While cited fairly regularly, some claim these articles are incorrect and distort history. How true is this?
Part 1.
The Guardian:
In late 1943, thought to be the peak of the famine, rain levels were above average, said the study published in February in the journal Geophysical Research Letters.
Al Jazeera:
The study found that the famine affected region received above normal precipitation between June and September of 1943.
The key year in terms of rainfall for the 1943 Bengal famine is 1942 which should be blatantly obvious since the famine started in May 1943 as such the shortage of food result in said deaths must pre date that and the only harvest capable of doing so is the 1942 Aman harvest which records show was down.
Next The Guardian:
Mukerjee has presented evidence the cabinet was warned repeatedly that the exhaustive use of Indian resources for the war effort could result in famine, but it opted to continue exporting rice from India to elsewhere in the empire.
India did seem to export rice and wheat from India during 1943, an export which was seemingly stopped in July.
The quantity? 91,000 tons from a country producing 50 million tons and more. Amery suggested, in line with Mukerjee's maths, the figure was 60/70 million tons.
The export represented a tiny fraction, not even a single percentage, of India's production.[1]
And I speak, not as one interested in bureaucracy, but as one interested in facts. The actual facts with regard to export are that in the first seven months of 1943 only 21,000 tons of wheat and 70,000 tons of rice were exported to Ceylon, the Persian Gulf or the Arabian ports.
Of course, those are comparatively small figures. And it was officially denied on behalf of the Government of India that there had been this alleged export of 300,000 tons of rice from Bengal to other parts.
The food was exported to Ceylon(under huge famine risk due to Burma falling), Middle East (another famine risk), and North Africa which might’ve been intended for Greece (experiencing a famine larger relatively than the one happening in India).
This export was however countered by a significant increase in imports, largely Australian wheat.
Next The Guardian:
Rice stocks continued to leave India even as London was denying urgent requests from India’s viceroy for more than 1m tonnes of emergency wheat supplies in 1942-43.
Any request made for Bengal prior to December 1942 would have been folly and unrealistic since information about the harvest can’t be gathered because it has yet to be complete. Even then the initial figures would prove to be unrealistic, as such the request was most likely not for Bengal but another province, which didn’t experience famine.
Next The Guardian:
Churchill has been quoted as blaming the famine on the fact Indians were “breeding like rabbits”
Al Jazeera:
Churchill was quoted as blaming the famine on the fact Indians were "breeding like rabbits"
Nope, here’s what he ACTUALLY said [2]:
I did not press for India’s demand for 50,000 tons a month for 12 months but concentrated on asking for 150,000 tons over December, January and February. Winston, after a preliminary flourish on Indians breeding like rabbits and being paid a million a day for doing nothing, asked Leathers or his view.
He said he could manage 50,000 tons in January and February (1944). Winston agreed with this and I had to be content. I raised a point that Canada had telegraphed to say a ship was ready to load on the 12th and they proposed to fill it with wheat (for India). Leathers and Winston were vehement against this.
He wasn’t blaming them, and he did agree to send aid which was sent and the articles makes no mention of.
Amery also technically wasn’t quoting Churchill however to be fair the version quoted may differ and considering the strange turn of phrase used let's accept that Churchill said ‘breeding like rabbits and being paid a million a day for nothing’. However, it is also true that he sent aid. Something not mentioned.
Next The Guardian:
and asking how, if the shortages were so bad, Mahatma Gandhi was still alive.
Al Jazeera:
and asking how, if the shortages were so bad, Mahatma Gandhi was still alive.
Nope, he never did, this is a common misconception Gandhi was released from prison on the grounds of ill health under the understanding that politics was out of the question (Britain wanted to avoid looking bad by him dying in prison), Gandhi in 1944 not long after being released returned to politics and started to spread misleading information to undermine Britain and Wavell causing Churchill to send a telegram asking how come Gandhi has returned to politics.
Here is the said telegram [3]:
Surely Mr Gandhi has made a most remarkable recovery as he is already able to take an active part in politics. How does this square with medical reports upon which his release on grounds of ill-health was agreed to by us? In one of these we were told that he would not be able to take any part in politics again.
Gandhi had nothing to do with the Bengal famine, nor was he even in the region (as far as I could find he was still in Poona).
Next The Guardian:
Mukerjee and others also point to Britain’s “denial policy” in the region, in which huge supplies of rice and thousands of boats were confiscated from coastal areas of Bengal in order to deny resources to the Japanese army in case of a future invasion.
Again we see, they are using words but not specifying quantities.
This denial policy saw the purchase of rice at or above market value from regions with surplus above demand to prevent Japanese invasion. The total quantity officially purchased was 40,000 tons. Bengal produced nearly 10,000,000 tons.
There is no evidence that the denial of rice led anywhere to a physical shortage. To quote the FIC pg 26:
There is no evidence to show that the purchases led anywhere to physical scarcity.
The total number of boats meeting the criteria for denialism was 66,563, the amount destroyed or claimed by the military was 4,986. The Bengal government, not Britain, and especially not Churchill improperly cared for the boats in storage leading to issues.
Next The Guardian:
During a famine in Bihar in 1873-74, the local government led by Sir Richard Temple responded swiftly by importing food and enacting welfare programmes to assist the poor to purchase food.
Almost nobody died, but Temple was severely criticised by British authorities for spending so much money on the response. In response, he reduced the scale of subsequent famine responses in south and western India and mortality rates soared.
This part is completely irrelevant for a few key reasons:
This was half a century before the famine, it’s relevance is zero.
Famine was avoided in India for the 20th century (upto Bengal) even with the criticism of Temple.
There is no evidence presented connecting Temple to Bengal in 1943 to any extent.
Next Al Jazeera:
Additionally, it claimed that wartime grain import restrictions imposed by the British government played a significant role in the famine.
Britain didn’t stop/halt the imports of rice from Burma, Burma was conquered, Burma is the nation that exported to Bengal. Britain didn’t have many places outside of India that produced rice so where can this supposed export of rice to be halted come from?
Interprovincial trade restrictions would have been imposed by the provinces not by Britain.
To quote Sir Henry Knight [4]:
September 8 1939 - Government of India gives Provincial Governments limited powers to control necessaries of life.
November 1941 - Provincial Governments given powers to regulate production, distribution, consumption, and prices of commodities.
December 11 1941 - Punjab Legislative Assembly protests at the low price fixed for wheat.
January 1942 - Punjab bans wheat export.
June 1 1942 - Madras prohibits export of rice.
July 1 1942 - Government of Bihar prohibits export of rice.
If it was a general ban on imports that isn’t true because foodgrains were imported [5]:
Since mid-October 130,000 tons of barley have been shipped from Iraq and 80,000 tons of wheat from Australia. 10,000 tons of wheat are being shipped from Canada and another 100,000 from Australia in January and February.
If it was a specific import restriction, that did infact happen. Churchill rejected Canadian aid [6]:
I have seen the telegrams exchanged by you and the Viceroy offering 100,000 tons of wheat to India and I gratefully acknowledge the spirit which prompts Canada to make this generous gesture. Your offer is contingent however on shipment from the Pacific Coast which I regret is impossible. The only ships available to us on the Pacific Coast are the Canadian new buildings which you place at our disposal.
These are already proving inadequate to fulfil our existing high priority commitments from that area which include important timber requirements for aeroplane manufacture in the United Kingdom and quantities of nitrate from Chile to the Middle East which we return for foodstuffs for our Forces and for export to neighbouring territories, including Ceylon Even if you could make the wheat available in Eastern Canada, I should still be faced with a serious shipping question. If our strategic plans are not to suffer undue interference we must continue to scrutinise all demands for shipping with the utmost rigour. India’s need for imported wheat must be met from the nearest source, i.e. from Australia.
Wheat from Canada would take at least two months to reach India whereas it could be carried from Australia in 3 to 4 weeks. Thus apart from the delay in arrival, the cost of shipping is more than doubled by shipment from Canada instead of from Australia. In existing circumstances this uneconomical use of shipping would be indefensible.
He did so because there was a lack of shipping and Australia was closer with an abundance of supplies so the same amount of ships could carry more aid. Contd..