I’m a lover of history especially you combat history as I call it. I focus more on the American Civil War era but the second world war is also an era of world history that I love. Now we all know about operation overlord better known as DJ. The landing on June 6, 1944 which resulted in the opening of the Western front in the second world war on continental Europe. We also know that this was a success. Although the time this wasn’t necessarily the case.
Later on in the conflict we are told that the British general Bernard Montgomery hatched an idea to undergo an operation that in his mind could’ve ended The war by a total of at least six months in his mind. This of course was the operation which came to be known as operation market Garden. However as the history books say market garden was an unmitigated disaster. Thousands of paratroopers or killed and hundreds more heartache and prisoner. Vehicles and other things are destroyed or even left behind. Yet what caused this disaster?
And was it really as big of a disaster as it is usually depicted in things like documentaries, films and other media?
Was it even a plan that could’ve ever worked at all or was it simply general Montgomery trying to put himself in the history books?
Operation Market Garden, and the recriminations which have since dogged historical interpretations of it, is a highly contentious and complicated issue. I'll try my best to work my way through it and answer your question. I'll split my answer into sections to do so.
The Situation prior to Market Garden
As you note, the Normandy landings were a success, although the subsequent attritional warfare that followed them until the opening of Operation Cobra was not in line with the operational plans prior to the 6th of June.
It should also be remembered, as this is especially important from the British perspective, that whilst casualties on the 6th had been substantially lower than anticipated, they had been significantly higher afterwards. Materially, this wasn't an issue, since for example many of the tank losses sustained during Operations Goodwood or Epsom were replaced on the same day (or very soon afterwards) from vehicle pools in France. The main issue was the high losses in men. The American 4th Infantry Division, for example, lost 5400 men & received 4400 replacements in the month to 6th July; General Barton remarked that "We no longer have the division we brought ashore " (Beevor, 242). These numbers would rise to 7876 and 6663 respectively by the 16th of July. The British suffered just as badly; 50th Northumbrian Infantry Division, for example, would be broken up in November 1944 due to manpower shortages. Anti-Air units in the British army, which were effectively redundant due to Allied Airpower, were also broken up to provide drafts for the infantry, which suffered disproportionately; the Americans, for example, found that whilst they formed only 14% of overseas servicemen, they suffered 70% of all casualties, rising to 85% in Normandy (Beevor, 258). The huge losses in infantry led to the preponderance in armour in the Commonwealth forces in the theatre, which was especially true of the Canadians. The problems of this are apparent in the issues with clearing the Scheldt, although it should be noted that this was also partly Montgomery's fault.
Finally, before i continue, the supply issue should be noted. By the time that Market Garden began, the Allied supply lines were stretched to breaking point. Patton's army was running out of fuel down near Metz, which gave the Germans enough time to fortify the Siegfried Line. A large part of the blame lies with Montgomery; whilst he made a grand gesture liberating Anterwp, he ignored the Royal Navy's advice that it was unusable without the Scheldt estuary. This would become a costly operation that was given to the Canadian 1st Army. Until then the Allied supply line, maintained by the 'Red Ball' express of American trucks, could only support one thrust; north, into the Netherlands and Northern Germany, or south, through the Siegfried Line into Southern Germany.
The Plan
Montgomery's plan was simple, at least on paper. The paratroop units of the Allied Airborne Army, minus the British 6th Airborne division (still recovering from Normandy), would seize 3 Rhine crossings- Eindhoven, Nijmagen and Arnhem, in that order- and hold them. The British 30th Corps would drive up the single road available to them, clearing it of Germans and then swinging past the Hurtgen Forest and the Siegfried line (both pinning the Americans in place), enabling the allies to push on for Berlin and end the war by Christmas. The airborne phase would be referred to as Market, whilst the conventional phase was Garden. Despite Patton's complaints, Eisenhower approved the operation.
Was the plan reckless? Yes. Many officers at the time commented on the poor planning, especially when compared to D-Day (sorry, I cant find my copy of Beevor's 'Arnhem' at the moment to give you the quote he cites). It was also planned in a comparative flash- two or three weeks if memory serves me correctly; although it should be noted several plans to use airborne forces had been cancelled last minute due to the quick advance of Allied armour, so the operation was almost conceived on the trot and ran with. It was also, to a degree, operationally ambiguous; there was talk, for instance, of the British 1st Airborne Division securing an airfield near Arnhem which would enable the Airlanding 52nd Lowland Division to be flown in as a support unit. It should be remembered, however, that the British army was being bled dry slowly; the manpower reserves were simply no longer there after almost 5 years of war, and the Americans mobilised a comparative fraction of their population and wouldn't reach their peak strength in the theatre for months. Questions have also been asked, especially in recent times, about the condition of the 1st Airborne Division, although in the circumstances I believe they performed well. Faulty intelligence also played a huge role; the American 82nd Division, for example, and the fiasco regarding the Reichswald and the 1000 hidden panzers (more than the total strength in the West) is probably the best example of how ridiculously bad Allied intelligence was for the Operation, but more serious issues are apparent in their failure to identify the presence of the 9th and 10th SS divisions. [Side not, TIK does a good video on the Reichswald panzers if you are interested in that].
Was Montgomery trying to get his name in the history books? No, i do not believe he was. Don't get me wrong, he was an egotistical, arrogant man who was respected, rather than liked, by his staff. But he had already cemented his position, by this point, as one of Britain's foremost military commanders ever. Churchill had recently made him Field Marshall (in response to Eisenhower's assumption of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, admittedly), but this should not be viewed as undeserved; his work in the build up to D-Day, as well as in Italy and the Western Desert, should be viewed with admiration. But he faced a huge issue in the last summer, early Autumn of 1944. His army was slowly loosing combat effectiveness, and soon the disparity in forces would reach the point that his 21st Army Group was relegated to a supporting role in the campaign. The Germany army in the west, so comprehensively shattered at the Falaise pocket, was starting to regain its strength. He had to do something, and he had to do it soon.
continued below.