The Dulle brothers, Secretary of State and CIA director respectively, who convinced Eisenhower to launch his invasion, had both worked with UFC, and along with other government officials, were on UFC payroll, albeit often indirectly. While this is far from the archetypal defense industry collaboration with the armed forces situation, it is still a collaboration between a large company and the armed forces at the detriment of foreigners which arguably continues to this day, with the legacy of the later Civil War. Did Eisenhower or any of his associates ever acknowledge or express regret for this? I understand this is a pretty charged question, but it is confusing, given how famous Eisenhower is for his warning, and how little the average american knows about Guatemala.
The military-industrial complex speech was a very specific warning, and is not generically about government power or government intervention. Nor is it about fears of corporate power! It is specifically about fears that military funding and military contractors could be co-opting representative governance to create the conditions for extensive, unnecessary funding of armaments. Specifically armaments.
He wasn't thinking about United Fruit, he was thinking of Boeing, Convair, and other major USAF and Army contractors. He was thinking of missiles, not CIA plots. He was worried that the Edward Tellers and RAND Corporations of the world were going to be the ones calling the scientific shots, as opposed to the more measured scientific advice he received from the President's Scientific Advisory Committee.
To be sure, there were many in his day that mis-read this speech as well (including PSAC, who thought he was being critical of government science in general), but Eisenhower was himself fairly clear that it was meant to be a very specific critique, not a general one. As for its origins, it is more about Eisenhower's lack of control in the wake of Sputnik — when he felt that even his own considerable popularity and military reputation would not let him avoid rushing out multiple, deliberately redundant missile systems — than anything else in his presidency.
It is tempting to see Eisenhower as a general critic of military intervention, but he was not, not in any way. He had a very specific fear, which was the misappropriation of government resources for technological defense purposes, and a more generalized fear that the specifically nuclear arms race had gotten to apocalyptic proportions under his tenure, and what ill that boded.
Alex has covered the military-industrial complex speech in detail, so I'll say a few words about Guatemala. First off, it's something of a myth that the ousting of Jacobo Arbenz (the left-wing leader of Guatemala from 1951-54) was done at the behest of United Fruit. The primary motivation for Eisenhower and his subordinates was fear of communism within the context of a global Cold War. The post I did the other day on the 'domino theory' might provide some useful context.
Upon coming to power, Arbenz had instituted significant land reform policies in a country where 2.5% of the population owned 70% of the land. These reforms were intended to parcel out uncultivated land to the landless peasants. At the same time, landowners would be compensated for the loss of this unused land. This included powerful foreign interests - such as United Fruit. Now, most of these landowners did not think the compensation was enough, even though this was largely unused land we're talking about. Arbenz was also willing to work with the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT), like other left-nationalist leaders who worked across party lines such as - surprise surprise - Mohammed Mossadegh who was removed from power in the 1953 Iranian Coup.
United Fruit certainly planted stories in US newspapers and attempted to make it look like Arbenz was instituting wholesale revolution (something that greatly upset the Guatemalans, as their ambassador to Washington noted in late 1952), but this was not the case. What motivated the Eisenhower administration was - as I noted above - fear of communism spreading in Latin America and the perceived success of the 1953 Iranian Coup. 1953 had - in the eyes of the CIA and the administration - demonstrated that it was possible to change a regime in a foreign nation to something more amenable to the United States. So if it worked in Iran, might it work in the back yard of the United States?
Another piece of context is that Arbenz realised that there might be interference from foreign powers and attempted to bolster Guatemala's armed forces. A shipment of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia was - for Washington - simply an indicator that Central America might turn 'red' and another motivation to intervene. Eisenhower stated prior to the CIA intervention that "The Reds are in control and they are trying to spread their influence to San Salvador as a first step of the breaking out...to other South American countries"[1]. After the ousting of Arbenz, John Foster Dulles again commented that the Guatemala coup was the "biggest success in the last five years against communism." [2]
So, United Fruit were a powerful economic force in Guatemala, that's true. However, the Eisenhower administration's motivation for removing Arbenz was not the pleadings of UF executives or their propaganda efforts, but their fear of the spread of communism within a regional and global context.
You can find a lot of useful, baseline primary sources in the relevant volume of Foreign Relations of the United States, which help to emphasise the centrality of the fear of communism to the administration's thinking.
Hope this helps.
Malcolm
[1] Quote taken from Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A world history (London: Allen Lane, 2017), 346-47
[2] Ibid.