continuing to operate against Axis shipping to North Africa. To solve this, Admiral Raeder began pushing for an invasion. Raeder produced a plan that called for the landing of two airborne divisions on the island. This concept was generally supported by German Army planners. However, Goering was opposed, believing that an airborne landing on the island would be made difficult by the profusion of stone walls separating fields on the island. These posed a real risk to German paratroopers, who could not control the direction of their fall due to the design of their parachute harness. There was also a desire to put off such strategic distractions until after the Soviet Union had been defeated. The invasion was thus put on the very optimistic timetable of autumn 1941. The May 1941 invasion of Crete, which decimated the German airborne force, put paid to this plan for good.

The final plan was initially driven by the Italians, with lubrication from a few German figures. The Italians had been drawing up a plan for an invasion, codenamed Esigenza C3, but lacked a number of key resources for it. Raeder, and Field Marshal Kesselring (commanding German Air Force units in the Mediterranean), pushed hard for German support for this. In February 1942, Hitler granted permission for a joint invasion. The German side of it would be codenamed 'Operation Hercules'. Invasion plans, including input from Japanese advisors, was carried out in February-March 1942. A final plan was produced at the end of May. This was a four-step plan, using both airborne and seaborne forces. In the first phase, paratroopers would land in the island's south-west, securing a landing zone for seaborne forces. In the second phase, more airborne troops would land around Mdina and Rabat, while amphibious forces landed on the beaches secured by the first wave of parachutists. In the third phase, the paras would secure the airfields at Ta'Qali, Hal Far and Luqa, while the seaborne troops secured the port at Marsaxlokk. The final phase would see a second wave of amphibious troops land at Marsaxlokk, and advance to Valletta. Diversionary raids would be carried out against forts near Marsaxlokk, while the Italian Navy would make fake attacks against the beaches on the island's northern and eastern coasts. The invasion force was mainly Italian, with the Germans providing just one airborne division, compared to Italy's two airborne divisions and five infantry divisions. The Italians also provided the majority of the shipping, though the Germans provided a significant amount of amphibious craft. The air forces were a more even split, with the Germans providing two Fliegerkorps, plus much of the transport for the airborne troops. While this plan came close to seeing reality, it was never used, as it was overtaken by events in North Africa. In May 1941, Rommel began a major offensive, driving the Allies out of Libya and back into Egypt. On the 21st June, Tobruk fell, with 33,000 casualties. It seemed that there was no way for 8th Army to fight back, and that Alexandria and Cairo would follow Tobruk. With these captured, there would be no way for Malta to hold. Hercules/C3 was delayed until September, to avoid diverting fuel and supplies away from Rommel's advance. In July, this advance would run into a road-block at El Alamein, and Rommel called for reinforcements from the Italian Army. This required the diversion of the troops earmarked for C3, leading to its cancellation.

With C3 cancelled, there were no future chances for an invasion. Rommel's further failure to breakthrough at Alam Haifa made it clear that Egypt would not fall. The joint offensives of 2nd El Alamein and Operation Torch relieved the pressure on Malta, clearing the path for easy resupply and reinforcement of the island. The Axis were pushed onto the defensive. Offensive planning had to be put aside in favour of attempts to rescue the situation.

You know, my grandparents told us that the Maltese population was very surprised that the Italians started to bomb us when the war broke out. Our People and nations has always had very close ties with each other. That changed very much when the bombs started falling. It's ironic because in modern times many Italians come to Malta looking for jobs.