In his Travels, Marco Polo devotes a short passage on Japan. While the question of whether he visited Japan itself (or really anywhere in his Travels) is debatable, it is an interesting acknowledgement of a land that is often shrouded in mystery and it certainly demonstrates awareness of Japan. However, this also makes me wonder, what if any awareness or involvement did Japan have with the outside world?
For reference, I am looking at Japan ideally during the Middle Ages, between 1100 AD and 1400 AD, before the Sengoku Jidai. Did Medieval Japan participate in the Silk Road? If so, to what extent? And what if any goods, ideas or people would have moved between Japan and the outside world through the Silk Road? And what if any knowledge did Japan have of the outside world? Not just of China or Goryeo, but also of India, the Muslim Sultanates of South East Asia, Central Asia, etc. Did the Shoguns of Medieval Japan have any trade, contact or knowledge of the Islamic World? Or Christian Europe?
By restricting your query to Japan's history prior to the Sengoku Jidai (let's say 1500 for round number sake), I'm afraid the answer is not very exciting. In short, there was "awareness" of the outside world, but no direct interaction with any of it until the mid-16th century with the arrival of Europeans. But before we get to that conclusion, let's first discuss the concept of "world-systems" so that we can develop a lens through which we can view early-medieval Japan through.
World-system theory (wiki) is a concept that goes beyond my breadth of knowledge as I focus mainly on early Japanese history and associated tangents (buddhism, et al). American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, in the late 20th century, describes the system as being composed of three elements: a single "world" market (mercantilism/capitalism), a "world" economy characterized by a multiple "state" system (nation-states, hegemons, etc), and a three-tiered structure to the "world" (core, periphery, and semi-periphery). A number of scholars use this concept when they engage in analysis of the ancient world, what it might have looked like, interactions, etc.
However, other scholars define "world-systems" differently. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall define world-systems as "intersocietal networks in which the interactions (eg, trade, warfare, intermarriage, information) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in these local structures." Basically, a system requires strong internal ties and autonomy from its external environment. Chase-Dunn and Hall further expand upon this to describe four categories of intersocietal links which, when combined, make up a "world-system":
The boundaries of each system don't necessarily overlap neatly, and over time may expand or contract. Two separate world-systems may merge into one, such as ancient China and the Korean peninsula. Then they may merge into three, when the Land of Wa (Japan) begins to emerge. It's all dynamic interaction that takes place over time. Which leads us to the root of you question: what was Japan's world-system prior to the arrival of the Europeans in the mid-16th century? For an answer, let's turn to Bruce Batten's work To The Ends of Japan and look at the political/military network.
Batten points out what everyone already knows: the relative easy of accessibility across the islands meant the internal political/military network was strong. This is important because the concept of "statehood" in Japan really doesn't emerge until the 7-8th centuries AD (a topic I allude to in this comment in a thread about Japan's imperial family origins and Korea associations). Along the way to that goal were a number of political and military actions in what we shall call their political/military network: China and the Korean kingdoms (Paekche, Koguryo, Silla, and later Parhae). You have Queen Himiko sending tributes to the Chinese Emperor Wei, who conferred title upon her in the 3rd century AD. She was not the first, though; the Hou Han Shu ( 後漢書 ) and archaeological evidence date Yayoi emissaries from the land of Na as early as 57 CE (Japan was called Wa 倭 at the time). By the time the 5the century AD rolls around, Yuryaku Tenno would be the first "King of Wa" (Wa no O 倭之王 ) if you believe his letters to China. In reality, he was one of five paramounts with whom the Liu Sung dynasty maintained diplomatic contacts with in the 5th century- last of the five to send an emissary, but third to receive recognition.
All of that is important because it shows the emergence of statehood, which impacts the "world-system" model above. Japan's political/military network prior to the Sengoku Jidai can be divided into three phases according to Batten: a pattern of progressive engagement with the Korean peninsula and China up through the Nara timeframe; a progressive pattern of disengagement during the Heian; and last is a return to active political/military involvement during the Kamakura and Muromachi... though not all of those were state-driven. Wako (pirates) play a role there.
I cover the engagement with the peninsula and China above; it was based around the establishment of the polity, bringing "Japan" into existence as a single entity. Disengagement began in Nara and would last around 350 years until the first Mongol invasion in the 13th century. Japan's embassies in China were suspended in the 9th century (the Tang fell in 907 AD); relations were maintained with Parhae (state founded by Paekche+Koguryo elites that fled to Manchuria) until they were destroyed by the Khitan in 926; Silla was an antagonist the whole time. When the Khitan Liao and Song came into power in the 11th century, Japan stubbornly resisted diplomatic overtures. Those overtures would eventually lead to the Mongol invasion and subsequent re-engagement during the Kamakura.
Disengagement began as a result of the Japan polity coming to completion. They recognized their envious position as an island archipelago, and after firmly establishing themselves as "equivalent" to China as a state, they felt no need to continue; they were free to regulate their relations with the continent based on their own internal needs and desires, and at the pace and depth of their choosing instead of one driven by conflict between nations sharing land borders. The freedom lessened the need for official relations with China, and the unifying land of Wa made it less attractive. Not all ties were severed, but that will come later (trade).
The Yuan (Mongols) changed Japan self-isolation. See, when Kublai Khan was seeking to conquer the Song, he viewed them as strong. To conquer the Song, he needed to strengthen control over then Koryo, calling it the Mongol's "eastern vassal state." He also recognized Japan as a trade partner (more below) which meant finances to the Song. A treaty would remove Japan from the Song equation. Kublai's first envoys arrived in Dazaifu in 1268, documents sent to Kyoto, and no answer given. The envoys were sent home. All subsequent envoys were sent home as well without answer. This is because the court found the initial dispatch to be a declaration of war; the reasons for that are complicated and worth of their own post as it involves both the court (warriors) butting heads with the Mongols (invaders) while simultaneously viewing the idea of a Mongol threat as a way to solve internal politics with Nichiren's fanclub. Eventually the Mongols attack... twice... and fail both times.
Interestingly enough, after those failures, open trade began to take place between Japan and the Yuan (Mongols). And then the Yuan sent numerous diplomatic envoys with edicts to Japan. None of them succeeded in their efforts. This led to the Yuan to begin fearing a Japan retaliation, and thus they imposed trade regulations. Japan responded by arming themselves, which led to a "forced trade" of sorts. On top of that, wako attacks on the Yuan ensued for grain and slaves. One of the first diplomatic requests of the Muromachi was the suppress the wako raids, which the shogunate did as an appeasement measure to the Ming dynasty in China and Yi dynasty in Korea. Years later, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, after having unified the northern and southern courts, send envoys to China to establish official relations for the first time in awhile... and was rebuffed at first, but eventually was accepted when he received an envoy from Ming with document acknowledging Japan as a vassal state to China (a marked departure from the "equal state" view held previous). That was done for political reasons; Ming China thus recognized him as "King of Japan," and gained him the support of China.
All that just to show how prior to the Sengoku Jidai, Japan's Political/military network was firmly defined by it's own islands (minus Hokkaido), the Korean peninsula, and China. And the Ryukyu, for the Ryukyu become important when we turn to two trade networks: bulk and prestige goods. On the topic of bulk goods, Batten points out that from the Nara to Muromachi, Japan's bulk good network was almost entirely internal. It wouldn't be until the late Muromachi when trade with Hokkaido takes place, let alone the Ryukyu. He points out some bulk good would make it to China and Korea during this timeframe, but they were isolated "small-scale flows" that don't fit a larger Japan-China-Korea network for bulk goods. That doesn't happen until after the Sengoku Jidai.
(cont)