I remember family visits to Pakistan Azad Kashmir in the analogue TV days pre-2006 or whatever. Villagers could easily pick up Doordarshan (Indian tele) as it was just across the border. So I'm wondering was it the same for those living in USSR regions bordering Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey. Would they have been able to catch up on their favourite Iranian or Turkish soaps in their free time or on current events outside the USSR?
Edit: reposting this with a more accurate title... thanks!
As there doesn't seem to be much in the way of answers yet as a layman i'll give a specific example of a Pakistani planned incursion into the USSR that took place during the war. It isn't exactly the same as your question but should be interesting nonetheless and is related. It comes from a book called Afganistan, The Bear Trap: The Defeat Of A Superpower written by a member of ISI called Mohammed Yusuf who was heavily involved in assisting the Mujahideen in their campaign against the soviets.
Mohammed Yusuf with the help of the CIA organised the distribution of propaganda (mostly Korans, but also CIA created pamphlets on soviet atrocities). Initially in 1984 a man called Wali Beg was sent out to cross over the Afghan Soviet border and check to see whether anyone was interested in receiving the propaganda material. To do this, at night time he swum across the roughly 600 metre wide Amu river using a goatskin that had been inflated with air. He then walked to a local border village where he spent his time discussing potential aid they could be given and hiding out as shepherd up in the hills. He also examined local military installations such as an airfield.
This crossing of the Amu river become more formalized and fighters began transporting books and pamphlets, roughly 300 at a time across the river in small boats, some equipped only with paddles and others with outboard engines.
Mohammed Yusuf steadily escalated Mujahideen activities in the USSR as time went on, with rifles and British supplied limpit mines being used to sink a number of Soviet barges that were used to traverse the Amu river. Rocket launchers were also used to attack Soviet freight trains and power lines and on one occasion in 1986 roughly 30 fighters crossed the river in order to attack some hydro electric power stations. The Sherkhan fuel silo also came under attack with local commanders sneaking fighters armed with rocket launchers into range to fire upon it.
Things eventually came to head in 1987 when a collection of ambitious missions (namely an attack on an airfield, the ambush of a collection of soviet military vehicles and a rocket attack on an industrial complex over 20 kilometres into the USSR) resulted in the USSR escalating. The Soviet Union threatening military action in retaliation against Pakistan who they new was supporting the Mujihaideen. This threat was enough for President Zia to order the immediate cessation of all future missions in the Soviet Union. The local CIA chief apparently said to Mohammed Yusuf after the incident "Please don’t start a third world war by conducting these operations inside Soviet territory".
So to get back to your question, the Soviet Union attempted to stop Pakastani and Afghan influence in the neighboring SSR's through border patrols and physical barriers. However the fact that these operations were able to continue for so long, that they received a not insignificant amount of local assistance, that a decent amount of anti-soviet propaganda was distributed and that there were instances of soviet troops from those areas defecting and joining the Mujihaideen suggests that these efforts were not particularly effective. Also TV's were expensive items and the border SSR's in the Union did not have nearly as wealthy a population as say the Baltic SSR's, making it less possible for many citizens to have a "favorite soap". I would also comment that the fact the CIA and ISI (as far as I can tell) did not set up a radio similar to Radio Free Europe and had great trouble getting local Mujahideen commanders access to radios suggests that radio ownership was not particularly common in the area. However the subject of media communication inside the USSR is only a very small subset of the information given in the book, so I would welcome a more qualified commenter providing additional information.
The short answer is that the Turkish, Iranian or Afghan radio and television signal picked up by Turkish and Persian speakers in the South Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia was so unsubstantial that the Soviet authorities did not see any use in jamming the latter. This can feel a bit counter-intuitive, given the current media landscape:
Commercial Turkish TV channels and Iranian diaspora channels (such as Manoto TV) are a relatively common occurrence in contemporary urban households of the ex-Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, respectively (alongside Russian TV channels, unsurprisingly). One can attribute this to the rich choice of such foreign programming (the range and quality of domestic TV broadcasting is seen as poor) and, more importantly, to the fact that satellite dishes have finally become affordable in the past two or three decades.
An exploration of the structural factors, such as technology, demographics and geopolitics of the Cold War era can therefore provide a more satisfactory answer to your question.
Sag0Sag0 alluded to a very good point, namely that the only prominent historical case of mass media programming from outside the Eastern Bloc gaining a cultural foothold on Soviet territory pertains to Estonia, specifically the capital of Tallinn and adjacent areas. The residents of the latter were able to catch itinerant Finnish TV signal ever since 1971 (Estonian-speakers can develop listening comprehension of spoken Finnish with relative ease). The reason why the Soviet authorities did not make a greater effort to counter this was the perceived benign character of TV programming coming from a neutral (albeit admittedly capitalist) country and the latter country's reasonably close relations with the USSR.
Cultural encroachment from Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in the form of radio and TV broadcasting was not a common-enough phenomenon to warrant Moscow's attention. If anything, the "soft power projection" dynamic was in the opposite direction.
Ideologically slanted, Soviet-backed radio programming aimed at Turkish (in the form of the East Germany-based Bizim Radyo (Our Radio)) and Iranian (in the form of the Baku-based Râdiyo-ye sedâ-ye melli-ye Irân (National Voice of Iran Radio)) audiences would not openly admit to being the mouthpiece of a foreign superpower, despite broadcasting continuously for three entire decades since the late 1950s. Shortwave radios across the globe would also be able to catch Radio Moscow, which was much more open about its state affiliation and editorial policy. Regional branches such as Radio Yerevan, Radio Baku, Radio Dushanbe and Radio Tashkent would broadcast in the regional languages spoken in the USSR's southern neighbourhood, such as Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish and Persian, but also in Urdu and Hindi in the case of Radio Tashkent.
Only an extremely small segment of the population of Turkey, Iran, or Afghanistan (such as the people on the northernmost fringes of Iranian Azerbaijan, the Turkmensahra and Afghan Turkestan) was able to catch itinerant "domestic" radio and TV signal emanating from the Soviet Republics, more often than not in a language they could understand.
So why was picking up radio and television frequencies even less often the case in the opposite direction, USSR-ward?
Regional demographics, further altered by Soviet "social engineering" on the USSR side, and the promotion of the state language at the expense of regional languages southward, across the border, played a role: Virtually no part of Eastern Turkey directly bordered Azerbaijani Turkish-speaking areas of the Soviet Union. Like many other "untrustworthy" Soviet ethnic groups with cross-border kinship ties, the bulk of Meskhetians (Ahıska Turks) of Southwestern Georgia had been deported to Central Asia in 1944, on the orders of Stalin. As far as Iranian radio broadcasting was concerned, the absence of Azerbaijani language (the second most widely spoken language of Iran) media programming disallowed Iran's unintentional mass media penetration into Soviet Azerbaijan. Northeastern Iran, in turn, was too far from the Persian-speaking population centres of Southern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for commonly used radio frequencies.
It perhaps should be mentioned that one of the factors behind the establishment of Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic in the late 1920s (up to that point a mere autonomous republic within Soviet Uzbekistan) was the "soft power projection" potential Soviet authorities saw in showcasing a Persian-language Leninist-Marxist polity. The aim was to appeal to the "culturally Persianate" Muslim intelligentsia of British India via media broadcasting, travel grants and print publications.
In the same decade, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk formulated the objective for his newly founded Turkish Republic of consolidating a Turkish nation exclusively within the borders of the Republic. He thus eschewed the distraction that a nation-building process inclusive of the Turkic speakers abroad, especially those living in the Soviet Union, would inevitably entail.
Unlike pre-Revolutionary Iran and NATO member Turkey, Afghanistan was already solidly in the Soviet orbit by the 1970s, the decade when radio ownership became commonplace in this poor country.
It ultimately boils down to the context of the Cold War. The foci of the propaganda struggle between the American-led Bloc and the Eastern Bloc were Central Europe and East/Southeast Asia (with US-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia's foreign language services reflecting this). Any Western-backed plan to gain a cultural foothold of the Soviet "Southern periphery" by means of radio or television broadcasting would have had to overcome this peripheral status. As far as purely "domestic" radio and television waves unintentionally crossing the border into Soviet population centres were concerned, the border-adjacent areas would generally lack an audience fluent in Turkish (in the case of Georgia and Armenia) or Persian (in the case of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan). This was a bit of a paradoxical situation, given that millions of Soviet citizens further East would have no trouble understanding standard Turkish and Iranian Persian, as the recent proliferation of satellite TV has clearly demonstrated.
Sources (non-exhaustive list):
https://www.viewjournal.eu/articles/10.18146/2213-0969.2013.jethc034/
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/shahsavan-grip-development