I can answer this question in relation to China, and how they employed certain strategies to work with the Mujahedeen in Pakistan and Afghanistan that follow certain Maoist lines.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and the Chinese Reaction

On December 31, 1979, the Soviet ambassador to Beijing was told by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "Afghanistan is China's neighbor... and therefore the Soviet armed invasion of that country poses a threat to China's security. This cannot but arouse the grave concern of the Chinese people." It was the first official comment where China actively showed interest in Soviet activity in Afghanistan. In January 1980 Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Pakistan and remarked his empathy for the Afghan refugees, assuring them of PRC support for their struggle and aid.

Primarily, China was outwardly concerned about the Badakhshan province of Afghanistan, which borders China. Inwardly, most officials agreed that the Soviet presence under the current situations were not threatening to China itself, but rather that China was angered by what it saw as the extermination of their influence in that region. Really, China was competing with the USSR for influence among other Asian nations and this was their best shot at doing so in the near Middle East. China's aggressive and radical state during the Cultural Revolution had left it politically isolated- Soviet advisors enjoyed status in Vietnam, and Afghanistan most concerningly. And of course unobstructed access to the Straits of Hormuz and all the oil that travelled through there was important to China's agenda of keeping Pakistan securely in their field.

It should be noted that while China's diplomatic response was incredibly vitriolic (especially considering their lack of attention in years prior), their practical response was far less exciting. China had declined a Soviet invitation for talks in 1978 prior to the Afghan Conflict, and their continual opposition to Soviet-oriented regimes throughout the 1970s (Angola, Ethiopia, and Yemen were all denounced by China) shows us how worried post-Mao officials were about being encircled by the USSR. This in turn helps push China hard into the US camp in the following years.

On the ground, China's assistance to Afghanistan was contained to material aid. The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan had the unintended consequence of dragging in more important players to the field, most notably the US, who worked with China and Pakistan to form a sort of informal anti-Soviet alliance in the region. They would support the Mujahedeen to attempt to contain Soviet expansion, but of course physically sending troops against the Soviet Union wasn't exactly practical. For all intents and purposes, this was meant to be the USSR's "Vietnam Moment." For China it was potential payback for Vietnam's (pro-Soviet) unseating of Pol Pot (pro-China) in 1978 and the subsequent Sino-Vietnamese conflict. China sent most of its aid through Pakistan, which acted as an unofficial camp in many areas for Mujahedeen looking to regroup and recruit displaced people into the conflict against the USSR. Chinese aid certainly helped the conflict, but it should be recognized that their aid was heavily dwarfed by US involvement, which saw more than 3 billion dollars worth of aid and materiel funnel into Afghanistan. Despite this, China continued to mainly aid the Mujahedeen mainly through Pakistan, who they gave full diplomatic and material support to.

China's support of Afghanistan saw more success internationally on the diplomatic stage. Publicly, China wrote the harshest of condemnations about the Soviet invasion. Deng Xiaoping stated that China demanded reduction of troops along the Sino-Soviet border in Mongolia, Withdrawal of support for the Soviet-backed Cambodian government, and unconditional departure from Afghanistan. Until these were acknowledged, China would not continue talks with the USSR. China spent a lot of effort on attempting to convince Western European nations and other developing nations of the USSR's evil nature. Chinese diplomats argued (with US support) that the Soviet ambitions in Afghanistan were a way to begin a plan of encircling the democratic world, controlling the oil trade in the Middle East and crippling Western nations. In regards to other developing nations, China stated publicly that:

Soviet tanks, aircraft and cannons killing Afghans in Afghanistan are making people everywhere see more clearly the true nature of the self-claimed 'natural ally' of the Third World. It is not without reason that the world is talking about the dangerous escalation of Brezhnevism - pg. 341, Hilali

China put emphasis on nearby Islamic nations that this was the time to mobilize, truly the first time they were united against imperialism. They wanted to mobilize world opinion to support a "People's War" being waged in Afghanistan. China noticed the demonstrations and strikes in Urban Afghanistan against the Soviets, the defection of government officials, and of course the mujahedeen itself being made up mostly of young, poorer Islamic followers. It all was evidence for China that this was a People's War.

Mujahedeen groups responded to China's diplomatic statements positively. In fact, Mujahedeen members had publicly stated that Chinese weapons were effective to counter the USSR and the best resource to fighting. In reality, its more likely that the US and Egypt supplied far more equipment, and better materiel at that.

Conclusion: Maoism and Mobilizing the People

As we can see from the main body of text, the Soviet-Afghan War was largely a political battle for China, and less concerning militarily. This lines up fairly well with the principles of Maoism concerning conflict. Maoism discusses mobilization in terms of societal organization. All of a nation can and should participate in war. Being behind the barrel of a rifle is but just one step in the struggle against imperialism. Mao places emphasis on mobilizing the whole country, arming guerilla soldiers, uniting minority groups, focusing on adjusting the economy to relevant measures, improving the livelihood of those fighting imperialism, etc. We can see a lot of this in Afghanistan in unique terms. China didn't necessarily organize tribal communities together to put forth some sort of pro-China government, but rather used themselves as a mouthpiece on many international affairs on behalf of the mujahedeen. They supplied materiel and humanitarian aid to displaced militias inside Pakistan. They shared intelligence about Soviet troop movements in Central Asia with their allies.

You don't really need modern technology to spread information. If there's one thing people love to do, it's talk, and nations in the developing world are not without their own media. For our case, Pakistan and China played a huge role in helping the Mujahedeen organize inside Pakistani borders, and recruiting displaced peoples is far easier than organizing youth from stable nations. But in the case of Sino-Mujahedeen relations, much of the organizing was done on behalf of one another, using intermediaries (particularly Pakistan) to wage conflict. China's efforts to discredit the USSR were ultimately unsuccessful. All Western European nations aside from Britain were cautious about not acknowledging the USSR's right to invade Afghanistan, and too many African nations were simply too reliant on Soviet aid to make any statements. The conflict was, however, far more successful in introducing China as a modern, and serious contender for international diplomatic power in the later part of the Cold War.

Sources

A.Z Hilali, China's Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Wen-hui Tsai, Mass Mobilization Campaigns in Mao's China

Mao Zedong, "For the Mobilization of all the Nation's Forces for Victory in the War of Resistance"