Scapa Flow had several problems that made it less suitable as a fleet base in the Cold War. Firstly was the general lack of amenities. Scapa, in the Orkneys, had few repair facilities, little accommodation and practically nowhere for rest and recreation. This meant that the Royal Navy only made significant use of it in times of war. In peacetime, it was only rarely visited. Maintaining a base that was so remote was expensive, and the RN was unwilling to spend so much on a base it almost never used. The post-war period was a time of defence cuts, and the RN preferred to spend its limited resources elsewhere. Secondly, we have to consider why Scapa was chosen in the first place. Scapa was well-positioned to counter German moves. It was well-positioned to dominate the North Sea, with a fleet based there able to rapidly respond to sortie from the main German base at Wilhelmshaven or from the exits to the Kiel Canal. In the Second World War, it had an added advantage of being well out of range of German air bases. In the Cold War, the threat to Britain looked very different. The main enemy was the Soviets, who did not have easy access to the North Sea; Wilhelmshaven and Kiel were under NATO control. Instead, the perceived threat was to the shipping lanes Britain depended upon. These were better defended by bases further south, closer to Britain's main ports. Scapa was closer to the likely approach of Soviet bombers, and hence harder to defend. It was a poor base for offensive operations against the Soviet coastline, being so exposed. These two factors - the lack of resources and the lack of justification - led to the base being closed down in 1959.