We cannot talk about the success of Nasser’s economic policies without defining what metrics we are using and what perspective we are choosing. 

On a microeconomic level, there were a few groups for whom the reforms were a qualified success. As Relli Shechter has shown, Nasser’s movement was a [Muslim] middle class movement, and this group was, although not directly stated, the main target of the reforms. 

Nasser’s self-styled socialism, Arab Socialism, meant some real income growth for them. He instituted, among other pro-labor policies, minimum wages, overtime bans to encourage new hires, mandatory retirements and forced price cuts. All of it meant more disposable income for average workers, with the white collar Egyptian benefitting the most.  There was also a general empowerment of the worker vis-a-vis management--for example a member elected by the workers sat on most board--the sum total of those policies led to greater employment permanence. This is not to mention the fact that the Nasser government nationalized most of the private sector. This nationalization, which fell heavily on non-Muslim and foreign populations, forced out most of the non-Muslims from the executive downward and opened many more positions for Muslim white-collar workers.

Likewise, the land reform package, although ostensibly targeted and large and medium land owners, also helped the rural middle class. It’s policies, land confiscation and redistribution over a certain acreage, did strike at the landed elite and even some of the middle class, but it was that same middle class that came to dominate the new rural bureaucracy that was created to implement and support the policy. For example, they became heads of rural cooperatives and other government intermediaries in rural locales.

Also benefiting from Nasser’s policies were economic nationalists, those who believed that the Egyptian economy should be controlled by “Egyptians,” meaning Muslims native to the country. 

The nationalization of the private sector heavily targeted foreign and non-Muslim populations. Part of that was due to demographics, the private industrial sector was the main employment venue for non-Muslims and foriegn residents. But a larger part was due to the ideological underpinnings of nationalization. Nasser portrayed it as an open declaration of war on foreign and “compradorial” elements, i.e. local collaborators, within Egypt that had stifled the development of the country (Malak Zaalouk, Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The rise of the new Bourgeoisie (London: Zed Books, 1989),33, 35; For discussion of the term comprador see Robert Vitalis, “On the Theory and Practice of Compradors: The Role of ʿAbbud Pasha in the Egyptian Political Economy,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 22(1990): 291-315).  It was quite easy in a country that was just escaping colonialism, to justify the expulsion of the British, French, or any other Western affiliated person or company in the name of the better of the country.  However, the adversarial attitude meant that the loyalty and even the Egyptian citizenship of non-Muslims was frequently questioned or outright denied. Once deemed non-citizens, foreigners, they became rightful targets for the freezing or nationalization of their assets.  

This is how the Jewish community of Egypt was slowly forced out. It was exceedingly hard for Jewish residents of Egypt, who have lived in the country for decades if not longer, to gain citizenship. They were swept up in the jingoistic policies of the Nasser government. A similar thing happened to the Greek, Italian, and Armenian communities. The Copts avoided the fate of expulsion, but their loyalty was often under question. 

A similar demonization could happen with elite Muslim Egyptians, although they did not lose their citizenship, they could lose everything else.

The upshot being that middle class Muslim Egyptians could now fill these vacated spots in the newly public ventures.