The Royal Navy did not abandon dive bombing, as such. Throughout the war, it operated strike aircraft capable of making dive bombing attacks, although they were not designed solely for the purpose. It started the war with the Skua, a dive-bomber/fighter. This had several successes in the dive-bombing role, most notably the sinking of Konigsberg during the German invasion of Norway. However, it was a poor fighter, and was retired from frontline service in 1941 as a result. After this, the Fleet Air Arm's strike capability centred on its TSR (Torpedo Strike Reconnaisance) aircraft. The Swordfish and Albacore, with their low speed, could be used for dive bombing, albeit at shallower angles of dive than purpose-built dive bombers. The Swordfish was commonly used for this task in the Mediterranean. Notably, of the 21 Swordfish that raided the Italian base at Taranto in November 1940, five were tasked with making dive-bombing attacks on cruisers and destroyers in the anchorage of the Mare Piccolo. Four more had the primary task of dropping flares to illuminate the harbour, with the secondary task of dive bombing targets of opportunity. The successor to the Swordfish and Albacore was the Fairey Barracuda. Like the earlier aircraft, this was a multirole aircraft, capable of dropping both torpedoes and dive bombing. The Barracuda was fitted with large Fairey-Youngman flaps. These, as well as giving it good low-speed performance for landing on carriers, had a special setting which allowed them to serve as dive brakes. Again, this capability was often used. Barracudas made dive-bombing attacks against Tirpitz in the Norwegian fjords, and against Japanese targets in the Far East.

While all of these aircraft were able to dive bomb, none of them had been designed solely for this, unlike their foreign counterparts. The Skua was a dive bomber and fighter, while the Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda were also torpedo bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. The reason for this multi-role focus largely lies in the pre-war system of procurement for British naval aircraft. Between 1918 and 1939, the Fleet Air Arm was a part of the Royal Air Force, under the auspices of the Air Ministry. The Air Ministry was largely responsible for the procurement of naval aircraft. The Navy (from 1924) set the requirements for new naval aircraft, but the Air Ministry set the numbers of aircraft that were to be purchased. The Air Ministry was more interested in strategic bombing than in naval aviation, and so tended to underfund the Fleet Air Arm. The RN never got as many aircraft as it wanted. This meant that the RN tended to build carriers with smaller aviation contingents than the USN or IJN did. It also affected the specifications the RN set for new aircraft. As the RN had comparatively few aircraft, it needed to maximise the capabilities of the aircraft it did have. This was done by making the aircraft multi-role, capable of doing more than one job.

That said, the RN definitely preferred torpedo bombing as a means of attacking ships. The torpedo was a more damaging weapon, and more versatile. Dive bombers could only damage an unarmoured target. Torpedoes could be used against any sort of ship. A bomb could start fires and damage a ship's superstructure, but was unlikely to do damage that would sink a ship. Torpedoes, which damaged a ship's hull directly, were much more likely to sink a ship. Dive bombers required a long, steady approach at high altitude, making them vulnerable to fighters and flak. Torpedo bombers, meanwhile, could take more evasive action during their approach; British doctrine for torpedo attacks called for the attacking aircraft to make rapid, extreme changes in height and bearing. Dive bombing attacks were harder to make at night, especially against moving ships. However, this approach would soften as the war progressed and the British learned from American experience in the Pacific. The RN's appreciation of the Battle of Midway suggested that dive bombers were much more important for fighting carriers; the damage done by dive bombers would neutralise the carrier's ability to launch aircraft, while the torpedo was only useful to finish them off. The conclusion of the report indicated that in future, carriers should carry more dive bombers than torpedo bombers.