Greetings! I shall attempt to answer your question as best as possible, but keep in mind that the manner in which you have phrased the question means that I cannot speculate on any "what ifs?" of the Treaty of Versailles. To avoid getting into counterfactual history, I will instead answer this question by arguing that a lighter version of the treaty would not have been possible. I would like to thank u/Kaiser-Jacob-II for their overview of the aims of the "Big Three", as it is helpful foundational knowledge for the response which follows:

In one sentence: the Treaty of Versailles was different to every single victor and signatory party. It is impossible for us to conclusively state that the Treaty was overkill without committing that sin of historical scholarship: utilising the standards of today (in this case the diplomatic standards) in judging a peace settlement of the past. What one delegation thought of the final Treaty was almost certainly different to how another delegation perceived it. Based on their aims at the onset of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the final revision of the Treaty which was signed represented a compromise, and one which is historiographically criticise as being a poor one. Here's historian Manfred Boerneke echoing such a claim:

“Scholars, although remaining divided, now tend to view the treaty as the best compromise that the negotiators could have reached in the existing circumstances. The delegations in Paris and their entourages had to work quickly. Troops had to be sent home, food shipments needed to enter blockaded ports, and revolutionary movements required containment. None of those endeavours allowed for delay. ”^(1)

Now let us ask another question to help guide our answer, why was the Treaty a compromise? The answer to that lies in the fact that (as u/Kaiser-Jacob-II's response points out), the Big Three had their own different aims. Beyond that however, each one also had a reason to ensure that the other Entente leaders did not fully achieve their claims. Such discreet disagreement often caused frustration for the three (British PM David Llyod George, American President Woodrow Wilson, and French PM Georges Clemenceau), and as the Conference dragged on it became clear that none of them would leave Versailles fully satisfied. Below is a primary excerpt from Llyod George himself while the conference was ongoing regarding his assessment of the French aims for revenge (or more accurately, his fears about an overly harsh peace settlement):

"You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth rate power; all the same in the end. If she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919 she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors... If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace, which, while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism."^(2)

Clearly, Llyod George feared (given the Bolshevik Revolution which had neutralised Britain's Russian ally in 1917), that any overly harsh Treaty which favoured the French would lead to another Bolshevik revolution in Europe, which might in turn inspire revolt across the Empire. Clemenceau for his part, was aware of this fear, but also believed that Wilson and Llyod George were being a tad overcautious with their stances:

"We cannot take unfair advantage of our victory; we must deal tolerably with peoples for fear of provoking a surge of national feeling…Mr Lloyd George has excessive fears of possible German resistance and refusal to sign the treaty…They will dispute on every point, they will threaten to refuse to sign…they will contest or refuse everything that can be refused…President Wilson warns us against giving the German’s a sense of injustice."^(3)

Woodrow Wilson was perhaps the most successful in fulfilling his "Versailles aims": he believed that he had softened the previously harsh French demands, reassured the British of their Imperial security, and managed to lay down the foundations for the League of Nations he'd envisioned before sailing to Europe. It is unfortunate then, that the true "problem" (if this response can point out just one) with the final Treaty of Versailles was its appearance to the Germans. The German people had not been expecting to lost the Great War, and nor were they prepared for any sort of "reparations" which the Entente impressed upon them. The final straw on the back for them was the notorious War Guilt Clause, formally known as Article 231 in the Treaty. It reads as follows:

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."^(4)

To be entirely logical, it is likely that Germany and her people would have baulked at any sort of Peace Settlement put before them, but it is a testament to the efforts of the more conservative peacemakers at Versailles that Germany herself did not lose more land, economic resources, or face the same "dismemberment" that her Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman ally would soon undergo.

Concluding this response, I would like to note that this final detail is one of great historiographical debate: the "German Question" as it's often called is a most interesting topic related to your question. In essence, it examines more closely the reception of the Treaty by the German populace/leadership rather than attempt to lay blame at the feet of the Entente Powers for a poor bit of treaty-writing. A.J.P Taylor and his fellow British historians are the more well-known writers of this school, though there are a few "combination" theories which look at the German reception in conjunction with the shortcomings of the Treaty of Versailles.

So there we have it then, a Treaty which was, in light of the circumstances in which it was written, a compromise at best and a bungled job at worse. None of the Big Three returned to their governments completely satisfied, and the consequences of the Treaty to all combatant nations (but Germany above all) set in motion the undercurrent forces which would engulf the world in global conflict nearly 20 years after the Paris Peace Conference ended. To leave this (hopefully) helpful response on a thought-provoking note, here's a final opinion by an observer at Versailles:

"We came to Paris confident that the new world order was about to be established; we left it convinced the new order had fouled the old…We arrived determined that a peace of justice and wisdom should be negotiated: we left it conscious that the treaties imposed were neither just nor wise…It is impossible to read German criticism without deriving the impression that the Paris peace Conference was guilty of disguising an imperialist peace under the surface of Wilsonism"^(5)