/u/Georgy_K_Zhukov explains that rail gauge was in fact a big issue for the Soviets, and talks about how they worked around it.

Part 1 of 2.

u/tombomp gives a good outline in the link they posted, so I'm going to focus specifically on how the USSR dealt with the European gauge Polish railways in 1944-45 using archival sources. The technical aspects of the gauge issue, in my opinion, contributed less to problems experienced by Soviet logistics in Poland than the collision which occurred in late 1944 between the Red Army's logistical needs and what the political situation demanded.

First, I think it should be clarified that converting track wasn't a problem for the Germans. In the USSR railway sleepers were wood and attached to the track with spikes so all you needed to do was break the wood, widen the track, and hammer down new wood sleepers. The Germans had the biggest issue with repairing damaged critical infrastructure (Signal stations, water towers, etc.) and finding Soviet-gauge locomotives to run on branch lines which weren't immediately converted in 1941.

In Poland and Germany proper the sleepers were often metal, and the track was firmly attached with screws, so it was a more laborious process for the USSR to convert the lines.(1) Soviet repairmen often hammered the screw into the sleepers rather than screwing them to hurry along the process, meaning that the track was unsteady and had to be redone later. Limited mechanization of railway construction meant that most of the work had to be done by hand, with repair teams working out creative ways to improve productivity.(2)

1st Belorussian Front aimed to achieve 10-20km per day of repairs even under less-than-ideal conditions, but often were stuck at less than 5km per day.(3) The low quality of repaired railways and misallocation of higher speed freight trains to frontline railways also contributed to severe transportation issues in late 1944.(4)

The Red Army had problems with damage to infrastructure just as the Germans did in 1941, both because of purposeful sabotage by the retreating Germans and the normal messiness of combat. In the entire country, the Germans destroyed or stole 80% of railway repair equipment, 100% of workshop buildings, 70% of traction equipment, 30-80% of signaling devices, 85% of wagons and 80% of locomotives.(5) At the Siedlce railway junction, the Germans methodically destroyed much of the city's rail infrastructure, including administrative buildings, water towers, repair shops, locomotives, and storage.(6) Along with material damage, 30% of the prewar Polish railways senior staff and 6% of all employees were killed or too disabled to work. (7) Local railwaymen actively tried to save what they could or prevent sabotage, and the Home Army was able to save a number of locomotives in Eastern Poland from capture.(8)

Repairing the Polish railway network was hampered by shortages of railway personnel - the lines had to be staffed by the pre-liberation railwaymen who remained in the area. In total, the Ministry of Communications (It went through several name changes but I'm sticking with this one for simplicity) had only 2,000 employees in August 1944.(9) The communist Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) worked with the Red Army to mobilize civilian labor to assist with construction - 500 people in Siedlce, for example.(10)

But staffing remained a problem even in November 1944, several months after the Germans were driven out of Eastern Poland – numbers were only 36,000 out of 150,000 prewar personnel.(11) The Ministry of Communications upped rations to improve morale and militarized the railways in November to prevent job-switching (“labor desertion”), but it wasn't until 1945 that Polish railways were adequately manned.(12)

Politically, how the Polish railways were to be gauged, staffed, and administered was a complex question. Poland was an independent country, a member of the Allies, and the USSR was unsure how to proceed with managing its railways in order to balance military effectiveness with Stalin's need to signal to the Western Allies that he didn't intend to annex Poland. Too openly seizing administrative control of the Polish economy would have had diplomatic consequences. Stalin in Eastern Europe had to maintain a careful balancing act between asserting control over an all-important buffer zone and avoiding antagonizing the US and UK.(13)

The State Defense Committee (GKO) reversed course several times about what to do with the railways. First, after the Red Army entered Poland on July 22nd, Stalin signed off on a GKO resolution on July 31st (Discussed by the GKO Operations Bureau on July 29th) which would convert Polish railways to the Soviet gauge along several directions up to the Oder and the Czech border, over 4,000km of track out of 14,000km total.(14)

Before this happened, the USSR signed a series of official agreements with the PKWN providing the legal basis for the USSR’s stay in Poland and administration of the Polish economy, adhering to public formality for what was essentially a unilateral Soviet decision.(15)

The management of Polish railways was left up to Soviet railwaymen, which proved very unsatisfactory for the new Polish communist government - several complaints were sent to Stalin via his representative in Lublin, Bulganin. One such complaint is reported on August 9th:

The Poles persistently put before us the question of railways in Poland being operated by Polish railroad workers, who would carry out the orders of our military authorities and military commanders. All members of the National Committee strongly object to the complete removal of Polish railroad workers from work. They are motivated by the fact that railroad workers are a large detachment of the working classes and the elimination of Polish railroad workers from work in transport will lead to an undesirable political result. It should be noted that under the Germans Polish railroad workers, under the supervision of the German military authorities, provided transportation for the enemy army.

We believe that the arguments of the Poles are correct and should be taken into account.

It is advisable to organize a Polish railways administration, which would work on assignments under the supervision of our military authorities and commandants.

Stalin handwritten comment on the cipher telegram notes it as "important".(16)

Sources:

1 - Dmowski, Rafał, “Funkcjonowanie Kolei na Południowym Podlasiu w Drugiej Połowie 1944 R. na Przykładzie Siedleckiego Węzła Kolejowego. Zarys Problematyki” Pages 63-64, 64n69.

2 - Antipenko, N.A. На главном направлении, Pages 227-228 and Terekhin, K.P. and Taralov, A.S., Гвардейцы-железнодорожники: Боевой путь 1-й гвардейской ж.-д. Варшав. ордена Кутузова бригады (1941-1945 гг.), Pages 117-118.

3 - Dmowski, “Funkcjonowanie Kolei” Pages 63-64.

4- Konarev, N., Железнодорожники в Великой Отечественной войне 1941—1945, Pages 151-153.

5 - Zamkowska, Stanisława, Odbudowa i funkcjonowanie kolei polskich, 1944-1949, Pages 30-39.

6- Dmowski, Rafał, “Rola kolei na wschód od Warszawy w końcowym okresie II wojny światowej”, Pages 229-230.

7 - Zamkowska, Odbudowa i funkcjonowanie, Page 38.

8 - Dmowski, “Funkcjonowanie Kolei”, Page 59

9 - Zamkowska, Odbudowa i funkcjonowanie, Page 40.

10 - Dmowski, “Funkcjonowanie Kolei”, Page 60.

11 - Zamkowska, Odbudowa i funkcjonowanie, Pages 38 and 53.

12 - Ibid., 49 and the decree “Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 4 listopada 1944 r. o militaryzacji Polskich Kolei Państwowych”, accessed here.

13 - For a recent work on Stalin and Eastern Europe see Naimark, Norman M. Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty

14 - RGASPI F. 644, Op. 2, D. 364, LL. 203-208, accessed here.

15 - Документы и материалы по истории советско-польских отношений. Т. VIII. Январь 1944 г.-декабрь 1945 г., Pages 153-155 and 287-290, and Dmowski, “Funkcjonowanie Kolei”, Page 64n69.

16 - RGASPI F. 558, Op. 11, D. 218, L. 1., accessed here