I shall take your question to mean that you would first like an overview of the historiographical situation regarding the influence of policy on the origins of the First World War, and secondly a direct analysis of the documents in question themselves (links shall be provided in the references section). Let us begin by analyzing the very basics of historiographical debate on this rather thorny and messy topic:

Simply put, the opinion on the role of policy to the cause of the war is almost directly entwined with the responsibility factor of historiography for the First World War. In other words, many historians of the post-war and even modern schools ask "Which nation's policy was more detrimental to European peace?" rather than "How did policy itself doom the nations of Europe into the First World War?". Whether or not this method is historiographically valid remains up for debate, as it certainly elicits a certain sense of bias within both the historians and their source material. Even as early as 1973, John Röhl claimed the following on developments in historiography linking to the Great War:

The controversy over the immediate causes of the First World War appears to be at last drawing to a close.^(1)

Perhaps Röhl may simply have been looking at the recent writings of historian Fritz Fischer, whose hallmark 1961 publication Griff nach der Weltmacht (Germany's Aims in the First World War) seemed to be a sign of things calming down in academia. Sadly this calm never lasted for very long and we now have a slew of new German historians who look beyond their German Empire and the aggressive Weltpolitik (world politics) of Kaiser Wilhelm II to the policies of other countries (France, Britain and Russia among them). Add on top of that the developments alongside Röhl's own writings with historians such as AJP Taylor and Zara Steiner who posited that it was a "war by timetable" and "collective fault" respectively. Policy does take a central line in almost every writing on the First World War, as to ignore the policy of any nation being investigated is to allow the elephant to remain in the room.

So what then, about the documents and policy themselves? What have historians offered up as their support to make clear which country, leader or society was stoking the flames of conflict more than the others? Let's turn to that now:

I have chosen for our 'starting point' the Dual Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, signed in 1879 when war seemed only to exist in the imagination of the most deranged (or extremist) of persons. Interestingly enough Article 1 hits hard and fast with the specific narrowing of the Alliance to directly address the 'threat' posed by Russia:

ARTICLE 1. Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.^(2)

Clearly, we already have the antagonising of the Russian Bear occurring more than 30 years before the events of June 28th, 1914. However, do not be swayed to believe that Russia took this threat to mean more than it was meant to. One must not forget that shortly after this treaty came the Dreikaiserbund, or League of the Three Emperors, an actual formal alliance between Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary which came into effect in 1881, an attempt by Otto von Bismarck to mediate the power balance in Europe.^(2) On the subject of Tsar Alexander III's concern over his nation's security facing the Dual Alliance, Laurence B. Packard writes:

[A]s long as the general European status quo did not alter too much, the Tsar did not regard Russia's isolation seriously.^(3)

So perhaps it might be wise to dismiss the Dual Alliance of 1879 as the first 'domino' in the chain of policy decisions which led to the First World War. Tsar Alexander III would even go on to sign the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887, which acknowledged the Russian claims over the Balkan 'sphere of influence as noted by Article 2 below:

Germany recognizes the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly the legitimacy of her preponderant and decisive influence in Bulgaria and in Eastern Rumelia. The two Courts engage to admit no modification of the territorial status quo of the said peninsula without a previous agreement between them, and to oppose, as occasion arises, every attempt to disturb this status quo or to modify it without their consent.^(4)

However, already by this time Russia seemed to be uncertain of how legitimate Bismarck's assurances truly were. After all, Bismarck himself was nearly at the end of his esteemed career (being dismissed in 1890) and this agreement would come only a year before the coronation of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who certainly did not share the same cooperative outlook that his father had. When that change finally did occur, Alexander III was more receptive to an Alliance with France, as the German Empire now appeared more concerned with colonial acquisitions (and as a result, was drawn towards deal-making with the British) than continuing the animosity towards Russia that Wilhelm I & Bismarck had facilitated.

The next crucial document we might look at is the France-Russian Military Alliance Convention of 1892, in which France and Russia were directly linked in an alliance which specifically singled out the powers of the 1882 Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) as potential instigators of an attack:

If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.^(5)

The British were still making colonial deals with the Germans over Heligoland and bits of Africa, maintaining their foreign policy of Splendid Isolation by not getting involved with any Continental business unless it directly threatened their peace (for the record, this was the hallmark foreign policy of Lord Salisbury) and to put it aptly in the words of historian Christopher Howard:

There can be few words on British foreign policy in the last years of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth in which this celebrated phrase does not occur.^(6)

Of course, one could go even further into this investigation, looking at how the various colonial treaties between Britain and Germany exclusively seem rather accommodating compared to the British attitude of an alliance with Russia or even France. The Dual Entente (as the Franco-Russian alliance was known) was not particularly well-received in the House of Commons, and in fact many in the British public were leaning towards a German Alliance rather than one with their longtime adversaries across the Channel and North Sea. Why exactly this did not occur is well summarized by Michael Howard:

That this [A British-German Alliance] did not happen was due partly due to the traditional British reluctance to become involved in any entangling continental alliances, and partly due to extraordinarily clumsy German diplomacy. More important than either, however, was the German decision... **to build a navy that could challenge the British command of the seas.**^(7)

Thus I shall leave part 1 of this investigation at the end of the 19th century for now. In Part 2 I shall be covering the further documents in the leadup to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, particularly the British abandonment of Splendid Isolation and the circumstances overseas.