The Iron Chancellor and the Three Emperors

Note: parts of this response were adapted from an earlier comment on the failure of "colonial war treaties" in the 19th century.

In the previous response we touched on the diplomatic blunders of the Crimean War and how the actions of Austria-Hungary during this time distanced it from both Russia and the other European powers as well... well all for one. Just before Austrian troops were put on high-alert and the Russian crossed the Danube, the Habsburg Monarchy managed to secure an alliance with the Prussians. This alliance never had to wield its guns in the Crimean War, but it did set a precedent of thinking in Vienna which would characterise the next several decades of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy.

When the Prussians defeated the French and gained Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the Austrians now had a new major power on the continent to deal with. In Berlin the Austrians had to deal with no less a figure than Otto von Bismarck, whose diplomatic insight and talent as the "Iron Chancellor" were well-known throughout Europe. Bismarck for his part, also knew the importance of balancing the influence of Austrian-German-Russian influence in the East. Russian ambitions in the Balkans were more pressing than ever, and it was these considerations which led Austria to conclude a Dual Alliance with Germany in 1879. Here's the first article of that Treaty, which immediately targets a former ally of Vienna:

"ARTICLE 1. Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement."^(1)

Clearly, we already have the antagonising of the Russian Bear occurring more than 30 years before the events of June 28th, 1914. In continuation with the Crimean War's events, this seemed a logical development. However, do not be swayed to believe that Russia took this threat to mean more than it was meant to. One must not forget that shortly after this treaty came the Dreikaiserbund, or League of the Three Emperors, an actual formal alliance between Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary which came into effect in 1881, an attempt by Otto von Bismarck to mediate the power balance in Europe. On the subject of Tsar Alexander III's concern over his nation's security facing the Dual Alliance, Laurence B. Packard writes:

[A]s long as the general European status quo did not alter too much, the Tsar did not regard Russia's isolation seriously.^(2)

Granted, the Dual Alliance of 1879 remained a constant thorn in the side of the Russians, but it did not spell the complete end of relations between them and the Austrians. Tsar Alexander III would go on to sign the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 with Germany, which acknowledged the Russian claims over the Balkan 'sphere of influence as noted by Article 2 below:

Germany recognizes the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly the legitimacy of her preponderant and decisive influence in Bulgaria and in Eastern Rumelia. The two Courts engage to admit no modification of the territorial status quo of the said peninsula without a previous agreement between them, and to oppose, as occasion arises, every attempt to disturb this status quo or to modify it without their consent.^(3)

Take note of how the "Near East" question of the Balkans remained a key consideration for all of the parties involved in these negotiations. All three had designs for Eastern Europe, and the "sick man of Europe" was beginning to show signs of cracking in the 1870s all the way up to the 1900s.

However, already by this time Russia seemed to be uncertain of how legitimate Bismarck's assurances truly were. After all, Bismarck himself was nearly at the end of his esteemed career (being dismissed in 1890) and this agreement would come only a year before the coronation of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who certainly did not share the same cooperative outlook that his father had. When that change finally did occur, Alexander III was more receptive to an Alliance with France, as the German Empire now appeared more concerned with colonial acquisitions (and as a result, was drawn towards deal-making with the British) than continuing the animosity towards Russia that Wilhelm I & Bismarck had facilitated.

The next crucial document we might look at is the France-Russian Military Alliance Convention of 1892, in which France and Russia were directly linked in an alliance which specifically singled out the powers of the 1882 Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) as potential instigators of an attack:

If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.^(4)

By this time, the Germans had come to the forefront of the discussions on hostilities in St. Petersburg, London, and Paris. Though the Austro-Hungarian Empire remained a key player, it had been overshadowed (if only for a brief moment) with the rapid rise of German expansionist desires. If we must point towards a critical "nail in the coffin" moment of Habsburg-Russian relations, then attention must be drawn towards the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-09, when the Austrians declared their annexation of the former Ottoman Vilayet (administrative district) of Bosnia and Herzegovinia. This of course, was met with massive protestations from Serbia and Russia, who viewed it as further Austrian infringement on the Slavic people's independence in the Balkans. Interestingly, the 1909 Treaty of Berlin saw the Austrians backed by the British and French who believed that further escalation would lead to a repeat of the events of 1854.

Conclusion

So there we have it, a two-part overview of the 60 or so years between the Hungarian Revolution of 1848/9 and the final straw in Austrian-Russian relations in 1909. The reasons why such close allies drifted further and further apart was geopolitical in nature: the "Near East" question was always on the minds of policymakers and conference tables in the late 1800s, and those in Vienna eyed those in St. Petersburg with apprehension at the thought of Russian dominance threatening Austro-Hungarian security in Eastern Europe. I hope this response has been helpful, and feel free to ask any follow-ups as you see fit!

Greetings! This is a most pertinent question to ask, for it seems most curious that Russia and Austria-Hungary experienced a complete reversal in relations despite the close bond shared between the two (most notably, as you have pointed out, in Russian intervention during the 1848/9 Revolution in Hungary). Unfortunately, this answer is one which has been largely overshadowed by the larger picture of the diplomatic relations at the outbreak of the war, and as such historiography on why the relations deteriorated so quickly is rather outdated or (as far as my expertise goes), a tad hard to locate. Regardless, let us see what we can do to answer your query, beginning of course, with Europe in 1853.

The Roaring Bear and the Double-Sided Eagles

In 1853 we find the origins of the Crimean War as the first major upheaval in Austro-Hungarian-Russian relations. The occupation by Russia of the Danubian Principalities shortly after the debacle over the rights of Christians in the Holy Land sparked a series of negotiations between the powers of Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was quick to react to the occupation in particular, joining with Britain and France in drafting the Vienna Note, which (without getting too far into its technicalities and interpretations), accepted the legitimate claims of Russia to the Ottoman-Christian territories, without overriding the authority of the Sultan. Tsar Nicholas I accepted this offer, but the Turks demanded certain changes which would have made the final Note unacceptable to the Russians.

This diplomatic back-and-forth went on for a while, until the Western Powers were persuaded to (with the supposed backing of Austria-Hungary) issue an ultimatum that the Russian immediately leave the Danubian Principalities by April 30th, 1954. When the tsar made no reply and the Habsburg support turned out to be merely diplomatic rather than militarily, Britain and France declared war on March 27th. It is this "big picture" narrative of events that we must keep in mind, as we pick out the specifics of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's role in the negotiations.

The Habsburg monarchy was a critical consideration for the policy-makers in St. Petersburg, including the Tsar himself. To that end, Count Orlov (a prominent diplomat) was dispatched to Vienna in January 1854 in order to secure Austrian neutrality for the war which was predicted to come (the Russian minister in Berlin was ordered to do the same for the Prussians). So concerned with the intervention of Prussia and Austria-Hungary was Russia, that Orlov was authorised to guarantee the integrity of Austria-Hungary from French hostilities. Knowing full well that such negotiations would add another complex dimension to the overarching ones with Britain, France, and the Ottomans, a young Emperor Franz Joseph declined to talk about such matters. Both he and the Austrian Empire's foreign minister Count Karl Ferdinand von Buol insisted instead that Russian troops not cross the Danube, for that would incite further reason for Austria to side with the Western Powers.

Mind you, the Western Powers were also finding it rather difficult to deal with Vienna in their own diplomatic efforts. It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire quite literally was the lynchpin of the entire negotiation process. This was particularly evident in the surprise of the Western Powers when Austrian support for the ultimatum turned out to be merely diplomatic in nature. Historian Bernadotte E. Schmitt writing in 1919 about this concern notes:

"They presented their ultimatum [for the evacuation of the Principalities] on the understanding that Austria would support it, whereas she actually gave only diplomatic approval, not a promise of military assistance, which alone would have compelled Russia to yield."

The difficulty for the Austrians was considerable. The memory of Russia's intervention (and specifically that of Tsar Nicholas I) during the Crisis of 1848 remained in the minds of both Emperor Franz Joseph (who came to power largely in part thanks to Russian assistance) and top-level advisors across the Empire. However, all of them also feared that if Russia maintained dominance in the Danubian Principalities, she would set up vassal states whose Slavic majorities would lead to further complications with the Slavic populations living under the Dual Monarchy. On the other hand, these leaders were also reluctant to cooperate with Britain or France in their opposition to Russia. The former was viewed as the home of liberalism and the home-in-exile of Hungarian lawyer Lajos Kossuth, who had played a considerable part in the 1848-9 revolution. The latter, ruled by Napoleon III, was viewed as the champion of Italian independence, which upset Austro-Hungarian rule in the region.

In the end, Austria became increasingly hostile towards her old ally in the east. After Count Orlov admitted that Russia would indeed set up vassal states in the Balkans, the Emperor insisted that they now only conduct military campaigns on the Asiatic side of the Ottoman Empire (an impossibility given that the main crux of hostilities lay in Eastern Europe). Even as the Russian troops crossed the Danube on March 22nd, the Austrians were reluctant to place their army on high-alert.

They would remain neutral throughout the war, but Buol's ultimatum in 1855 that Russia accept Anglo-French peace terms or face a war with the Dual Monarchy further alienated the Habsburgs in Vienna from the Romanovs in St. Petersburg. Austria at this point was isolated. Her neutrality during the Crimean War strained relations with the Western Powers who relied on her support for a peaceful outcome, and her betrayal of the Russians meant that she was surrounded by potential enemies on all sides.

In the next bit, we will fast forward to the critical years of the 1870s, when the "Eastern Question" arises again and a legendary figure in diplomacy tries to mend the gap between the former allies.

Sources

Lieven, Dominic. "Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity." Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 2 (1999): 163-200. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/261214.

Schmitt, Bernadotte E. "The Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War." The American Historical Review 25, no. 1 (1919): 36-67. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1836373. (Free access)

Schroeder, Paul W. "Austria and the Danubian Principalities, 1853-1856." Central European History 2, no. 3 (1969): 216-36. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545535.