I’ve done some surface reading on the General Alexander Suvorov’s campaigns through the Alps which sounded like something out of every general’s wet dream. Not to mention he also led a string of stunning victories against the Ottomans earlier, and that some of other Russia’s finest generals (Kutuzov, Bagration, etc) were his pupils-all of which sounded very fascinating. However, his most important accomplishments were, apparently, the reforms that he helped instituted into the organization and training of the Imperial Russian army. What were exactly these reforms and what profound changes did it make?
Suvorov is, indeed, considered to be one of the best, or probably THE best military commander in Russian history, and his reforms changed many things in armies he commanded, but, surprisingly, they never took off in a long term and Russian military as a whole proceeded into the 19th century being mostly unchanged, despite Suvorov's efforts.
Alexandre de Langeron, a French immigrant who left France after the beginning of French Revolutionary Wars and joined Russian service in 1790, considered Suvorov to be one of the best generals of the Russian Empire and later commented on his Italian campaign to be "a virtue of military genius". He also wrote down some training exercises which were conducted under Suvorov's guidance. Before discussing how exactly his changes influenced 18th century warfare and why they were largelly forgotten soon after his death, it's important to understand what these changes looked like.
Suvorov also published several instructions and manuals in 1790s, all of which bear more or less indentical focal points and can be broadly attributed as components of his reformation plans. Suvorov, unlike majority of Russian officers of the 18th century, considered aggressive offensive actions to be decisive factor in outperforming his opponents on the field of battle. To better train and accommodate his troops, he utilized drilling practice called skvoznaia ataka ("perforating attack" or "punch-through attack"): his troops, divided into two parts, would swap their roles between attackers and defenders and constantly charge each other (portraying real engagement) without stopping, moving through gaps in each other's ranks, then rotate, reform and begin the exercise anew. Defending team was to shoot into advancing attacking team with blanket cartridges, then, when they were no further than 30 paces away, to counterattack with bayonets. Langeron considered such training to be very useful, especially for cavalry: he noted these methods did a great job on accustoming both riders and horses to not being afraid of enemy infantry, smoke and gunfire, to never stop and assault thick formations at full speed. He also was very fond of an idea that charging infantrymen should start running with their bayonets ready only when they're close enough, quoting:
Oftentimes a commander who is unable to calcute either distance or usefulness of this maneuver, shouts: "Bayonets ready!" (a la bayonnette). Soldiers start running, sometimes when there are as many as 300 paces between them and the enemy, their ranks become confused and they later retreat to their positions very tired.
Suvorov, unlike many of his contemporaries, considered excessive shooting to be harmful to achieving victory and put all his bets on decisive bayonet charges that would shock his opponents and make them flee, and if they don't flee, then his troops' better melee training would prove to be overwhelming, quoted:
There are many unneeded deaths during the firefight since all men have equal hands that can hold muskets. But they are unaccustomed to the power of Russian bayonet. Thin your lines and do not hesitate, attack your enemy with melee weaponry.
He deemed very important that no soldier, no matter the situation, should ever stop or turn back during bayonet charges ("No formation and no front stabilizations justify backing away, even a single step back means death"). Suvorov commented on the fact that chasing your enemy can be just as important as winning the battle itself:
You should never allow your adversary to reform back and fight on equal grounds... The enemy that's fleeing away is destroyed by the mere fact someone's following him close behind. Fleeing opponents are eager to finish the fight by either dying or surrendering. When they enemy is running, he is being harrassed by the gunfire. He can't shoot back, can't stand firmly, can't reload. Such are inconveniences of those who run away. But when he's being chased down by bayonets, he can't even stop for a moment and will never ever consider returning fire. You shouldn't stop either and must always hasten his retreat by your vigorous pursuit.
The problem here lies in political field: Suvorov was one of the brightest minds of the "old breed" and greatly disliked young, Prussophilic emperor Paul I (feeling was mutual). Suvorov criticized new Russian military (which was based on old Prussian theoretical military work called "Experience of the field art of war") statute in 1797:
This "experience" has been found in the corner of an old castle ruin, on a scrap of pergament, eaten by mice.
After the end of 1799 campaign Paul had several ideas on how to properly reform Russian army, but none of them came into reality. As Russian historian Alexander Zhmodikov states: "In the end, Paul didn't have any grasp of real art of war". He decomissioned Suvorov and didn't take notions of old man's combat experience seriously. Suvorov died in 1800, and Paul was later killed in coup of 1801. New emperor, Alexander I, also didn't consider recent experience to be worth implementing into the main bulk of the army proper. Russian military in the 19th century had to start anew.
Sources: Zhmodikov A., "Tactics of Russian Imperial Army during the Napoleonic Wars", 2015.