Title.
Which of these events were the most influential for the surrender? Thank you in advance!
The answer is that both played critical roles in the surrender of Japan in WW2, as did hundreds of other events that led up to this point in the prior years. The problem with the camp that believes that the Japanese surrendered due to the entry of the Soviets is that they usually take one of two additional leaps: 1) the US is the bad guy for dropping the atomic bomb, and Japan is the victim, or 2) That Japan surrendered because they feared the might of the Soviet army. I won’t go into the first as Japan was obviously not the victim in WW2, but will try and debunk the second.
There have been several respected historians who have argued that the Japanese surrendered due to the invasion of Manchuria and not the bomb, notably Paul Ham who wrote Hiroshima Nagasaki: The True Story of the Bombings and their Aftermath. Probably the main reason why there is an argument to be made is because the Japanese government in the latter half of WW2 was kind of complicated.
First there is Emperor Hirohito, who was Emperor from Dec 25, 1926 to 7 Jan 1989. Next you have the Japanese Supreme War Council or Big Six. The Supreme War Council effectively ruled Japan during the war, and consisted of:
Next you had the Cabinet, which consisted of 19 members of the civilian government and military establishment, including Suzuki, Togo, Anami, and Yonai. The Supreme War Council was effectively in charge of the country and had complete discretion on prosecution of the war or in fact surrender. The Emperor was Divine, and his word was sacrosanct, but it was not customary for the Emperor to approach the Government to make his views known. In fact, he only became involved when the government approached him to ask his opinion.
It’s also important to note that Japanese law required that that the Army be part of the Cabinet. This meant that Anami held a position where he could veto any action by simply resigning.
After Midway, Guadalcanal, and Saipan, several members of the cabinet saw the writing on the wall. Among the Big Six, Tōgō was probably the only member in this camp. Suzuki continually vacillated until August 9th, and Yonai also joined the peace camp around this time although he was generally a hawk. Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu were always hawks and only agreed to peace once the War Council approached Hirohito for his opinion and risked going against the Emperor’s wishes.
The timeline that led up to the surrender of Japan is as follows.
· July 1945 – Potsdam Conference between Allied leaders
· August 6 – Bombing of Hiroshima
· August 7 – Meeting of the Big Six
· August 9 – Soviets notify Ambassador Naotake Sato that Japan and the Soviet Union were now at war and the invasion of Manchuria begins (The actual invasion probably began the evening of the 8th)
· August 9 – Bombing of Nagasaki
· August 14 – Hirohito’s speech is broadcast to the nation announcing the surrender of Japan.
The question of why Japan finally surrendered boils down to the opinions and actions of the Big Six and the Emperor from August 7 to August 9th.
First off, when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the Japanese knew from a theoretical standpoint what an atomic bomb was. When the bomb was dropped, they suspected it was an atomic bomb, but it took a full two days to confirm that it was, in fact, an atomic bomb.
Second, you had the three hawks on the Supreme War Council; Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu, who never really agreed to surrender until Hirohito was asked to give his opinion which was to surrender. While the Big Six were in effect, in charge of running the country, going against the Emperor was a leap that was unheard of in Japanese culture. Despite this there was a coup against the Emperor known as the Kyūjō incident where several junior officers seized control of the Emperor and killed the leader of the Imperial Guard and his aide. They failed to convince the Emperor or the remainder of the army and did not dare to harm the Emperor, so they ended up committing suicide.
Back to the importance of the Soviets breaking the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941. The Japanese had realized that the war was not going to their advantage and had sought to broker a peace deal with the Allies through the Soviets. The terms the Japanese sought included the preservation of the imperial house, that there be no Allied occupation and that demilitarization, and any war crimes trials be conducted by Japan itself. This was a nonstarter for the US and Britain, and while it was also rebuffed by the Soviets, they were careful not to communicate this to the Japanese as they sought to prepare for war and create an advantageous position to take Japanese territory. When the Soviets entered the war, it removed any hope for a negotiated peace.
As to why the threat of military might wasn’t important to the decision to surrender, there are a couple of important points. First, the loss of armies in foreign lands never bothered the Japanese leadership. They had lost hundreds of thousands of men in Tarawa, Guadalcanal, Borneo, the Philippines, Okinawa and Saipan. They were prepared to sacrifice millions more including women and Children in defense of the homelands. The loss of the Kwantung Army would not have impacted their decision on ending the war.
The thought of the Soviet Army invading the Japanese homelands is ridiculous. The only Navy that the Soviets had was lent to them by the US as part of Project Hula. They lost a full third of their landing ships to shore batteries in the invasion of the Kuril islands after Japan had already surrendered. The US had already blockaded Japan and had more aircraft carriers and escort carriers than the Soviets had ships in total, the largest Soviet ships being Tacoma Class patrol frigates.
In the end, the Soviet invasion was incredibly important. It removed any idea of a negotiated surrender. It brought the hawks in the Supreme War Council to entertain the idea of surrender and approach the Emperor for his opinion. But at the end of the day, the final decision was made by the Emperor, and he made very clear in his speech to the people of Japan as well as public and private conversations afterwards that the atomic bombs were the main reason for the surrender of Japan.
- Barton J. Bernstein, The Struggle over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative, in Judgment at the Smithsonian
- Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender—A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review 67, no. 4
- Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999)
- Tōgō Shigenori, Jidai no ichimen