Well, to a certain extent it does depend on how you define 'victory', doesn't it? But lets not delve into that, and rather just talk about Japanese successes post-Midway.
At least in the Pacific, with the loss of 2/3 of the Kidō Butai at Midway, the Japanese carrier arm had suffered a devastating (but not yet lethal) blow. The following year of campaigns, from mid-1942 to the start of the US's Central Pacific counteroffensive in late 1943 are some of the more interesting battles and campaigns of the Pacific War as, unlike the earlier stages of the war, where the IJN had operated with near crushing superiority, and the latter stages, where the USN now had an overwhelming superiority, throughout late 1942 and early 1943, the Japanese and Americans fought on the closest to what could be "even terms". Much of this campaign was taken up by the Solomon Islands Campaign in the South Pacific, perhaps most famous sub-part of which was the Battle of Guadalcanal.
This particularly battle opened with what is considered a major Japanese victory at sea: the Battle of Savo Island. Elements of the Japanese 8th Fleet under Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi engaged a joint American-Australian cruiser force covering the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, and in a close quarters night action, sank 4 Allied heavy cruiser and crippled another, all for relatively light damage on their part. The engagement was a showcase of the IJN's focus on night battles and torpedo warfare, as well as benefitting a great deal from surprise due to issues in scouting and communications on the Allied side. While a major tactical victory, in the aftermath, Mikawa elected to withdraw, rather than push on to potentially attack the Allied transport fleet still lying off of Guadalcanal. In fairness to him, Mikawa was very concerned about the potential of air attacks from American carriers believed to be nearby, and did not know that the carriers had withdrawn for the time being. Regardless, Savo Island marked the beginning of a series of naval battles off of Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands that would see-saw back and forth for much of the next year.
As part of the Campaign, both sides committed their carrier forces. Despite the losses suffered at Midway, the Japanese still had the two excellent carriers of the Shōkaku class as well as an assortment of light and converted carriers, and still had a core of their elite, veteran aircrews. Two major carrier battles were fought as part of the Solomons Campaign: the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. Neither of these battles were the kind of easily identifiable "victories" like Midway, but were rather more even. The former was tilted more in the Americans favor, as they sank the light carrier Ryūjō in exchange for moderate damage to the Enterprise. The latter was much more of a Japanese victory, as in exchange for heavy damage to the Shōkaku, they sank the American carrier Hornet and heavily damaged the Enterprise. The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands left the IJN with the only real operational carrier force in the Pacific, but also inflicted enough damage on the Japanese that they were unable to really exploit their victory.
Regardless of these occasional Japanese victories, the Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands Campaigns were likely the death knell for the Imperial Japanese Navy. In both of the above carrier actions, as well as the continuous naval and aerial battles as part of the campaign, the Japanese were dragged into the kind of war that they absolutely could not win: an attritional grind. The elite corps of pre-war Japanese naval aviators that had been so effective earlier in the war, along with the crews of the IJN as a whole, were slowly ground down, unable to replace the experience crew lost. In this respect, the Solomons Campaign, rather than Midway marked the ultimate defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy as an effective fighting force, as by the time it recovered and attempted to challenge the US Navy again, the result was the Battle of the Phillippines Sea, otherwise known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, to show how far Japanese naval aviation had fallen.
However, the South Pacific was not the only area of combat during this period. In the far north, the Japanese had occupied part of the Aleutian Islands at the same time as their attack on Midway (not, as is commonly said, as a diversion from Midway). Operations in this area saw a rather interesting engagement: the Battle of the Kommandorski Islands, which was unique in being a daylight surface engagement without the involvement of aircraft. In this battle a Japanese and American cruiser force clashed to the southwest of the Aleutian Islands. Although the Japanese had the advantage, and even inflicted heavy damage on an American cruiser, the Americans wear able to withdraw, and the Japanese force--fearing the potential of air attack--also withdrew. Again, although a tactical victory, the Japanese had failed to exploit their success to potentially turn their tactical success into a strategic one.
Of course, World War II in Asia was not just the Pacific War. The Imperial Japanese Army and Navy faced a huge war on the Asian mainland as well. Unfotunately, I'm not as well read on these operations, so I'm going to be a bit more perfunctory in summation. In Burma, the Japanese defeated an Allied offensive in late 1942-early 1943, in the Arakan Campaign. Meanwhile in China, despite the war situation turning against the Japanese near universally, in 1944, the Japanese launched what was probably one of the largest land offensives in the Pacific thus far: Operation Ichi-Go. The goals of Ichi-Go were to link up different parts of Japan's holdings in China, as well as displace Allied airfields in southern China, which the Japanese feared could become a base for air attacks against the Home Islands. In this, the operation was a complete success, managing to connect their holdings in northern and southern China with occupied French Indochina, as well as driving out the US bombers based in the South. Again, despite what should have been a major victory, there was ultimately little impact on the rest of the war. Japanese naval defeats in the Pacific meant Allied bombers were able to hit the Japanese Home Islands from bases in the Marianas Islands, while--despite the Japanese victory, China was still nowhere near being knocked out of the war.
Suffice it to say that the Japansese continued to engage in effective military operations after the Battle of Midway, including some rather stunning tactical victories. Despite all this, the tide was against them, and even many of these tactical victories were strategically questionable.
Hope this serves to answer your question, and feel free to ask any follow ups.