The main reasoning behind the taking of Tarawa was for it to be used as a testing ground for the new theory of “island hopping.” The upper echelons of the Navy/Marines, particularly Admirals Nimitz and Spruance dispatched a ragtag force of the Marines and assets they had available after the prolonged campaigns of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Cape Gloucester, and so on. The unfortunate unit to befall this assignment was the 2nd Marine Division. They were sent to Tarawa from New Zealand with Task Force 45 (TF-45) and would arrive there in late November, 1943. The Marines were equipped this time with new LVT-2s for the first wave followed by the standard shallow draft LVCPs. Navy intelligence failed to properly utilize the intelligence provide by British expatriates (Tarawa was a British possession) who warned off the unpredictable tide and coral reefs. The Marines disembarked under the cover of darkness and launched an reconnaissance plane, which was spotted by a keen Japanese sentry who alerted Tarawa’s defenses and began to take shots at the ship from which it had launched. This ship - which was acting as the command post for the entire Marine/Navy operation) returned fire with its 16 inch guns, the concussion of which knocked out its radios and shorted the electricity. For the remainder of the battle, communications from on shore to off shore would be incredibly limited and sporadic. The American bombardment of the island was stopped 10 minutes prematurely to allow the smoke to clear, which enabled the Japanese to not only consolidate their defenses but also redirect the majority of their troops to the northern sector of the island where the Marines were poised to land. The Japanese commander originally thought they would land in the south based on the geography. As such, the Japanese were dug in and prepared for the Marine assault. Additionally, an often overlooked aspect is how intricate the Japanese defenses were and who were manning them. The Japanese had spent months fortifying the island with intricate trench systems, bunkers, mutli-purpose anti-aircraft guns that could be depressed to fire at approaching crafts, 8 inch Vickers cannons, 3 inch AT guns, machine gun posts, minefields, strongholds, barbed wire, barbed wire landing craft obstacles, and more. The men manning these defenses were of the elite Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF), the Imperial Japanese Marines - a highly trained, motivated, and experienced force. Their leader also had experience with naval landings, having participated in several during the campaigns in China in the 1930s. This is what the Marines faced as they landed and this was a major factor as to why they suffered so dearly. Another factor was the pure volume of fire forced many coxswains to drift off course and land their men on in the wrong areas. When the LVCPs came to follow, they became stuck on the coral reef and the Marines had to go over the side and wade 500-700 yards to shore well within few of the pre-ranged, interlocking Japanese guns with coral cutting through their boots. Needless to say, casualties were incredibly high among those who did make it ashore. On beaches Red 1 and 2, the most resistance was met and small gains were made. Red 3 faired better with destroyers nearby to support - they only experienced 25 casualties in the first wave. Communications were poor among all units - their radios had been soaked in salt water and the majority of the runners dispatched were cut down by Japanese snipers. There was a 200 yard gap in-between beaches Red 2 and 3, Red 1 was isolated as well. The cut off communication meant that for the first day, supplies could not be landed and the wounded could not be evacuated. The Japanese were poised to make a counter-attack that night - the Japanese were renowned night fighters and the Marines were located in precarious defensive positions, isolated from one another, low on ammo, low in manpower, and had their backs quite literally to the ocean. What saved the Marines was a decision made by the Japanese commanding officer and their staff to leave their bunker HQ and make it into a hospital. A Marine onshore spotted them and called in a barrage, which killed the commander and all of his staff. From then on the Japanese were relatively aimless and did not mount a counter-attack. The following day the Marines consolidated their position, evacuated the wounded, received reinforcements, tanks came ashore, and the assault was brought on inland. Thus began another costly campaign of brutal close quarters fighting. The battle would end 3 days later and provide the Americans important lessons on future island hopping campaigns such as waterproofing radios.