There were some differences. The South was an agricultural exporter to England, had some strong ties to the Caribbean ( where it bought its slaves) and the elite was more Loyalist. When the British failed to crush the conflict in the north, after the Continental victories at Saratoga and Trenton, General Clinton switched strategy . Faced with pacifying a vast sparsely populated region with limited numbers of occupying troops to deploy, he assumed that the greater loyalty among the Southern population to Britain would make it easier to stamp out the rebellion there. Once the South was under control, the Northern colonies would be isolated and , from a secure southern base of operations, could be picked off and subdued piecemeal.

This failed, though . First, Virginia Governor Dunmore quite early in the conflict promised freedom to all slaves who left their rebellious masters and helped the British army. This had the effect of alienating the many slaveowners in the Southern elite. The remaining Loyalists also encountered a very big problem: while the British could demand Loyalist support for their army, that small army could not guarantee security for those Loyalists in return. In some places, notably South Carolina, as soon as the British troops left the area, the rebels were quick to take revenge on any Loyalists who had given aid and comfort to them.

Second, while there were Loyalists among the elite of the east, the land-hungry backwoodsmen of the western frontier were incensed at having Native lands set out of bounds by the Proclamation of 1763, and had few direct economic ties to Britain. Their resentment manifested itself quite strikingly at the Battle of King's Mountain. In the end, the Continental army was able to move pretty freely through the south, avoid defeat, and take advantage of Cornwallis' position at Yorktown.