Hi, sorry to be answering so late! I am actually researching both of these events for my undergraduate history thesis, and I'm glad I can put my knowledge to some use. My paper is specifically looking at the motivations of leadership in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, so the answer will be from that perspective. Unfortunately as an undergraduate student from the United States, I don't speak the relevant languages, so I have had to rely on translated material. Lets dive into it!

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The Hungarian Revolution and Prague Spring were fascinating displays of political and military aggression by the Soviets against supposed allies. In both instances the Soviet Union's action was taken in response to political reform efforts. Now, the reform efforts in Hungary, while motivated by average Hungarians, were very much a political process. In the case of Hungary, it was the Prime Minister, Imre Nagy, who implemented reforms as a response to public demand. In Nagy's view, there was a method of socialism, "which could be pursued without ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’”^(1) It is important to note that this was contrary to the Soviet model of how socialism was meant to be practiced.^(2) The party in the Soviet model was meant to dominate the social and political atmosphere. To put it short, there was not supposed to be a questioning of the national communist party, nor was the party supposed to abdicate its monopoly of power. Now, you may notice, Imre Nagy was only the Prime Minister of Hungary, he was not the General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. That title, at the start of the Hungarian Revolution, belonged to Erno Gero. He rejected, at least in part, the Hungarian Revolution, and he specifically called on Soviet forces already in Hungary to help put down the revolters.^(3) What it is important to take away from this, is that the Hungarian Revolution is in a way, a Soviet characterization of the events. Just as important is idea that Hungarian leadership was itself split on the matter. A man such as Imre Nagy, who while a reformer was still communist, would have suggested the Hungarian Revolution was no more than an attempt to reform socialism. The goal, as was insisted upon by Nagy, was that the reforms were an attempt to fit socialism to Hungary. The Soviets, on the other hand, did not see room for a case by case application of socialism. Even amongst Hungarian leadership, the party itself, evidenced by the actions of General Secretary Gero, did not support the method reformers were taking.

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The connection the of the Hungarian Revolution to the events of the Prague Spring is interesting, because of how it weighed on the minds of Czech leadership. Like Nagy before him, the leader of Czech reform at the party level, Alexander Dubcek, rejected the notion that reform meant a turn away from socialism. Rather, Dubcek characterized the efforts as a reapplication of Marxist-Leninist principles.^(4) In part this was because of the response that met the Hungarians during their reforms, which weighed on the mind of Dubcek. He was careful not to characterize the reforms as anything more than a way to strengthen socialism in Czechoslovakia. However, at the same time the response by the Soviets to the Prauge Spring caught Dubcek offguard. He mentioned himself in his autobiography Hope Dies Last that following the Hungarian Revolution, "the Soviets had made great efforts to present themselves as consistent opponents of aggression,” and even stating that, "Until the last moment, I did not believe the Soviet leaders would launch a military attack on us.”^(5) So as to your final questions, it did and it did not. The Czechoslovakian leadership certainly understood that any attempt to reform had to be made in a way which did not provoke the Soviets. They mentioned reform in a manner which invoked a strengthening of socialism, and a return to the roots of socialist ideology in Marx and Lenin. However, as over a decade had passed, and as the Soviets had softened their rhetoric, there was a sense by Dubcek that the Soviets would not openly attack an Eastern Bloc nation.

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Each reform effort on its own is a fascinating event, but looking at the Hungarian Revolution and Prague Spring together is fascinating. I did not want to write a whole paper here, because I still have to finish my own, but there are so many intricate details that make the story interesting. One example is the conversation between Dubcek and the Hungarian General Secretary who was placed into power by the Soviets after the Hungarian Revolution, about the Prague Spring. But to answer your question, in the words of the Hungarian and Czech leadership, their efforts were socialist reforms. They verbally committed to the ideals of socialism, and were adapting the Soviet model to their own nation. The Soviets viewed any departure from their prescribed model as a threat and thus took action. In the case of the Prague Spring, Dubcek certainly understood what occurred in Hungary in 1956, but he genuinely thought the Soviet Union would not act.

^(1) ^(Györkei, Jenő, and Miklós Horváth.) *^(Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956)*^(. New York: Central European University Press, 1999. 130.)

^(2) ^(Dubček, Alexander, and Jiří Hochman.) ^(Hope Dies Last : The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek.) ^(New York: Kodansha International, 1993. 148.)

^(3) ^(Gyarmati, György, and Tibor Valuch.) *^(Hungary under Soviet Domination: 1944-1989)*^(. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 262.)

^(4) ^(Ello, Paul, Alexander Dubček, and Komunistická Strana Československa Ústřední Výbor.) ^(Dubcek's Blueprint for Freedom: His Original Documents Leading to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia.) ^(London: Kimber, 1969. 67.)

^(5) ^(Dubček, Alexander, and Jiří Hochman.) ^(Hope Dies Last : The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek.) ^(178-179.)