The short answer is " India was probably not richer in Europe in general, but there are almost certainly times and places where some parts of India were better off than some parts of Europe." Claims of overwhelming disparity are almost certainly exaggerated, though - every society was relatively poor prior to the modern period, and even the richest and best organised was not very far removed from subsistence.

The long answer is that historical estimates of income are very tentative, rely on making quite heroic assumptions involving stringing together lots of sources that were not designed to be systematic, not easily aggregated, and not easily compared across regions, and then puree'ing the whole mess through a mid-20th century methodology for economic accounting that relies, among other things, on the idea that the nation state is a relevant unit of analysis. The result is a bit of a mess. But it's not clear how else to estimate historical incomes, except to rely on the qualitative assessments of historians who seldom have deep expertise in multiple disparate regions, so it's what we've got, if we want to do comparative work.

The question is made almost impossible by the counter-questions of "which European states do you mean," and "which parts of India do you mean," and "when exactly in this period are you talking about." Europe ranges from Lisbon to Arkhangelsk. India is not even a single well-defined entity at any point in this period but a shifting succession of political entities (just like Europe), and the period runs from Charles Martel to Akbar. The variations between regions and across centuries are large, within the bounds set by largely agricultural societies with relatively small cities.

For most of this period the two regions (and indeed all regions) were at least roughly on par, subject to very large error bars on the estimates. By 1700, the richer parts of Europe (mostly the ones that did the colonising) had decisively higher incomes, on the order of being twice as high. The closer we get to the present, the better our source base, and the more the picture at that time can come into focus. So we can much more reliably state that Western European states had higher incomes than the Mughal empire than we can state whether the Gupta Empire was richer or poorer than the Carolingian Empire.

Nevertheless, different regions and polities did experience golden ages, what Jack Goldstone calls "efflorescences," where the vagaries of trade, domestic politics, military success and population line up favourably for a century or two, and a region experiences high incomes (by the standards of the pre-modern world.) It is entirely probable that, at some points, particularly successful regions succeeded at war, trade, or political organisation, and briefly escaped the hard Malthusian limits of food production. The usual sign is that cities grow large, which is both caused by and the cause of higher incomes.

India is not usually the case used in the literature to talk about wealthy non-European societies in the pre-modern era; that honour goes to China, variably between the Tang and Ming dynasties. The Great Divergence debate has typically been framed in that way, and research into India's place has been more limited. The most modern work in terms of GDP estimates is still Broadberry, Gupta and Custodis (2015), which goes back to 1600, and shows India with about 80% of English GDP/capita - in the same ballpark, but lower. For less comparable and more qualitative estimates of when India was and was not wealthy, you would need someone with expertise on pre-modern India, which is surely not me. But such descriptive estimates are at best a general guide, and not easy to compare across time and space.