So, from my understanding, the air forces that were sent to attack Pearl Harbor were sent out from various aircraft carriers in the vicinity, such as the IJN Akagi and IJN Kaga, northwest of Hawaii.
These ships would have had to have traveled deep into what is, internationally, neutral water, but in the eyes of The USA, is within their sphere of influence of The Pacific Ocean.
Sending multiple aircraft carriers and other vessels would've been seen as a serious incursion, and one that isn't likely to be overlooked or unnoticed.
Secondly, the Imperial Japanese Navy didn't ever attempt a marine landing on Hawaii, due to supply range issues. So, wouldn't the same supply issues that prevented an amphibious assault on Hawaii also have prevented The Pearl Harbor Attacks.
So, simply put, my question is, how did the Japanese Empire outfit a fleet with enough fuel and supplies to not only launch an attack against Hawaii, but do it with the utmost secrecy and surprise?
The Northern Pacific is BIG, like BIG BIG, and empty as shit. Its not non any of the useful direct shipping lanes to anywhere, so ship traffic can often be low or non-existent. You could literally drop the lower 48 states in the North Pacific and it would be a while before anyone comes across them. Of course today the area has a new occupant in the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, but thats another story.
So the first part of the equation is that the IJN intentionally selected a route that would take them away from prying eyes, outside the search range of US bases like Guam, or Midway, on their approach to Hawaii. Then by launching in the predawn darkness, they could maximize their chances that they would have their strike package in the air before the risk of being spotted by any aircraft from Hawaii got too high.
This as it turns out was not that large a worry as for months US commanders in Hawaii had been dealing with an acute shortage of flying boats, and other long range patrol aircraft, which also had to be rationed across the Pacific.
While on the supply question, just getting Kido Butai off Oahu was no easy task, but it in itself was mostly a question of fuel, having enough feet oilers to support it, and working on new methods of UNREP(underway replenishment) to ensure the warships could fill up. A very complex series of exercises yes, and one that taxed the Japanese navy's and marchant marine to the limit when coupled with the drive South requirng other task forces and support in SE Asia. It was also one they certainly respected as a challenge, in the summer of 1941 various other ideas were floated including abandoning some of the escorting destroyers or even 1 of the 6 carriers on the way back after it ran out of fuel!
But thats very different from trying to get a Corps sized formation of maybe 50-75k men ashore, with all their gear, and to keep them fighting, and in the long term to provide replacements, keep them from starving if unable to pillage what they need locally, and continue a steady stream of ships to and from indefinitley. A raid by your navy isnt in danger of running out of food halfway through, or being unable to retreat if they get low on ammo, an army ashore faces much greater challenges in that regard.
Even had the Army been willing to commit that many men to an operation, it would have required diversion of transports and merchant ships from supporting the drives against the Malaysian Peninsula and Singapore, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies, whose natural resources were so central to Japan's decision to expand the war when and how it did.
If you are interested in a deeper dive, the authors Anthony Tully and Jonathan Parshall(both leading Pacific War historians) on their website Combined Fleet, have actually broken down this question, including looking at how it changes if it was to be after a Japanese victory at Midway. http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm