You might be interested in my previous answers on how Napoleonic battles were fought here and here.

You're correct to point out that subordinate leaders in the Napoleonic Wars had greater scope to exercise their own judgement than their counterparts in the wars of Frederick the Great. In most of Frederick's battles, he did attempt to work out a set idea to govern the whole concept of the attack. However, it's important to underscore that this stemmed from the fact that once the battle proper began, he would have little control over the forces actively engaged, which comprised most of his army. As such, it was important that they be set in motion according to a preconceived plan; if he could not react to changing circumstance, all the more important to preemptively give the enemy something to not react to, so to speak. Frederick in fact had little recourse if any part of his plan failed.

By contrast, most of a Napoleonic army was kept in reserve, with a only a small proportion actively engaged at any one time. The presence of large bodies of fresh troops out of the range of fire gave Napoleon and his contemporaries far greater control over the progress of a battle. While the Austrians at Leuthen struggled to respond to the appearance of the Prussians on their flank and were completely defeated by a force half as large, a Napoleonic army of that size would counter such a threat with relative ease. The Duke of Wellington's army at Waterloo had only 30 battalions in the front line, with roughly 150 battalions and squadrons available to counter any unexpected developments. At the battle of Leipzig, Napoleon had eight army corps and five cavalry corps in the main sector south of the city, with only four corps in his first echelon. Each of those corps would be keeping their own reserves as well. With all these troops kept unengaged, it was much harder to 'pull a fast one' on these armies.

As Clausewitz describes it, battle in his day had become a slow and methodical trial of strength, with relatively little scope for the general to display superior tactical skill. The armies themselves developed along more or less identical lines, to the point there was little difference between the best and worst. Most battles were effectively decided before they began, according to the circumstances in which they were fought [the number of troops on each side, the strength of a defensive position, the available lines of retreat, the direction of the approach marches of the different corps, and so on]. I should emphasize, though, that simpler plans are generally better; they take less time to take effect, thus leaving the enemy less time to disrupt the plan. Thus while their effect is less dramatic, a simple plan is more likely to succeed.

This doesn't mean, though, that the commander in chief had become redundant; far from it. Rather than attempting to produce a set plan to defeat the enemy in the course of the battle, the role of the general was to secure the best conditions for the battle in terms of time, place, and troops involved. The battle of Wagram was effectively won by Napoleon securing the crossing of his whole army , which outnumbered the Austrians by 40,000, and so preventing them from defeating his force while still astride the river like they had a month prior at Aspern. A better strategist could rely on his ability to gather superior strength producing a victory far more in Napoleonic times than in the 18th century. Once the battle began, his main role was to keep and release reserve formations as necessary. If released too soon, as Blucher did at the battle of Ligny, the general risked losing the superiority of reserves that won battles; if too late, the enemy could recover from the chaos of combat, and so put up a much stiffer fight than if caught in 'the critical phase' of confusion and weakness that follows every engagement. Additionally, it should be pointed out WRT the role of subordinate leaders that Napoleon had personally selected his subordinates and trained his army according to his thinking, so there was hardly anything unnatural about their good performance during his campaigns.

Applying this to Austerlitz, then, we see that it was the commander in chief, not the subordinate leaders, who decided the outcome. Napoleon was the one who decided to have the battle east of Brunn on December 2, which is obviously the most important decision of the whole affair. He was the one who decided to hold the position behind the Goldbach stream [which protected his critical line of retreat] with one division; this bait would consume considerable Allied reserves, especially once Friant's division arrived to reinforce them. The Allies spent three of their columns overcoming a single division, but they still could have won had Napoleon miscalculated the arrival of Friant. This drew a fourth Allied column into the engagement behind the Goldbach. Despite his overall inferiority, then, Napoleon achieved such a superiority of reserves that even when the Russian Guard overpowered Vandamme's division, he could direct Drouet's division and the Guard Cavalry to crush the Russians' last reserves. Even after this point, though, the French still had Oudinot's grenadier division and the Guard infantry in reserve; the presence of these fresh troops help convert the Allied defeat into a rout. Had Napoleon given battle before Friant's division was available, or committed reserves to the southern sector, he would have lost much of his margin of superiority in reserves. Maintaining it thus required considerable resolution on the part of the commander in chief.

In sum, then, while the new ways armies were used in the Napoleonic Wars somewhat reduced the importance of tactical skill on the part of the commander in chief, they greatly increased the importance of strategic skill.