A draft declaration by Ludwig Beck in the event that the coup succeeded explicitly stated that the concentration camps would be shut, but even for purely practical reasons it's unlikely that they would have been allowed to continue operating. Part of the coup plan involved pre-emptively disarming the SS to ensure that they wouldn't pose a threat. In Prague, occupied France and Vienna on the 20th of July, SS and Nazi party functionaries were arrested by the Wehrmacht commanders. The order came through to France that Field Marshal von Kluge should 'eliminate the SD'. 1200 Gestapo and SS members were arrested by the Paris garrison without a shot being fired. While no orders were issued on the day of the coup to occupy the camps or arrest the SS who ran them, it is unlikely that the plotters would have allowed armed SS units to continue operating had the coup been successful.

It's important to note as well that by July 1944, a large part of the holocaust had already happened. All of the killings which took place on Russian soil happened before this point, and the gas chambers at Auschwitz ceased operation on November the 25th. While massacres were still taking place, most of the large scale killings which characterised the Holocaust had already happened by the time the coup took place.

While the operation of the camps would have stopped (at least temporarily) purely for practical reasons, this leads us on to one of the most controversial aspects of the historiography of the plotters. Namely: how much did they know about the Holocaust, how early did they know about it and how involved were they?

It's important to note that the resistance was composed of individuals. There was no decided upon 'policy' which spoke for all of them. Plans for the post-coup order were constantly revised and discussions of how Germany would look if they succeeded were more of an exercise in boredom by the civilian members of the resistance than the drawing up of a coherent policy plan. Some members of the resistance (such as General Lahousen, head of Abwehr Counter-Sabotage) were committed anti-Nazis from the start. Some (von Stauffenberg) were initially warm towards the party but turned against it when the course of the war began to turn. Some (Artur Nebe) were Nazis who were only in it to save their own skin. Each member had their own reasons for resisting and each had their own views towards German policy. Some members of the resistance, von Stauffenberg among them, held anti-semitic views, although not as extreme as those of Hitler. Many of the members were conservative noblemen.

There were three major groups who carried out the largest amount of resistance work between them. The first of these was the leadership of the Abwehr, the military intelligence unit. Admiral Canaris, the head for most of the war, was an ardent anti-Nazi who would be executed for his membership of the resistance, although he was unaware of the assassination attempt until it had already happened. Many of his section heads including Hans Oster, Erwin Lahousen, Georg Hansen and Freytag-Loringhoven were members of the resistance as well. The Abwehr, being an intelligence agency, was in a good position to be obstructive to the Nazis. They ignored a number of what they viewed as criminal orders and protested in the strongest terms against Nazi policy in the east. Canaris protested against the proposed executions of the Polish clergy, saying that "one day the world will hold the Wehrmacht responsible". The Abwehr heads issued a collective protest against the Commissar Order, which ordered German soldiers to execute any Communist Political Officers they captured. Hans von Dohnanyi, a junior officer, is one of the only resistance members to be honoured by Yad Vashem as Righteous Among Nations for his involvement in Operation Seven, where he smuggled 13 Jews into Switzerland disguised as Abwehr agents.

The second major group was in the staff of the Replacement/Home Army, which was responsible for training units and garrisons within the borders of Germany itself. This was where von Stauffenberg did his work, and where the impetus for the 20th July plot happened. Apart from the plot itself, this group was unable to take much action either against the Holocaust or against the Nazi party.

It is the third major group which was the most active in trying to kill Hitler, and the most controversial. This was the plotters on the General staff of Army Group Centre. Twice, they would manage to have a live, armed, explosive device within range of Hitler. The first of these was a device smuggled onto Hitler's plane disguised as a package of Brandy. The second was at a display of captured Russian equipment where Rudolf Christoph von Gersdorff was wearing a suicide belt. Hitler left before the bomb went off and von Gersdorff had to hurriedly disarm it.

For many decades, the resistance was portrayed in a relatively positive light. While historians acknowledged that some of the plotters were initially supporters of the Nazis or displayed anti-semitic views, they were relatively positive. This was helped by the fact that most of the knowledge of the plot came from accounts from the surviving resistors, which historians treated relatively uncritically. There was also a political motive, as western historians tried to play down the impact and size of the communist resistance to discredit East Germany. The idea that there had been some non-Nazi Wehrmacht officers was also important for the rehabilitation of the West Germany army.

However, at the end of the 20th Century, new research appeared which cast doubt on the claims that the resistance, particularly the resistance in Army Group Centre, were as innocent as they seemed. Christian Gerlach, who published the first revisionist account, noted that Belarus, which fell under Army Group Centre's area of responsibility, lost 20% of its population during the war. Gerlach also noted that most accounts treated the resistors as if they were "on permanent leave". The three major conspirators, Henning von Tresckow, Fabian von Schlabrendorff and Rudolf Christoph von Gerlach, were staff officers at the highest level. Von Tresckow was the Chief of Staff, von Gersdorff the Intelligence Officer.

The traditional account maintains that the officers in Army Group Centre knew nothing, or very little, about the killings until they witnessed the murder of 7000 Jews at Borrisow in late October 1941. Gerlach demonstrated this to be untrue. This was supported by an article from Johannes Hurter who found documents which showed that von Gersdorff was aware of the killings as early as the 16th of July.

The most damaging part of the story for the generally accepted history of the resistance is that these documents were written by one Artur Nebe (mentioned above), who was also a member of the resistance. As head of the Criminal Police, it was his responsibility to kill Himmler should the plot go ahead. What most of the accounts of the resistance fail to mention is that Artur Nebe was also the commander of Einsatzgruppe B, which was responsible for the murder of 45,467 Jews.

Other members of the resistance were aware of this, although there is some evidence that Nebe understated the numbers in reports he sent to Army Group Centre. Despite this, Fabian von Schlabrendorff said that "‘under the mask of the SS leader lurked a committed anti-Nazi … who invented a thousand pretexts for sabotaging Hitler’s murderous orders". He goes on to claim that the pair of them saved many Jewish lives together. There is no evidence for this at all.

While many members of the resistance were opposed to the Holocaust, at least one was actively involved in carrying it out. The Army Group Centre plotters did convince their commander to protest to Hitler about the Commissar Order, but between that protest and them actively plotting, there is a significant and worrying gap of several months where they were aware of, and facilitated the execution of, the holocaust.

Naturally, this doesn't mean that they would have been in favour of continuing the Holocaust had the plot succeeded. After they decided to kill Hitler there are records of them condemning the Holocaust. Axel von dem Bussche, who was the planned assassin of Hitler at a display of new uniforms which was then cancelled, was directly inspired to resistance when he witnessed a massacre at Dubno airfield.

I realise I've gone on a bit of a tangent here, but I thought it necessary to demonstrate that while the resistance would have halted what was left of the Holocaust if the plot had succeeded, they had already been complicit in it for a number of years.

Edit: I've just read the question again and realised I didn't cover the resistance plans for surrender. Even as late as 1944, the resistance were still hopeful that they'd be able to keep on to some of their conquests from the early years of the war through a negotiated peace with the West. This was a pipe dream, as the Allies were committed to unconditional surrender already. While it's impossible to know what would have happened if the plot had succeeded, the policy of the western Allies in 1944 was no armistice, no negotiation; unconditional surrender was the only thing they would have, and did, accept.

Sources:

Christian Gerlach, "Men of 20 July and the War in the Soviet Union", in War of extermination: the German military in World War II, 1941-1944. eds. Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (New York: Berghahn, 2000), pp. 127-46.

Johannes Hürter, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Militäropposition. Tresckow, Gersdorff, der Vernichtungskrieg und der Judenmord. Neue Dokumente über das Verhältnis der Heeresgruppe Mitte zur Einsatzgruppe B im Jahr 1941’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol.52 No.3 (July 2004), pp. 527-562.

Hoffmann, Peter, History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996).

The short version is that they intended to stop the mass-killing of Jews that was still going on but their further plans are unclear and a lot points to them not planning to restore civil rights for Jews or similar measures.

The first thing that is important with regards to this question is the time line of the Holocaust: By July 1944 the vast majority of the victims of the Holocaust had already been murdered. The organized mass murder of Europe's Jews and Roma, Sinti and others classified as "gypsies" happened in several phases that don't happen exactly consecutively but overlap for some time and can be roughly sketched out as: The Einsatzgruppen killings in the Soviet Union – also known as the Holocaust by bullets –, the Operation Reinhard Death Camps where the vast majority of Jews from Eastern Euurope were murdered, and the Auschwitz-Birkenau mass killing in gas chambers. The Einsatzgruppen kililngs as well as Operation Reinhard had long since finished by July 1944 with most victims of the Holocaust having been killed in the span of a couple of months during 1942. While some of the Aktion Rienhard Campüs reopened because of Auschwitz-Birkenau exceeding its capacities in 1944, by the end of 1943 their operation had ended and their location covered up.

In July of 1944 one last nad massive wave of mass-killing was underway: The deportation and murder of Hungarian Jews. Because the Horthy Regime in Budapest regarded the war as lost and made overtures to the Western Allies in the beginning of 1944, the Germans decided to occupy Hungary in March 1944. While Hungary had previously participated in a variety of persecutory measures against Hungarian Jews and especially non-Hungarian Jews in various occupied territories, the regime in Budapest had largely held out on deporting Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz and other camps. When the Germans occupied the country in March of 1944, they brought their "deportation experts" like Eichmann along to organize the killing of the Jews of Hungary. And they indeed were experts: Starting in March in the provinces outside of Budapest, by July 9 1944 the Germans had deported about half a million Jews from Hungary. There still were about 200.000 Jews in Budapest with Western powers as well as neutral countries making an effort to save them from deportation to Birkenau.

The point, however, is that by the time the July 20 group executed their plan, the overwhelming majority of victims of the Holocaust were dead – killed in part by the very same people who as part of that group tried the coup against Hitler. A lot of ink has been spilled over things like Stauffenberg's 1939 to his wife where he wrote about Poland: "The population is a rabble, lots of Jews, lots of race-mixing. It's a people that feels happiest when under somebody's heel.". While such things point very clearly to an anti-semitic attitude and at least a certain nonchalance of the conspirators towards the regime's policy on Jews, it's really the presence of people like Arthur Nebe in the July 20 group that exemplifies how little of a role anti-Jeiwsh policies played in their thinking.

Nebe in his post as head of the Reich criminal police went to the Soviet Union in 1941 to command one of the previously mentioned Einsatzgruppen. Under Nebe's command Einsatzgruppe B murdered about 45.000 people in Belarus where he also was one of the people leading development of methods of mass killing by gas and other means. He would later also be largely responsible for the so-called Stalag Luft murders where Western POWs who had attempted escape were executed. Nebe was a mass-murderer and leading trerchnician in a very literal sense of the Holocaust. That the rest of the July 20 plotters approached him in the first place and planned for him to have a place in their version of post-war Germany shows at least they didn't pay much consideration to anti-Jewish, genocide policy. For the July 20 plot he worked together with Kurt Gerstein who could later show that it was being appaled at the mass-murder of Jews because he had witnessed a mass-killin in Minsk that had been organized and orchestrated by Nebe.

As for others, historians like Michael Dipper have argued forcefully that Goerdeler, Beck and others had no intention of restoring civil rights to Jews – or what remained of Jews in the territories they planned on keeping. In his essay Der deutsche Widerstand und die Juden (German resistance and the Jews), which you can read here, Dipper points to a variety of Goerdeler's writing that shows that not only did he know about the Holocaust as early as the summer of 1941 but also that he discusses it almost solely in terms of being a catastrophe for Germany's foreign relations vis-á-vis the Western allies and therefore must never be discussed openly. Goerdeler writes clearly in one of his declaration penned shortly before the planned assassination and supposed to formulate new policy that the persecution of Jews is ended immediately. In another declaration written three years earlier and around a time when he already knew about the Holocaust, Goerdeler wrote that after Hitler had been removed it fell to them to design the Jewish Ghettos in a "more humane" way which among other things points to a planned continution of discriminatory measures.

In the end, by the time the plotters executed their attempted removal of Hitler, the Holocaust was mostly over and while they agreed on stopping the killing, the killers were among them and it was not exyactly uncontroversial to continue with anti-semitic discriminatory measures. Lastly, while always hard to determine what would have happened, it's seems very unlikely that their plans for a seperate peace with the Western Allies could have succeeded in light of the staunch position of the Western Allies for an unconditional surrender and the still holding unity among the Allies.