I've been doing alot of reading on this sub and asked a few questions about various topics, and as I read some of the stuff in the FAQ about the world wars and other information I've digested from my education and general reading, it seems to me like the Kaiserreich, Nazi Germany, and even the Austro-Hungarian empire seemed to be really bad at logistics. It even seems like the Wehrmacht in particular had an outright disdain for logistics and would ignore their logistical services (don't know the correct term for the people that handled logistics in that organization). I can understand Italy having logistical problems for various reasons but it just seems so bizarre that those other land empires would have those issues.
It seems to me like they'd make unrealistic plans with barely any thought given to how they'd supply or their troops, or make wildly optimistic assumptions about their troops ability to function without supplies. I'd even read that one of the many reasons Stalin didn't believe the Germans would attack when they did is because they were not producing or purchasing any of the things they'd need in anywhere near the quantities required to be successful in such a massive invasion - winter clothing for example (maybe a bad example because of the widespread myth of winter being the deciding factor in defeating the Nazi's, but still the first example I could think of).
I'd read of similar, but less extreme behavior done by the German Army in the first world war, and that the Austro-Hungarians had even worse problems than the Germans. Stuff like offensives starting out successful then falling apart because of poor logistical planing being routine, or complete dysfunction on the part of the Austro-Hungarians ( I am a little wary of the stuff about the Austro-Hungarians because I had been reading up a bit recently that the narrative I was taught as a kid that it was perpetually sick and dying and doomed to fail no matter what isn't popular anymore).
I don't understand why these large land empires would decide to ignore logistics to the degree they did. I know the Nazi's were devoted to an incoherent and insane ideology that assumed they'd be victorious before christmas based on the inferiority of their enemies - but surely they looked at a map at one point and realized how large the invasion would be, looked at the amount of troops and realized "this is going to be a bitch to supply for any amount of time".
Plus the Kaiserreich and the Austro-Hungarians - they had large empires and surely must've had experience moving stuff around, so why did they seem to not put any focus into logistics?
It all just seems so weird to me that they'd make these glaringly obvious mistakes, especially considering that at least the Wehrmacht studied Napoleon's invasion of Russia.
So what's the deal? Is the conceit behind my question wrong and I need to figure out the right question to ask?
Or is there a nice long answer describing the historical reasons the Germans (and to a lesser extent Austro-Hungarians) were bad at logistics?
I want to thank in advance anyone who takes the time to read this and explain the factors involved. I really love this sub and appreciate all the effort you guys put into answering questions.
Edit: sorry about the typo in the title, I'm on mobile and didn't catch it til I posted it.
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I'll write only about the topics that I know about which is World War II since I did go through a long project into researching Germany's logistical situation as I was curious myself on the topic. I can't answer to World War I because I'm not confident that my knowledge is in depth enough to provide a good enough answer, but World War II seems to provide the largest discussion on logistics so I can help with that thought.
I do want to say that the question does seem to be a bit loaded with certain pre-conceived ideas, and while you can believe what you'd like and come to your own conclusions, I'll just try my best to shed some light on what I know.
I did come to the conclusion that the Germans were bad with logistics but a large part of that issue with logistics they had are just the circumstances surrounding their wars. France never really had the goal to march its army to Moscow (At least not with the advent of railway and modern operational logistics, Napoleon gets a pass). Britain was a naval nation, as the saying goes "Brittania Rules the Waves", and by the 20th century, the oceans were pretty easy to navigate, the only issue was enemy interdiction like u-boats which could be solved with advances in technology and tactics.
Only the USA was really comparable in its severe supply issues and constraints, and it adapted for that. The M4 Sherman was designed with the idea in mind that it was not going back to a factory for repairs. It was cheap, mass produced, easy to ship as cargo, could travel terrain easily, was modular and easy to repair, easy to recover from battle, fuel efficient, and reliable. Thats not to say Germany just didn't care about logistics, but they had a very different situation for the time. Germany had to win the war quickly, even if that meant having very poor logistics. This actually worked incredibly well for them in France. Both sides expected a long protracted war like WW1, a war of attrition which eventually favored the Allies. Germany took a gamble and put all of its eggs in one basket and just threw all of its armor to punch a hole in France. Were the logistics awful, and were they severely over extended? Yes, but it avoided a long war.
The USA really nailed the logistics game, knocked it out of the park. Thats not to say they didn't have logistics issues such as in North Africa or the Pacific ground war. I don't think the USA was some mastermind genius when it came to logistics, but rather I'm using the USA as a comparison to make to Germany to understand the different circumstances the nations had. Logistics is significantly complex, far more than just simply getting food and ammo to the troops. Nations go about logistics in different ways and face different constraints and bottlenecks given their situation. The USA had a very good situation. They had a massive and experienced navy, massive shipyards, a huge domestic industry, and very importantly: They weren't getting bombed. Their railroads and ports and air bases always worked. Germany on the other hand was handed a very different situation.
Lets take North Africa for example. When Germany intended to aid Italy in its struggle with the British in North Africa, Italian Libya's logistical situation was quite literally a nightmare. While in 1941 the logistical situation was better with not much shipping being sunk, the frontline close to the ports, and the number of troops was low, it got severely worse in 1942, horrendously worse. Franz Halder wrote in his diaries how Rommel was begging for more supplies in 1941 around the time Barbarossa was being planned, and Rommel's diaries don't paint a pretty picture either.
To put it into perspective how bad it was, Rommel was literally at the maximum number of troops he could support. Not with a bit of leniency, but rather that he was barely receiving enough supplies to arm his troops, so when the British bombed the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk, or sunk an oil tanker, it was devastating to the supply situation. The ports simply didn't have the supply capacity required to support the army. They regularly struggled to break 100,000 metric tons in capacity per month. To put that in perspective, Cherbourg, the primary target following the D-Day landings, could regularly break 300,000 tons per month once it was repaired. Cherbourg also wasn't a major port either, Antwerp was a major port, and it could push 600,000 tons. It also didn't help that even once the supplies got into Libya, there was no guarantee they'd even reach the frontline.
The Axis had to use absolutely massive fleets of trucks to haul the supplies to the frontline since there was effectively no rail transport to use. This posed a huge variety of issues.
Firstly, Tripoli was a port all the way in western Libya, and once supplies landed, they had to drive sometimes over 1200 miles to deliver supplies to the frontline.
Also, getting the needed trucks was an issue too. The Axis regularly suffered from truck shortages, and Germany was leaning heavily on the usage of captured French trucks to help the invasion of the Soviet Union succeed. There was a point in Rommel's diary where he describes that his Afrikakorps had "An astonishingly high proportion of our transport now consisted of captured British vehicles and it was, in fact, no longer possible at any distance to distinguish us from the British", simply because they used so much captured British equipment, primarily their trucks & fuel. This issue was constrained further as driving trucks for 300-1200 miles to the frontlines would cause significant breakdowns and requires for repairs.
Trucks also used a lot of fuel, fuel was the primary handicap of Rommel's Afrikakorps. In Rommel's diaries he describes the disastrous fuel situation that arises from the constrictions of shipping and motorized units "The supply situation was now approaching disaster. The tanker Proserpina, which we had hoped would bring some relief in the petrol situation, had been bombed and sunk outside Tobruk. There was only enough petrol left to keep supply traffic going between Tripoli and the front for another two or three days".
Trucks were also easy targets in the flat open desert and when the Luftwaffe didn't have the equipment nor fuel to provide adequate air cover for the convoys. This restricted the movement of truck convoys primarily to night-time operations.
As you can understand, the situation was incredibly fragile, and with Rommel attempting to push into Egypt, he stretched his supply lines by hundreds of miles and was thriving off of captured equipment and fuel. And considering the circumstances of the North Africa campaign, running out of fuel was basically akin to surrendering. Rommel's main asset was his usage of armored and motorized units to maneuver in the desert, and without fuel, the crew would have to get out and push if they wanted to advance.
But, this doesn't mean the Axis was bad at logistics. For Rommel's circumstances I can't blame him for the choices he made. You see, the British supply situation was significantly better, but thats a low bar to pass. It wasn't a great situation to be in, the attrition in North Africa was difficult and their losses in armor was horrendously bad against Rommel, but their supply lines were safer, closer to the front, and they had the advantage of railways to benefit the transport. Eventually by the Second Battle of El Alamein, the Allies easily outnumbered Rommel, whereas before they could reach rough parity with eachother. Rommel did excellent given the circumstances he was in, but it was a tough spot in the first place. Its not like a videogame where you can just upgrade your ports with some artificial number of resources and your supply issues are fixed.