It is widely known that in the aftermath of WWII former Nazi scientists and engineers were recruited to work in the United States and the Soviet Union. Were Japanese and other Axis professionals ever harbored in the same fashion?

by bigdickzillionaire

You hear all about how the allies recruited thousands of former nazi war criminals through Operation Paperclip for their scientific knowledge after the war, but did this ever happen for Japanese or Italian war criminals as well? If there are no reports of this happening, why was this the case? And why did the allies find German scientific knowledge so much more valuable than Japanese or Italian? Was it more a racialist question of Japanese ability to integrate into western society, or did the allies not consider any knowledge they possessed of sufficient value to offer the same protection?

ScipioAsina

Off the top of my head, I can name two Japanese generals whom the United States shielded from prosecution for war crimes in order to secure their post-war cooperation, though I hesitate to put them in the category "professionals."

The better known of the two, Lieutenant General Ishii Shirō (1892-1959), oversaw the development and deployment of biological weapons as well as horrific biomedical experimentation on civilians and prisoners of war throughout his career as a military doctor, most infamously as the head of the Kwantung Army's Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Department (a.k.a. Unit 731). For his role in these activities, he was initially placed under informal house arrest in January 1946, but after negotiations with American authorities, he and his subordinates obtained freedom and immunity from prosecution in 1948 in exchange for handing over the testing data. This data turned out to be worthless on the whole, since the experiments had been performed rather crudely and unscientifically, and American biological warfare capabilities already far exceeded those of the Japanese.

The other individual, Lieutenant General Arisue Seizō (1895-1992), was Chief of the 2nd (Intelligence) Section under the Army General Staff Headquarters from August 1942 onward and had previously played a major part in pushing for Japan's entry into the Tripartite Pact while serving as the military attaché to Italy. In the months leading up to Japan's surrender, having seen the writing on the wall, Arisue made plans to ingratiate himself with the Americans while simultaneously laying the groundwork for a secret resistance movement, which would fight back in the event of a harsh occupation. He would end up gathering intelligence on communists on behalf of the American authorities, who in turn decided not to charge him for war crimes.

Sources:

Hata Ikuhiko, Nihon riku-kaigun sōgō jiten [Comprehensive Dictionary of the Japanese Army and Navy], 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2005).

Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-up, rev. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002)

Michael Petersen, "The Intelligence that Wasn't: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan," in Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays (Washington, D.C.: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006).