The question of "Jewish homeland" Zionism is not as clear-cut as one might expect. The movement that advocated for a shared homeland of sorts that I think you're getting at is a binational state, which was viewed as likely to have Arab leadership while Jews would have a cultural national home in the area.

This is distinct from the mainstream Zionist movement, which sought a Jewish state that contained full minority rights for Arabs (at the time, Jews too were considered Palestinians; I explain that term for precision). This is exemplified well by Ben-Gurion's evident belief that conflict might come, but that the Arab population could still be convinced to work with and benefit from Jewish leadership. Thus, Ben-Gurion in 1938 told the Jewish Agency Executive that a partition should eventually be expanded through Arab-Jewish agreement to the whole of the Mandate. When asked if this would be by force, Ben-Gurion said:

Through mutual understanding and Jewish-Arab agreement. So long as we are weak and few the Arabs have neither the need nor the interest to conclude an alliance with us. So long as it would seem to the Arabs that they can stop our growth and leave us as a small minority - they will try to do so...Only when we become a major power - and the [establishment of a Jewish] state will help this more than anything else - will the Arabs recognize the need to reach an agreement with us. And since the state is only a stage in the realization of Zionism and it must prepare the ground for our expansion throughout the whole country through Jewish-Arab agreement - we are obliged to run the state in such a way that will win us the friendship of the Arabs both within and outside the state...the Arab policy of the Jewish State must be aimed not only at full equality for the Arabs but at their cultural, social, and economic equalization, namely, at raising their standard of living to that of the Jews.

This would include "machine guns" if necessary to enforce order and security, but this was not Ben-Gurion's ideal. That, too, is what he said to the Peel Commission in 1937. However, Ben-Gurion also harbored doubts that this would work, and may have expected that demographic shifts through expulsion or fleeing Arab populations might be necessary to make a Jewish state possible. These doubts may have been less present in the early 1930s, and surfaced as the Arab Revolt continued through 1939 (albeit at a lower fervor), but they were most clear following the failures of negotiations and diplomacy following the end of WWII. By the time the UN passed the partition plan, Ben-Gurion was confident war was coming and had been preparing for quite some time.

Notably, as you mentioned, Ben-Gurion's strand of "Jewish state with minority rights" was not the only one. There was the much less popular Revisionist Zionist view, which favored expulsion at maximum and an "Iron Wall", guaranteed by a superpower defending a Jewish state's existence, at minimum, and depending on Jewish power relative to the Arab world.

The vision of a binational home with a cultural Jewish homeland, one under Ottoman or Arab rule, likewise doesn't really line up best with Ahad Ha'am's view of the world (the Cultural Zionist movement). His view, articulated shortly, was that Zionism was nothing but a distraction from the real problem. He believed that a Jewish state would make no difference to the Jewish people, because the problem was a spiritual one. A focus on material gain, like that of statehood through Zionism, would mask the problem and lead to "a state of Germans or Frenchmen of the Jewish race", which he believed the Zionist movement was already playing out in what became Israel. However, even Ahad Ha'am (whose beliefs were unpopular, unlike the man, who was quite popular) did not necessarily oppose a state. Instead, he believed that through a spiritual revival of Jewish values a Jewish state might eventually be established, but not before.

Among the better-known binationalist thinkers is Judah Leon Magnes, who called for a binational plan in 1930 (following Arab riots in 1929). His views appear to have existed prior, but were likely spurred by the violence. He'd moved to the Mandate in 1922, and lived there til his death in 1948, having seen the state of Israel established 5 months before his death. But in 1930, Magnes wrote in a way reminiscent of binationalist thinkers to follow. He spoke of the fact that the Jew "will not abandon the Land of Israel", reiterating that the Jew "cannot abandon it". But he also said that Jews would not be able to hold the land should they try, that their spirits would rebel against it and the violence would be great from Arabs, and also that the British would not allow it either, so he called instead for a binational state with a cultural homeland. Needless to say, with the backdrop of Arab riots in 1920, 1921, and 1929, and many of them premised on fighting against the Jewish presence and Jewish immigration, Magnes's views struggled to find a foothold. Binational peace seemed unlikely to most Jews, and his fears (of spiritual inability, framed as a lack of fortitude to succeed, as well as the British/violence) were dismissed as incorrect or insufficient to stop the Jewish movement for a state. Magnes's views were eventually, in that sense, proven wrong; violence did not defeat the movement for a Jewish state, the British did not either, and Jewish souls did not rebel against it.

However, Magnes's views were echoed by perhaps the most famous binationalist, Martin Buber, in 1939 and earlier (Magnes, and others, were his disciples of sorts). In his letter to Gandhi in 1939, Buber took issue with Gandhi's claim that "Palestine belongs to the Arabs", pointing to the long Jewish presence and connection with the land, and also calling it Gandhi's attempt to "settle the whole existential dilemma with [a] simple formula" that would not work and was not correct. But while he said this, and said that Jews would gladly work and create their own life, he also reiterated his belief that "We have no desire to dispossess [the Arabs]: we want to live with them. We do not want to dominate them: we want to serve with them." Buber believed, in essence, that a Jewish state would eventually topple, be it by spiritual bankruptness or by military defeat, saying "The might of battalions is decisive only temporarily." Buber had, in essence, likewise been pessimistic that Jews would be able to establish a state, and believed that any such state would be a waypoint towards binationalism. He recounted a tale of a shopkeeper, who told him not long after the victory in 1948, "An utter political rout like the oneyour circle suffered is no common thing...It looks as if you’ll have to face the facts and resign yourselves to total silence for the time being". Buber's response was somewhat semantic. He argued that Zion had not come, because the Jewish state would not be binational and reflect values he believed were integral to any true Zionist (i.e. someone seeking to reestablish Zion). Instead, he said, "[The] day will yet come when the victorious march of which our people is so proud today will seem to us like a cruel detour."

Continued in a comment reply to myself below.