Determining the legacies of a state is always tricky, especially for one that spanned over 600 years of history and bridged two worlds: Europe and Asia. This becomes further complicated when we ask what exactly legacies are. I would argue that they are what we choose to remember or to emphasize and play a key role in the rhetoric of how we discuss a state. So, depending on who you ask, you will get wildly different answers.

Below I will stress some legacies that immediately come to mind or interest me, but there are surely countless others.

An Intertwined World

This first one seems a bit obvious, but I still think it's worth quickly mentioning. Trying to discuss, for example, the history of the Balkans post-1300 without at least a cursory look at the Ottoman's reign over them is nearly impossible. The history of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa are intimately intertwined over several centuries. Therefore, if we want to understand a country like Serbia, we at least need some understanding of its over 500 years of subjugation to the Ottomans.

Islamization and Islamaphobia in the Balkans

This becomes magnified when we discuss states like Bosnia, Kosovo, or Albania, which have demographically seen large populations of Muslims and Islamization since the beginnings of their rule by the Ottomans. For example, in Bosnia following its conquest by the Ottomans in mid 15th century, many Turkish dervishes, ghazis, and akhis settled there and worked to successfully convert much of the Bosnian population to Islam.^(1)

Looking at the history of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans is also key to understanding the rhetoric of racism against Turkish people in this region. This rhetoric often alludes to violent Ottoman rule and the devshirme system, in which Christian children from the Balkans were enslaved by the Ottoman government to work as soldiers and administrators. Examples of this rhetoric can be found in the historiography of Albania, in which its Ottoman past and Muslim identity has often been obscured or demonized.^(2)

State Formation in the Middle East

Furthermore, it has been argued that the formation of some modern Middle Eastern states from the remains of the Ottoman Empire actually have their roots during the Ottoman Empire.^(3) Some posit that during the Ottoman Tanzimat era, many regions, designated as Eyalet-i Mümtaze or special territories, gained attributes akin to independent states. As defined by Jonathan Endelman, these states were: Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia.

This reasoning challenges the traditional view of Middle Eastern state formation coming from English and French colonial treaties post-WW1.

In either case, whether these states effectively existed before or after Ottoman reign, the Ottomans certainly did shape much of the Middle East. Furthermore, we must ask: what systems did the Ottomans have in place that continued to be used by these new states? Therefore, we must look at these new states emerging from the remains of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East as at least partially derivative of it.

The Skyline of Istanbul

If we want to look at something more physical, we may look at Ottoman architecture. Crowing achievements, such as the Blue Mosque, the Selimiye Mosque, the Dolmabahçe Palace, along with countless others continue to dot the landscape of Istanbul. Ottoman architecture during the early period infused Seljuk, Byzantine, and Persian styles.^(4) Later, European styles came into popularity. Therefore, the very fabric of Istanbul is very Ottoman in nature.

The capture of Constantinople/Istanbul in 1453 also marked a new era for the city.

In the final centuries of Byzantine rule, the city was quite literally crumbling away. Nearly bankrupt, the Palaiologos dynasty could barely afford the upkeep on their own palace and was forced to close off large sections of it due to longstanding neglect and disrepair.^(5) Doubtless, many grand structures in the city faced the same fate, such as the church of Our Lady at Blachernae the church of the Holy Apostles.

As the capital of the rich Ottoman Empire, Istanbul was practically reborn. Many buildings were renovated, with some of them living a new life as a mosque, such as Hagia Sofia. The sultans also built a myriad of new buildings in Istanbul that complimented the Byzantine landscape.

Conclusion

I hope this provides a small glimpse into the legacies of the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, its legacies and impacts on the modern day are countless and varied. So, whether you want to discuss demographics or Islamophobia/racism in the Balkans, the formation of modern states in the Middle East, or the architecture of one of the most storied and legendary cities, Istanbul, it can all be looked at through the lens of the Ottoman Empire.

Bibliography

^(1) Dervishes and Islam in Bosnia : Sufi Dimensions to the Formation of Bosnian Muslim Society by Ines Asčerić-Todd (2015), see page 2.

• For a more general overview of conversion in the Balkans, see Honored by the glory of Islam: conversion and conquest in Ottoman Europe by Marc David Baer (2011).

^(2) Islamization of Albanians in the Middle Ages: The Primary Sources and the Predicament of the Modern Historiography by Ataullah Boddan Kopański (1997).

^(3) In the Shadow of Empire: States in an Ottoman System by Jonathan Endelman (2018).

^(4) The Art and Architecture of Ottoman Istanbul by Richard Yeomans (2011).

^(5) The End of Byzantium by Jonathan Harris (2013).

One very interesting take on this problem has been advanced recently by the Yale historian Alan Mikhail, in his new biography of Selim I, in whose short, early 16th century, reign the Ottomans became, in his opinion, a global power.

This concept may seem counter-intuitive, given the Empire's geographical location in the middle of the massive, Eurasian landmass, which they did not fully dominate – while the Ottomans were, of course, much less able to project power to the Americas, for instance. But the argument is an interesting, thought-provoking one, because Mikhail is explicitly challenging the familiar view many hold today concerning the "rise of the west" by introducing an Ottoman element into the argument, in ways that allow him to explicitly assert that "the Ottoman Empire made our modern world". His thesis looks something like this:

1. By tripling the size, and reach, of the Ottoman Empire, Selim created a sort of existential threat to the Christian powers of Europe
2. Ottoman naval power came to dominate the Mediterranean, and this was what drove Iberian explorers out into the Atlantic – to the south, rounding Africa and opening up trade with the Indies, in the case of the Portuguese, and to the Americas, in the case of the Spaniards
3. In addition, both Columbus and Henry the Navigator were explicitly voyaging in the hope of meeting the "Grand Khan" (in essence a figure forged in memories of the Mongol empire) that both believed offered a potential counterbalance to rising Ottoman power. Both set out to create the conditions for Holy War, but instead stumbled into points of access to massive economic wealth
4. In the meantime, the first early modern "superpower", Spain, was forging itself by completing the "Reconquista" of the Iberian peninsula – a revival of a very old and long-standing conflict whose timing owed everything to the fear that the Muslims of Granada would make common cause with the newly-powerful Ottoman state. It was the same basic fear, Mikhail argues, that prompted Ferdinand and Isabella to finance Columbus – his voyage was not so much to "find a new route to the Indies," as is so often stated, as explicitly a voyage in search of the Great Khan.
5. On the Ottomans' southern and eastern borders, Selim was responsible both for the defeat of Ismail I and his Safavid, Shia Persia (Battle of Çaldiran, 1514), thus ensuring that Sunni, rather than Shia Islam would predominate until the present day, and with the destruction of Mamluk power in Egypt and for the seizure of the Holy Places – Mecca and Medina, which gave the Ottoman sultans – now also "caliphs" – claim to the religious loyalty of all Muslims, a potentially dramatic further extension of their power that continued to worry their western enemies as late as World War I, when the Ottoman sultan attempted to call for jihad against the allied powers
6. The Ottomans and the rising threat they represented had further knock-on effects that the Turks themselves neither really realised, nor could control. For Mikhail, for instance, it was Pope Leo X's obsession with the "Turkish menace" – at the cost of contemplation of “the dignity of man or the immortality of the soul” – and the concomitant costs of his projected crusade against them that inspired Martin Luther to denounce the papal initiative as an attempt to distract attention from Catholic corruption and helped to catalyse the Reformation. For Luther, Selim and his successors were God’s “lash of iniquity”, created as a means to punish Christian sinners
7. Ultimately, Mikhail argues, it was the unprecedented century and a half of Ottoman success, from roughly 1450-1600, that is the underlying reason why, even today, the west, and especially the US, considers Islam as an existential threat; the same period also offers a model for Turkish nationalism currently being pushed by President Erdoğan

Now, all this, I think it's probably safe to say, is to an extent a case of an Ottomanist making some essentially rhetorical points. I'm sure historians of early modern Spain, for instance, would have some challenges to make to his portrayal of an Aragon and a Castile focused more on events several thousand miles to their east than they were on the day to day issues of governing in Spain. But for the purposes of the lectures you're writing, this might not matter. Mikhail's purpose is to let loose the historical cat among some fairly unthinking pigeons, and so generally to stimulate debate. That seems to be what you need to do, as well.

Source

Alan Mikhail, God’s Shadow: The Ottoman Sultan who Shaped the Modern World (2020)