They must have, considering he was sent into exile twice ;)

The real turning point in the wars against Napoleon was the Battle of Leipzig, fought from 16-19 October 1813. Napoleon's army was drawn from all over Europe, with 200,000 French, German, Italian, and Polish troops fighting under the eagles. The battle was the climax of the Fall Campaign, which for the first time pit France against every Great Power in Europe, with Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia arrayed against Napoleon; they brought 3-400,000 men between them throughout the fight. The battle itself was mostly a brutal struggle of attrition, in which each side gradually committed their reserves, burning out their fresh troops and replacing them as necessary. The Allies, having brought the stronger army, kept their edge, until Napoleon had only 10,000 fresh troops in reserve on the 18th, while the Allies had 100,000. Facing complete destruction if he continued to fight, Napoleon pulled out, and the dregs of his army shambled over the Rhine eleven days later. His empire beyond France collapsed, and though he fought hard against vastly superior forces through 1814, there was no longer any doubt he would be defeated (though it wasn't known just what form this defeat would take until the very end).

So if the empire collapsed because Napoleon lost the Battle of Leipzig, and he lost the battle because he brought the weaker army, why was the battle fought at all?

After the 1813 Summer Armistice, the Allies would oppose Napoleon with three main armies: The Army of the North (based around Berlin), the Army of Silesia due east of Napoleon's position, and the Army of Bohemia to the south. All told, the balance of forces at the beginning of the Fall Campaign stood at 575,000 Imperials to 655,000 Allies, counting garrisons and reserve forces in addition to field troops. While the Allies enjoyed a numerical edge, it was hardly insurmountable, especially since the awkward position of the armies would make it difficult to mass forces against an Imperial advance. Napoleon would thus have the opportunity to attack one Allied army with superior forces while the others were too far away to help.

In response to this danger, Allied officers drafted a number of war plans during the armistice. The one that emerged as the guiding principle for operations in the fall became known as the Reichenbach plan, with the groundwork being laid down by the Austrian-led Army of Bohemia's chief of staff, Radetzky. He predicted Napoleon would make his first offensive against the Army of Bohemia with his main force, leaving smaller armies to keep the Army of the North and the Army of Silesia at a respectful distance until he could defeat the Army of Bohemia in battle. In response, Radetzky established the principle that the army attacked by Napoleon with his main force should retreat, while the others advance aggressively against the secondary armies and Napoleon's line of communications. Napoleon's skill at massing superior forces for the decisive battle was well-known, but Radetzky also recognized the zeal his presence on the field inspired in his war-weary men and marshals; denying him a chance to employ his talents would be critical.

One of the most important aspects of strategy is determining the correct goal for the operations. This goal can vary from simply wearing down the enemy so as to make them more amenable to cutting a deal, or defeating them completely, leaving them unable to resist. The former was characteristic of C1700 warfare, in which monarchs waged war to gain taxable provinces, trading territories like bargaining chips; the general battle, in which everything is risked in hope of a complete victory, was generally something to be avoided. The Austrian Archduke Charles, formerly considered one of Napoleon's most able enemies, retained this strategic outlook; when recounting battles, he passes over enemy losses in silence, considering them of little importance compared to gaining the position held by the enemy. It should come as no surprise, then, that in all his victories, his opponents never suffered great losses of prisoners or guns, the chief metric for judging damage inflicted on the enemy.

In the Fall Campaign, though, the Allies pursued the latter goal, the destruction of the enemy's ability to resist. Rather than pursuing a general engagement from the beginning, though, they sought to degrade the French fighting strength first, through the aforementioned attacks against secondary armies and threats to communication lines. These operations would force the French to march back and forth to no purpose; as marching is a force of active destruction on an army, compelling the enemy to make many strenuous marches can cause heavy losses through sickness, straggling and desertion, fatigue, and so on.

Schwarzenberg, commanding the main Allied force in Bohemia, explained the plan in action in a letter to his wife.

My pursuing vanguard made several hundred prisoners, who were almost dying of hunger. The road is covered with dead horses; the lack of food of all kinds is extraordinary, and it is to be hoped that this type of war will soon put the enemy army in a considerable degree of hardship. Heaven is favorable to us. This rain is destroying the troops as they march, so I hope it will give us a significant advantage. If Napoleon marches against Blücher, he will not accept a battle, but will retire on his magazines, and the French army will again, without achieving any purpose, become fatigued and starve in plundered Lusatia. But if Napoleon marches against the crown prince, Blücher can attack his rear.