Albania joins a select club of countries that had communism established without communication or connection with the USSR. Throughout Hoxha’s (Albania’s communist dictator) regime, the country had three major alliances: one with Yugoslavia until 1948, one with the USSR until 1960, and one with China until 1978. Beginning with Yugoslavia, Albania was little more than a vassal state of Yugoslavia. Communist Albania signed over any claims they had on Kosovo, and the two countries took steps to integrate their economies via fiscal standardization, joint economic planning, and subsidization of Albanian agriculture to keep the country afloat. In short, Albania was heavily reliant on Yugoslav subsidies and its market for any hope of a successful regime. However, over the years relations would tense and as Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comintern in 1948, Hoxha pivoted to Stalin and purged any and all previous or current supporters of Yugoslavia.
Albania’s relationship with the Soviets remained prosperous through Stalin’s death, but it was the transition to Khrushchev that would lead to Hoxha leaving the Soviets for the Chinese. There were several Khrushchev policies that fragmented the relationship between the superpower and the ant: rapprochement with Yugoslavia, criticizing Stalin in his famed secret speech (leading to criticism of Hoxha within his own party), and Khrushchev’s refusal to help transition Albania from an agricultural state to an industrialized one. Regarding Yugoslavia, Albania felt as though the USSR may no longer have a special relationship with Albania and instead view it as another Balkan state, while at the same time forcing Albania to reconcile with a country it regarded as its greatest sovereign threat. Hoxha and Shehu would not look kindly on Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence”, and refused to rehabilitate the purged “Titoists” killed in 1940s Albania. Next, Hoxha’s criticism by his own party forced him to further reject the destalinization of the USSR. Coupled with the brutal crackdown of Hungary in 1956, in Hoxha’s mind the Soviets were straying away from true communism and was determined to maintain his Stalinist state. To top it all off, the Soviets wanted Albania to remain an agricultural state as well as a port for its warships, having no interest in helping to fuel the small country’s path to industrialization. Following a Comecon plan in 1958 focused on Eastern-European integration, Khrushchev repeatedly tried to convince Hoxha and Shehu to be “socialism’s orchard.”
At the same time, the Chinese and Soviets were facing their own row regarding similar issues. Mao Zedong’s backing of Stalinist policies while the USSR was trying to phase them out, his opposition to destalinization, and opposing foreign policies. Hoxha visited China in 1956 and was endorsed by Mao, and both fell on the same side during the Hungarian protests of 1956. To further cement the friendship between the two leaders, the CCP showed full willingness to aid Albania in its path toward industrialization. Several Congresses in 1960 established the great divergence of the Chinese and Soviets, and the Albanians and Soviets, while simultaneously bringing together the Chinese and Albanians. The Conference in Bucharest, where the Eastern European countries labeled China as a warmonger and attempted to get Albania to do the same all but cemented Albania’s diplomatic isolation in the east and further cemented the path on which Albania was treading. The rest of the conference was spent, for the Albanians, masterfully frustrating and delaying the USSR’s delegations while buying time to publicize their own position. Khrushchev publicly exposing the Albanians in their “non-aligned” stance did nothing to help. At the Moscow Conference in 1960, Hoxha would verbally attack Khrushchev in a show of force, leading the Albanian delegation and using the opportunity to both proclaim Albania’s new diplomatic position as well as to shore up support for his regime within his ranks and back at home. After several attempts at rapprochement the following year, the country would break with the Soviets.
In short, there were several factors at play, but all were built around the fact that Hoxha and his regime were tiring of Moscow’s shadow over their country. There were many superficial reasons for Albania’s pivot to China, but they boil down to economic and ideological necessity. Economic policies in that Albania needed to shift toward heavy industry if it was to survive as an independent nation. A constant threat of annexation from the Yugoslavians and Albania lack of… well… anything pushed Hoxha for industrialization. More important, though, was ideology. It was Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, the subsequent critique of Hoxha by his own party, and Hoxha’s following purges that defined how Albania saw the USSR. In the Soviets, he saw an overbearing hegemon that wanted to dictate how Hoxha should run hiss country, and posed a threat to his rule and regime. The Soviets refused to aid the Albanians in transitioning to a more stable and prosperous economy, spoke out against the style of governance that Hoxha currently exhibited, and cozied up to the country’s enemies. In China, Hoxha saw a like-minded leader and nation, willing to lend aid and stand with it in support of whatever goals it sought. As the USSR and the CCP relationship began cracking, it provided Hoxha with the avenue he needed to achieve what he wanted. After a certain point, it was not a matter of if Albania would split with the Soviets, but when.
References
Marku, Y. (2019). Communist relations in crisis: the end of soviet-albanian relations, and the sino-soviet split, 1960-1961. The International History Review. 42(4): 813-822.
Zagoria, D. (1961). Khruschev's attack on albania and sino-soviet relations. The China Quarterly. (8): 1-19.