Hey all,
So the title mostly covers it.
As mentioned, I’m reading Caesar’s Gallic Wars and I find it interesting how often logistical issues arise — which totally makes sense, considering the era in which he writes. With that being said, I’ve noticed that much (if not most?) of the grain the Roman’s used was acquired from the many villages they passed when marching.
Take, for example, this section from book 5 of the Gallic Wars, wherein Caesar writes (or, dictates, I suppose): “Caesar gave [the Trinobantes] orders to send him forty hostages and grain for the army, and sent Mandubracius back to them. They swiftly carried out his orders, sending the designated number of hostages and the grain” (Book 5, around section 21; page 145 in The Landmark Julius Caesar).
My question, then, as framed in the title, is essentially: Did the Romans’ acquisition of grain, for their army and livestock, hinder the production/stock of grain villages from which they were taken? Would the villages who were forced to offer tribute/payment starve, or would the Romans leave them enough for self-consumption?
Thanks a ton in advance, and don’t be afraid to digress in regards to Roman logistical issues! I’d love to read any and all information you can throw at me! :D
Thanks!
Before going to the matter of grain storage and impact of Roman logistics on Gaul, we have to look a bit on the role of the oppida in late independent Gaul (i.e. roughly the IInd and Ist centuries BCE).
These proto-urban agglomerations were, being planned for the most part, elements of centralization of political, social and economical activities the latter of which covering trade, artisanal production and redistribution which itself could have a really important political and social function, notably in the redistribution of meat and wine, both products whose flux were controlled by equites. This was symptomatic of some reinforcement of Gaulish petty-states apparatus, especially in Celtic Gaul as with, e.g., Aedui, Bituriges, Veneti, etc. with all that it generally implies : censes, fiscal/captation organization, etc.
This seems to have concerned grain storage and redistribution as well, especially giving the importance of grain export in Gauish trade.
Gaulish farms in the IIIrd and IInd centuries BCE seem in their majority one or several granaries, siloes, storage pits, etc. matching the farm production and consumption; even if some farms had storage structures exceeding their production capacities with ten of granaries or pits, likely hinting at their important local role in centralization of neighbouring production and part in regional trade. Pit tended to disappear with the IInd century, possibly because of its storage limits (once its opened, it have to be consumed or goes to waste) at the benefit of granaries : the quick absorption of Gaulish grain production in Roman economical networks after the conquest hints at an already interconnected grain trade regionally.
The development of oppida and aristocratic villages (different in being centered around old rural centers and possibly limited political important) is paralleled with a growing importance of storage in these "controlled" encloses spaces, sometimes up to being quasi-warehouses whereas simpler rural granaries tend to be more uncommon by the Ist century BCE.
There is only limited and debated possibility of communal storage in oppida : it is possible the stone terrace found at Bibracte could have been either that or a market place as found elsewhere in Gaul, and the datation of Lac-Du-Puy storage pits is still debated possibly antedating the oppidum by centuries. Even if a mention by Caesar "finding there the greatest plenty of corn and other provisions" in Avaricum (DBG VII, 32) leaves some room for their existence, what might be more relevant would bet to stress is that this new spatial organization set flux of grain (preservation and exchanges) more easily overseen and accounted for.
This is even more true for livestock (quoting from this earlier answer) as consumption of meat had a broader social implication. Pork seems to have been fairly high-status along with rare dog-meat, horse, beef, mutton and goat-meat in descending order. Generally, chops and fillets were favored regardless of the animals, while extremity are found discarded. The control of cattle (in itself a sign of wealth and probably a raiding target in common warfare in Gaul), meat production and redistribution in oppida, taking the form of veritable roofed halls as in Corent, was probably an important social display and political device in redistributing it to an extended domesticity and clientele in par with wine consumption.
When Caesar requested and requisitioned supply for his armies, thus, he wasn't much (at least in most of Celtic Gaul, as this social and political development is less observable in some peripheral regions, especially in Northernmost Gaul) going from village-to-village but requested from allies or submitted peoples for their logistical support, effectively a tribute (which would be formalized as stipendium after -52, in order to supply the Roman garrisons, themselves often set on or nearby oppida).
Caesar is requiring peoples (i.e; polities) to give him supplies, troops and hostages; which would be hard to do if they didn't already had the means to manage that at this scale which we otherwise know they did for fiscal, military and diplomatic matters down having made censes and filing (which Caesar probably used for both estimating Gaulish numbers in battle, but probably establishing a tribute as well). Interestingly the Trinovantes' supply spare Caesar's troops of starvation in Britain, while this particular danger was less of a threat in Gaul, maybe due to better connection and dominance over Gaulish polities.
It's hard to tell how much Romans took from Gauls and how much did it impact local consumption in a first time. Caesar doesn't really mentions it, not only because it's not the point of his commentaries, but also because he likely let peoples dealing with it directly when it was possible : he had requirements, up to these to met them. Of course, it doesn't mean that these requisitions were fairly applied (depending on the circumstances, some families, especially rooted in anti-Roman factions, might have payed a lot) but it seems to have generally took the form of at least formal "agreements" if imposed (DBG III, 7; with people being "delegated" to require supplies out of Aremorican peoples). While certainly humiliating, and a breech of "sovereignity", there's no evidence for starvation or feeding stress in Gaul in the first half of the Gallic Wars.
Interestingly, peoples with less complex social structures and arguably less agriculturally productive in northernmost Gaul seemingly were both more resilient to Roman occupation (such as Morini, Eburones, etc.) but also suffered most from Roman counter-guerilla and counter-little wars tactics : Caesar do not shy away to describes how he ravaged the territory and took what he could (less for supplies themselves than to deprive them to his ennemies), with archeological evidence for lasting depopulation.
What's much more agreed on is that by the mid-50's, an important drought befallen on Gaul for years : renew of troubles in Gaul in -54, after a brief respite, are certainly to be correlated with a significant decline of food production and limited supplies (especially among peoples harshly defeated and tributarized by Romans). Accumulating years of poor harvests and increasing demands from Romans to quell revolts and garrisoning the territory (DBG VI, 44) taking care to gather hostages and supplies in fortified places (DBG, VIII, 55), this most probably played a major role in the revolts of the second half of the Gallic Wars, with roman merchants in Cenuanum or Novodonium being possibly specially targeted as being responsible of Roman supplies management and thus having an important role in the requisition and food stress.
The Roman garrisons being dependent on Gaulish supplies and maintained lines, Vercingetorix adopted harsh tactics of scortched earth, guerilla and little war; depriving Caesar out of supplies either to "force" him fixing his troops to harass them, having them exhausting themselves in siege warfare (which failed at Avaricum, succeeded at Gerovia, and eventually failed at Alesia).
Eventually, if the requisitions were certainly harsh and even dramatic in a context of severe drought, Caesar wasn't much interested on the consequences : while he certainly did not plunder Gaul for the principle (which doesn't mean he did not, as well as other families, immensely benefited from the conquest), he took what he needed to feed and supplies garrisons in Gaul eventually formalizing it in -51 as an owed tribute for most of Gaulish peoples, except more or less loyal allies (including peoples having joined with Vercingetorix as Aedui or Bituriges, but whose importance and presence of strong pro Roman factions factored in).