It seems to me that Ethiopia for many years was a centralised, large, prosperous monarchy little different from Middle Eastern or European states. It was able to fight off European invaders. Yet today it's poor, corrupt and wracked with ethnic tensions. What happened?

by The_Manchurian

Georgy_K_Zhukov

A bit narrow in scope, but this earlier piece I wrote looks at Ethiopia and the ways that, post-1896, the European powers colluded to keep her weakened. There are other factors well beyond these, but I'll repost it here:

Ethiopia hold the unfortunate and rare distinction of being essentially the only African nation to successfully resist European colonization, humiliating Italy in 1896 at the Battle of Adowa. While they would eventually be defeated in a renewed Italian campaign several decades later, it was a short-lived occupation which would soon see a coalition of Allied forces push Italy back out. As I seem to have fallen into something of a pattern with these floating features, today I'll be visiting one aspect of this resistance to European oppression, namely some of the arms that the Ethiopians carried, and the complicated history of arms acquisitions which they labored through.

Through the 19th century, Ethiopia had worked to acquire a wide variety of arms in an attempt to present a more modern and capable fighting force. This effort came mostly into its own under the Emperor Yohannes IV who took ascended the throne in 1871. His predecessors had worked to acquire an odd and varied assortment of mostly outdated European arms, some as ancient as the old matchlocks, but this began to change under Yohannes thanks to agreements with the British, although this too remained in small quantities, receiving a mere 725 muskets and 130 rifles at the onset of his reign. Nevertheless, despite only 1/6th of his 60,000 man army carrying firearms and a smaller number still trained in European-style tactics, he was successful in demolishing a well armed, European-trained force from Egypt in a series of engagements in 1875-'76 as the Ottomans unsuccessfully sought to expand into Ethiopian territory.

Not only did the success in the conflict ensure Ethiopia remained out from the Ottoman thumb, but it also provided a veritable windfall as some 20,000 Remington rifles. Although soon to be supplanted by magazine-fed repeaters, the single-shot, breech-loading Rolling Block rifles were nevertheless an effective, modern arm, and that bonanza alone placed Ethiopia as one of the best armed nations on the continent, just as the "Scramble for Africa" began to take shape in the 1880s.

In hindsight, the next series of moves are quite ironic. Sahle Maryam, the King of Shewa, had been building up an alliance with the French, and more importantly, the Italians, through the 1880s. The French saw it as a way to counter British influence in the region, and the Italians thought he would be a useful tool to counter Emperor Yohannes IV as they sought to exert more influence in Northern Ethiopia. The Italians, in 1884 agreed to provide Sahle with 4,000 Vetterli Rifles, a repeating rifle used by the Italians themselves, as well as a 10 year contract to provide 50,000 Remingtons. The French as well provided Sahle with arms, mostly older French or Belgian models that French merchants sold to him at considerable markup. Additional Italian gifts were also forthcoming beyond the contract, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition as well.

By the mid-1880s, Sahle had amassed a considerable arsenal, and at first the overtures of friendship by Italy seemed like they were going to pay off! Italy occupied Massawa in 1885, and Emperor Yohannes IV found himself assailed on two fronts as the Italians pressed along the northern coast and the Mahdist War in Sudan spilled over the western borders. When Yohannes IV fell in battle with the Mahdists, Sahle usurped the throne, declaring himself Menelik II, and signed the Treaty of Wuchale, a very conciliatory document recognizing the newly formed Italian colony of Eritrea, and which Italy considered to have placed Ethiopia under protectorate status.

For the next several years, Menelik II maintained the status quo, using his access to European arms via Italy to continue to modernize his forces as he sought to consolidate his rule over Ethiopia itself. Not only did tens of thousands more rifles arrive from Italy, both via purchase and as gifts, but other countries as well, such as Russia which in 1891 presented the Emperor with a gift of 10,000 rifles. By the early 1890s, some 25,000 rifles were being imported to Ethiopia per year. The variety of sources meant that the Ethiopians possessed a vast and varied array of small arms, of which only some were a modern, repeating design. While especially strong in terms of domestic use, it did nevertheless present an inadequate picture against any European power which.

Hoping to standardize, and also looking to find more independence from Italy in terms of their supply chain, the Ethiopian government attempted to contract for 100,000 German rifles in 1893, although they were rebuffed, as the German government didn't wish to become caught in the middle. Other countries were not so reticent. In 1894, Austria shipped some 4 million cartridge cases, and the Italians themselves noted with some worry the arrival of French Gras rifles, not to mention Hotchkiss machine-guns and modern artillery. The simple fact of the matter was that after having spent the better part of a decade supplying Menelik II with large quantities of arms to get on his good side, Italy had created a force it couldn't actually control. In the 1889 Treaty of Wuchale, the Italians had claimed it made them the conduit for Ethiopian foreign relations and thus Ethiopia their protectorate, but the clause was out of the Amharic version Menelik II had read, and when he discovered this, he denied the clause, and in 1893, entirely repudiated the treaty. Relations deteriorated quickly, and in late 1894, war had broken out between Italy and Ethiopia.

Mustering a force of some 10,000 Italians and 7,000 Eritreans, the Italians marched into Ethiopia expecting an an easy victory of European superiority, but were instead in for a rude awakening. Although the estimates vary wildly, the Ethiopians possessed anywhere from 300,000 to 600,000 rifles, of which a significant portion were modern, breech-loading, and often, repeating arms such as the French Gras, Russian Berdan, and British Lee-Metford, not to mention the Italian-supplied Vetterlis and Remingtons. If anything, there were more arms available than could be used, the limiting factor not the availability of rifles, but the availability of men who were adequately trained in their use. Nearly 200,000 men were raised for the force that went to meet the Italian invaders, and while only about half carried firearms, it spoke little to availability, but rather to the system of levies which had brought men into service who simply didn't know their use so preferred the more traditional implements of war such as spears or bows. Meeting at Adwa, Menelik's forces carried out a veritable massacre, wiping out roughly 50 percent of the Italian forces, and forcing the new Treaty of Addis Ababa, which assured Italy's complete recognition of Ethiopian sovereignty, soon to be followed by the opening of formal diplomatic relations with other European powers.

The power of the gun in Ethiopia's independence did not go without notice, and in the years after the Italian humilation, foreign observers in Ethiopia continually commented on how widespread their possession was, and the pride with which the Ethiopians brandished them, and expounded upon their knowledge of the workings. Nor did Ethiopia stop in its acquisitions. Certainly some acquisitions continued in the same, hodgepodge manner as before, and acquisition was not always easy due to European stonewalling. The first few years after victory, it appeared that Ethiopia was on the path of only further imcreased military might. 30,000 rifles arrived from Russia in 1898, as well as 8 Maxims, and 150,000 Gras Carbines in 1900 from France. So many arms were coming in though it was well beyond the needs of the military, resulting in many being sold or traded, many of them ending up in British and Italian colonial possessions.

After approaching Menelik II to clamp down on the illegal arms trade under the 1890 Brussels Act, and being essentially rebuffed, the bordering Colonial powers took matters into their own hands. Coming together, the result was the 1906 Tripartite Treaty between France, Italy, and Great Britain, which included provisions that seriously limited the importation of arms into the country, and in any case was designed to regulate the levels of influence each power could exert on Ethiopia, regardless of Ethiopia's interest in the matter.

Commustar

I tend to disagree with your framing of the question.

It seems to me that Ethiopia for many years was a centralized, large, prosperous monarchy little differerent from Middle Eastern or European states. It was able to fight off European invaders.

First off, we need to clarify exactly what time period are we talking about? From your reference to fighting off European invaders I assume you are talking about the period circa 1870-1935, the era surrounding the victory over Italy at the Battle of Adowa in 1896.

Yet, that was an era of relative strength of the monarchy, and if we were to look to the era of Tewodros II in the 1860s, there was fierce rivalry between that emperor, Ras Kassa and Ras Menelik of Shewa which undercut Tewodros' resistance to the British punitive expedition under Robert Napier in 1868. Ras Kassa cooperated with the invading British, who besieged Emperor Tewodros II's capital and caused him to commit suicide. Kassa went on to become Emperor Yohannes IV and would rule for ~20 years, but would die in battle against the Mahdist sultanate in 1889. The final rival Ras Menelik would later become Emperor Menelik II in 1890 and victor at Adowa in 1896.

So, the period from 1870-1935, (i.e. the reigns of Yohannes IV, Menelik II, Empress Zewditu, and Haile Selassie's first reign) was a time where there was comparatively smooth transition of power between claimants to the throne, unlike the earlier tumultuous Zemene Mesafint (circa 1750-1850) where there was effectively no central authority and power was contested by multiple sub-kings.

Still, I would not call the Ethiopian state from 1890-1935 as either prosperous or centralized. Yes, Menelik II was able to command enough authority to call out a well-armed force of 100,000 soldiers to resist invasion, and canny enough to secure diplomatic recognition of Ethiopian independence from powers like Russia, UK, France and US.

However, Menelik II was still very reliant on the support and loyalty of powerful regional lords and the traditional landlord class. Of course, he and Haile Selassie made strong efforts to assert their own power, and to centralize power, but that was very much an unfinished process by 1935.

On the subject of prosperity, up until 1935 Ethiopia was overwhelmingly an agrarian country. Yes, there was splendor and finery around the monarchy, and funds were found to equip a credible army. However, those things obscure extremely low levels of industrialization and widespread rural poverty in the country.

Now, if instead we are looking at the period from 1941-1974 (Haile Selassie's 2nd reign after the Italian occupation), then things look a lot different.

Starting in the 1940s, there is great emphasis on elite education, sending pupils overseas for technical education. These promising students were then incorporated into a growing bureaucracy which Haile Selassie used as a political counter-balance against the landed nobility. He also promulgated a new constitution in 1955 (his second constitution, after one in 1931). These actions all had the effect of further centralizing power around the Emperor.

Ditto, the 1950s to early 1970s saw efforts to appeal for foreign commercial investment in commercial agricultural schemes, petrochemical refining, and textile manufactures. Also, the regime happily accepted humanitarian and developmental assistance in the form of support for education, hospitals/health, and experimental agricultural schemes. So, you could say that Ethiopia was becoming more prosperous in this period. Although, I would note that industrial development, education and health spending became tools for further reinforcing imperial authority and centralization of power. There were stark inequalities in terms of number of schools and doctors per 100,000 people in the different provinces, with areas like Addis Ababa, Shewa, Tigre, Eritrea having more schools and doctors, but areas like Hararge, Sidamo, or Wollega having only one or two hospitals and a handful of high schools for the whole province.

Yet today it's poor, corrupt and wracked with ethnic tensions.

Are Ethiopians today poorer than Ethiopians in 1900? No. As I already said, up until 1935 the country was a heavily agrarian country with almost no industrialization. Today, Ethiopia is still not as industrialized or as wealthy as a country like China or Egypt or Turkey. But, if we look at World Bank economic indicators, since 1980 per capita incomes are up quite a lot. Poverty is down from 45% in 1995 to ~25% now. School enrollments are up, life expectancy is up. Now, World Bank data starts pretty recently (there wasn't even a World Bank before World War 2 to collect the data). GDP growth rate has been 8-13% per annum since 2004.

Ethiopia is still considered a low-income/developing country. But, I think people in the West have a big hangover from the images of the 1984 famine. Ethiopia in 2020 is a far richer country than in 1935.

wracked with ethnic tensions.

The events and grievances that underlay these tensions go all the way back to 1870 or earlier. What is new now is that these tensions get more openly expressed in public among communities which have in the past been marginalized. And these tensions become visible and legible to outsiders in Europe and America through a handful of means. With video and the proliferation of instantaneous international news reporting, the public in North America or Europe can see protests happening right now in Ethiopia. Ditto, the proliferation of social media and internet connections means that people living in Ethiopia can keep in contact with relatives in the diaspora. And the diaspora can become a powerful pressure group lobbying the international community about government handling of tensions.

A secondary factor is that the increase in educational provision in Ethiopia, particularly higher-education, has meant that pupils from marginalized ethnic groups have gained access to higher education, and since the 1980s have produced a lively batch of revisionist scholarship which challenges the narratives produced during the regime of Menelik II and Haile Selasse.

This revisionist school highlights the Ethiopian state from 1855-1974 as promoting an Amharic court culture and working to assimilate and subordinate other communities like the Oromo, Somali, Sidama, Afar and others.

So, where traditional historiography will applaud Menelik II as victor at Adowa and savior of Ethiopia, revisionist historians will note that Menelik launched the conquest of Oromo, Sidama and Somali lands in the south of the Empire and established settlements of Tigray or Amhara neftegna (literally "gun men") as local landlords and settlers in the newly conquered south. here is an essay on that theme

Other historians will focus on the period from 1941-1973 and examine the ethnic dimensions of Haile Selassies national developmental schemes. I mentioned above about the geographic inequality in hospitals, doctors and schools in the 1960s and 1970s. It bears mentioning that areas with good provision, like Shewa and Gondar were considered Amhara areas, while Hararge, Sidamo and Wollega were Somali and Oromo provinces.

So, revisionists (perhaps a bad term, their criticisms have become part of the academic mainstream in the last 2 decades) would argue that the modern ethnic tensions are the result of Ethiopian imperialism in the 19th and early 20th century. Or, to quote Lubie Birru's 1980 essay "Abyssinian Imperialism as the Genesis of the Crisis in the Horn"