In WWI, if things went as the British hoped, there would have been one large battleship engagement between the British and German fleets, in which the German fleet would have been crushed. As it was, the German losses at Jutland were light compared to what the British had hoped for, but it still achieved the objective of encouraging the German fleet to stay in port. If the Germans had been willing to try again, until their fleet was destroyed or the British fleet too damaged to contain the German, there could have been more major battleship engagements. The Germans weren't willing to try again, so the German-British battleship battles stayed at 1 (or 2, if you count the battlecruiser engagement at Dogger Bank).

Russia fought in the other 6 battleship engagements of the war, twice against the Germans in the Gulf of Riga, and four times against the Ottomans in the Black Sea. Only one of these battles involved a Russian dreadnought, with Russian pre-dreadnoughts fighting in the other battles (the opposing Ottoman battleship being the battlecruiser Yavuz in all 4 of the Black Sea battles).

Austria-Hungary began the war with 12 battleships, 9 of them pre-dreadnoughts, with a 13 battleship commissioned in 1915. Geography did not favour the Austro-Hungarian fleet, which spent the war bottled up in the Adriatic. Most of the Austro-Hungarian battleships survived, with one dreadnought lost to an Italian torpedo boat, and another in harbour to Italian frogmen.

In WWII, the German navy had very few battleships, and did its best to avoid battleship vs battleship, since this would quickly lead to the end of the German ships. Despite their efforts, German battleships fought battleships as many times in WWII as in WWI: four times (however, the WWII battles were all very small). Scharnhorst and Gneisenau fought Renown during the invasion of Norway, with the German ships using their superior speed to escape after Gneisenau was hit thrice. The other 3 German battles were the Bismarck vs Prince of Wales and Hood, the soon-after sinking of the Bismarck, and finally the sinking of Scharnhorst two and a half years later. Of the other German battleships, Tirpitz was sunk by air attack, Gneisenau spent much of the war in port in a cycle of being damaged by bombing and being under repair, and the two German pre-dreadnoughts stayed in the Baltic, safely away from British battleships.

The Italian navy only had a few more battleships than the Germans, eight in total (4 at the start of the war, and 4 more commissioned during the war), and also wanted to preserve them. Three battles involved both Italian and British battleships, but only in one of these battleships did battleships shoot at battleships. At Cape Spartivento (27th November 1940), the Italians sought to avoid battle (in accordance with orders to avoid battle unless they had a large advantage, and the principle of preserving their battleships as a fleet-in-being), and the Italian battleships stayed out of the battle. At Cape Matapan (28-29th March 1941), both the Italian and British battleships fired, but at the enemy cruisers rather than battleships. Only at Calabria (9th July 1940) did British and Italian battleships fire on each other, at the extreme range of about 25km. Despite the range, Giulio Cesare almost hit Warspite, and Warspite hit Giulio Cesare, encouraging the Italians to break off. The Italian conservative approach meant that most of their battleships survived the war, with only Roma being sunk (by a German guided bomb after the Italian surrender).

With the British navy busy in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, the main opportunities for large battleship-vs-battleship engagements lay with the Japanese and US in the Pacific. Pre-war planning foresaw a major naval battle for the control of the Philippines. It was expected that Japan would invade the Philippines, successfully, and the US response would be to send the fleet (from the US perspective, hopefully while US forces still held the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor), and the winner of this naval battle would win the war. The Japanese pre-war plan was to use submarines and carrier air strikes to whittle down the US fleet, which, along with their secret weapon - the Yamato class battleships, designed to defeat any US battleship that could fit through the Panama Canal - would ensure victory. The pre-emptive strike on Pearl Harbor left the US fleet incapable of this relief of the Philippines, and the war did not follow the pre-war plan.

Despite the Pearl Harbor losses, the USA still had more battleships than Japan - 11 old battleships from the 1920s and earlier (after losing 4 sunk at Pearl Harbor) and 2 new ones (the North Carolina class), vs 10 old battleships from the 1920s, and Yamato commissioned shortly afterwards. Three of the damaged battleships at Pearl Harbor were out of action for some months (Tennessee and Maryland returning to service in February 1942, and Nevada in October). Neither side had enough battleships to lightly risk them. There were potential opportunities for battleship to fight battleship, but until the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944, only once did that potential become reality: the night of 14th November 1942 off Guadalcanal, when Kirishima and friends disabled South Dakota, Kirishima then being sunk by Washington (Hiei had been scuttled after being crippled fighting cruisers the previous night). Potential opportunities that didn't come to battle included the recapture of the Aleutians, aided by naval gunfire support by US battleships, with the recapture completed before the Japanese fleet responding could sail, and the Battle of Santa Cruz which included battleships on both sides but consisted only of carrier air strikes and no surface action.

Around New Guinea and the Solomons, the threat of land-based air discouraged major Japanese warships after the loss of Hiei and Kirishima. When the US went on the offensive in the central Pacific, taking Makin and Tarawa in the Gilberts, the US fleet had grown overwhelmingly powerful (the US committed 13 battleships, 6 fleet carriers, and 14 light and escort carriers), and Japan sensibly kept their fleet out of harm's way. The Japanese naval effort to reverse the unfavourable course of the war was the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in June 1944. The US attack on the Marianas surprised the Japanese by leap-frogging further than they expected. The Marianas would give the US bases from which Japan could be bombed - it was time to commit the fleet, despite the threat of destruction. However, after Japanese land and carrier based air units in the battle were shredded by US fighters, and two carriers lost to submarine attack, and one carrier lost to air attacks, the Japanese had lost most of their striking power, having caused only minor damage to the US forces. Even if the Japanese surface forces could get through air attacks and close, they would still have been outnumbered 5 to 7 in battleships, and they withdrew, to make a second "maximum effort" attempt later.

(to be continued)

In short, there were, but both wars had different mitigating factors that reduced their decisiveness and/or scale.

In WW1, the two largest battleship fleets in the world were the British Royal Navy and the Imperial German Navy, with the largest concentrations of battleships for both navies being the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow and the High Seas Fleet at Wilhelmshaven, respectively. There were smaller numbers kf capital ships scattered around the globe for both sides, especially the British who far outnumbered the Germans and could afford to deploy their older ships abroad, but this is where the majority of the existing dreadnoughts in 1914 were located. The Germans, being outnumbered in battleships, based their strategy on attempting to lure out pieces of the Grand Fleet to defeat them in detail. Their ideal scenario, and the one they came closest to pulling off at Jutland, was to use their own battlecruisers to lure the Grand Fleet into pursuing them, and then ambush sections of the British fleet(especially their battlecruisers, who would be somewhat separated from the main British battle force and were the Grand Fleet's scouting force) to destroy them in detail. This would help offset the disparity in numbers between the British and German fleets, but the Germans were never able to pull off this strategy and their attempts to do so led to a series of inconclusive skirmishes and battles where the Germans would lure the British out(often by bombarding the British coast) and then retreat when it became clear they would not have the opportunity to destroy sections of the Grand fleet piecemeal. Hence the Battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland. There were also smaller battles involving capital ships during WW1(Battle of the Falklands, Goeben's raids in the Black Sea, the blockade of the Austro-Hungarian coast, etc.) but these were the two largest fleets in the world at the time.

In WW2, there are 2 reasons there were no massive battleship brawls: first, airpower had advanced to such a point that any warship traveling without air cover was hideously vulnerable to being damaged or sunk, and the second is that there were simply fewer battleships in existence.

Taking the second point first, the Washington and London Naval Treaties of the 1920s and 30s had massively reduced the fleet sizes of the major powers. To give an idea of scale, in 1919 the Royal Navy had 32 dreadnought battleships of various classes from Dreadnought herself all the way to the Queen Elizabeth class(plus a large number of pre-dreadnoughts) and 9 Battlecruisers(3 lost during the war) ranging from the surviving Indefatigables to the Renown class and Hood. By 1939, treaties had reduced their capital ship fleet to just 15 capital ships: 5 Queen Elizabeths, 5 R-class, 2 Nelsons(built in the 1920s), the 2 Renown class battlecruisers, and Hood. A total of 15 down from 41, and the Royal Navy was tied with the US Navy for the largest capital ship fleet in the world, with Japan being allowed 60% of their fleet strength in the 5:5:3 tonnage ratio. There were almost as many capital ships in the Royal Navy alone in 1919 as in the entire world in 1939. This may sound strange, but the leading powers(US, UK, Japan, France, and Italy) had agreed to these terms as cost saving measures: naval arms races are expensive, and ultimately tend to be fairly pointless as the largest economies cannot be out-built, as Germany found during the Anglo-German naval arms race. So while there were a few battleship engagements(Battle of the Denmark Strait, Battle of the North Cape, Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Battle of Surigao Strait, etc.) There were simply fewer battleships to fight each other.

Secondly, airpower. Aircraft and air dropped weaponry advanced incredibly quickly in the few years leading up to and during the second world War, and battleships lacking air cover proved hideously vulnerable to air strikes whether in harbor or out at sea. The threat of aircraft had been considered by pre-war planners, and the incredible success of the raid on Taranto had been noted as a major success, but it wasn't until the twin blows of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941 that the point was truly driven home how aircraft carriers had become the primary striking power of naval warfare rather than as partners or supplements to the battleship gunline. Pearl Harbor showed the potential of concentrated air strikes(Taranto had been a relatively small operation by comparison, consisting of only a single carrier's air wing on only a few Italian battleships) and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales disproved the previously held notion that ships at sea with room to maneuver would be able to evade or fend off enemy air attack by themselves. Repulse(a battlecruiser) and Prince of Wales(a brand-new King George V class battleship) were among the fastest and most maneuverable capital ships in the world at the time(IIRC Renown and Repulse were the fastest capital ships in the world at the time, or only just coming in 2nd behind the Japanese Kongo class, I would have to double check my sources) and not even they were able to escape destruction. It cannot overly emphasized just how much the paradigm of naval war shifted in December 1941. Before then, carriers had been a useful tool, but afterwards they became the power in a fleet. To put numbers on it, on December 7 1941, the US was building or had ordered 10 battleships(4 South Dakotas and 6 Iowas) and were designing another( the Montana class) and were building 10 aircraft carriers(the Essex class). In the end, 2 of the Iowas would be canceled as well as the Montana class, and the US would end up building 151 aircraft carriers before the war ended. Most of these were small escort carriers, but among them were 26 fleet carriers and 9 light carriers, and the United States would never build another battleship.