Greetings! This is a most interesting question that you have posed, and it does crossover into the whole philosophy of history a bit (though perhaps that was not your intention in asking it). To give an overview of my tuppence on the matter, this response will consist of two parts: the first will address the "misconceptions" presented in the question, as well as perhaps some fresh perspective, and the second will deal with the actual historiography of the "seminal tragedy" itself. Let's begin.

Judging 1914

"Europe is to be the scene of the most terrible war that she has witnessed since the fall of the Roman Empire." - The London Times just before the outbreak of war.

The concept of "stupidity" in the First World War, as the question puts before us, is an odd one indeed. Forgive me if I sound a tad too direct or fired up in these coming sentences, but I would argue that the following statement:

And then there's the whole stupid way the war started. I've always hated studying WW1 because it's just stupidity start to finish.

Is egregiously and dangerously "anti-historical". On the first count, reducing an entire event (especially one with such impact on the world even today) to a single, fairly insulting, descriptor, is in of itself ridiculously dim. I do not fault you for believing that the First World War was "stupid", but I implore you (and everyone else) to realise that perhaps such judgement is too dismissive of the historical circumstances and nuances which led Europe to catastrophe in 1914.

The war did not simply start over the assassination of some archduke. Its causes remain a highly debate historiographical topic even today, and all manner of responses have been written on this sub about all manner of possible factors which led to the Great War. I will not go too in-depth on this debate, but feel free to ask any follow-ups on this most pertinent matter. What I will instead point out is that if you believe the start of the First World War is stupid, then I would bet a fair bit you believe that the start of the Second one was utter nonsense.

It is one thing to ascribe a descriptor to the actions of an individual, it is another to apply that same descriptor to the complex web of actions and decisions undertaken by an entire continent.

Not only are we possibly falling for this trap in asking such a question, but we are falling into another one: judging the past by the standards of today. To us, it seems entirely illogical and dim that an assassination of some high-ranking individual form the casus belli of an entire continent-wide conflict. Europe however, was no stranger to war even in 1914, and underlying the assassination was a system of alliances, national interests, geopolitical rivalries and old tensions going back decades.

A necessity to studying history, I argue, is that you approach it with an open mind. If you, for example, already have the fixed notion that the First World War is "stupidity from start to finish", then you will most likely frame every single bit of information about it in that light. With regards to that argument, I would happily vouch that Scott Anderson had his own agenda when writing that chapter on "Imperial Folly" (ignoring for even a brief moment that such sweeping claims might not have been appropriate for the focus of his work), which of course makes him highlight all the follies and blunders of the Anglo-French forces during the War.

To wrap-up this longer preamble/section before moving on to the actual historiography of the First World War, I would like to simply ask that we consider the possibility of the First World War not being a war of stupid mistakes in decision-making and their subsequent consequences, but rather a tragic outcome of the dominoes falling when they were otherwise at their most stable. All subsequent decisions were of course, products of their own historical precedents and circumstances.

A New Age of War

La guerre! C’est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires.

War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men. - French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, quoted in Soixante Anneés d'Histoire Française (1932) by Georges Suarez.

Turning to the first points you have mentioned from the "Imperial Folly" chapter:

When he describes the dominant pattern of "throwing your forces at the strongest defended point", i.e. the cult of the offensive, the whole general stupidity of trench warfare,

the German "invade France super fast" plans involved troops moving faster than their supply train, both times,

At the outbreak of war in August 1914, none of the European great powers save Russia had been involved in a major war for 43 years. There had been regional wars limited to two or three powers, namely the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 and the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. Despite this lull in conflicts, the technological advancements of the 19th century had reshaped the face of warfare, yet few if none of the generals who took command in 1914 had a full grasp of that "revolution in firepower" as David Stevenson calls it. Gone were the inefficient single-shot muskets and cannons of Napoleon's campaigns, gone were the days when an army's size dictated how much firepower it could put out in a single salvo, and gone were the days when supply trains consisted of horse-drawn wagons. The weapons of 1815 had been replaced by the bolt-action rifle, machine gun, and breech-loading artillery. The size of an army now mattered little in the face of such deadly arsenals, or on the presence of fortifications. Supplies and men now travelled far faster by rail or lorry. This new style of warfare had been written about by 1914, but it had not become standard reading for new officers or high-ranking commanders.

In short, the "cult of the offensive" remained the main tactic of the generals because there had been no time to devise a more suitable alternative. What eventually became the horrific war of attrition started out in 1914-15 as genuine attempts to rout an enemy or capture a key position. It is testament to the fact that Napoleon's tactics were still valid when armies were caught in wide-open battlefields, where the offensive truly mattered. Erich von Falkenhayn on the Eastern front, General Allenby in the Middle East, and Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa are just some examples of successful commanders who embodied (at times) what had made Napoleon's campaigns the envy of all Europe.

Yet curiously, the horrid reputation of trench warfare" is a paradox we must consider for a moment. Whilst these battles of open manuever and defense in the first few stages of the war perhaps saw the most success, they were also the costliest. Stevenson brings up the example of the 23rd of August, 1914 for the French Army, in which 27,000 soldiers were killed in one day. The establishment of the trenches, no matter how horrid and terrible they would later become, was at least a respite from the dangers of being in the open in an age of artillery and machine guns. I highly recommend reading some memoirs from the war (especially the earlier years), where a common theme actually is that soldiers feel safer in the trenches.

The eventual back-and-forth of trench warfare may itself seem stupid, it is perhaps the very definition of insanity, but there was a certain logic to it. In the stalemate which became the status quo for much of the war, neither side was able to push the other back decisively. To that end, generals began realising that the only way to achieve victory was to force a war of attrition which the opposing side could not hope to win, eventually causing them to abandon a position or risk losing unacceptably high numbers of men again and again. It is a horrific assessment, but it was one which fitted the realist tactician of the trenches.

So to end this part of the response: the generals of the First World War, no matter how much bungling and stupidity historians have ascribed to them, were the uninitiated top brass in an era of warfare which had not been tested in-depth until 1914 (and presented a learning curve which took almost an entire war to surmount) . No matter how repugnant the idea of attritional warfare was, it served as the best option to break the deadlock which had developed. Thus no matter how irresistible the word "stupid" is to describe the combat of the First World War, I submit that the word "unfortunate" is a better one.

But let us not forget that behind the military blunders lay the political ones, and that is where we are headed next in this exploration.

Part 2: The Politics of War

In the last bit I touched on the military circumstances surrounding the horrors of trench warfare and how the First World War was a massive and bloody learning curve for all sides in a new age of warfare. In this section I shall briefly go over the political arena during 1914 and up until the American involvement in 1918. Let's begin.

Note: some parts of this response have been adapted from earlier questions I have answered on the sub, they are linked in the "Sources" section for reference. Similar sources from yesterday's comment were used, and any new ones are cited.

The problem of the First World War in diplomatic terms is that it was rarely ever the case that countries were united on the same matter. Even within the Entente and Central Powers, there was disagreement as to which nation should act in which way over which matter. You mentioned Anderson's focus on the Gallipoli Campaign, and the French insistence on gaining control of Syria at the end of the war. I would like to focus therefore on these two areas of blunders, and explain the more "hidden" side behind the decisions.

In acknowledging the "stupidity" of the French and British venture in the Middle East, we are ignoring the key consideration (or two considerations at this point) which cast a shadow over the Great War in general: imperialism. The idea of Empire remained a pertinent one in Europe at the time, and it is therefore no wonder that the two largest imperial powers of the time sought to wrest control from a longstanding 'Eastern' counterpart: The Ottoman Empire. The "sick man of Europe" as it was known was crumbling, and the First World War was an opportunity for France and Britain to advance their imperialist agendas on the Arabian Peninsula. This was coupled with the Royal Navy's desire for that increasingly precious "black gold": oil (specifically in this case the refineries at the head of the Persian Gulf). Thus at the time, invading the Ottomans by forcing a campaign directly through the Dardanelles seemed a logical option.

In 1915 however, it was actually the Russians who requested that the Anglo-French forces launch a "demonstration" against Constantinople to relieve the Russian troops in the Caucasus (where the Ottomans had maintained a significant military presence since late 1914 and kept up the pressure with bloody but constant offensives). In London there was significant support for the (rather logical) decision to launch the Dardanelles Offensive. First Sea Lord Winston Churchill was backed by that giant of imperial conquest: Lord Herbert Kitchener (who at the time was Secretary of State for War, and thus possessed considerable influence). Michael Howard best sums up the arguments for a conquest of Constantinople:

"For one thing, it would reopen communications with Russia, freeing her to export the grain that played so vital a part in her economy. For another, a 'back door' could be opened through the Balkans to help the Serbs, who were still successfully resisting Austrian attack; and the Serb's former allies of the Balkan Wars, Bulgaria and Greece, might be persuaded to come to her help as well."

The naval venture however, turned into the shambles that it was due to a mix of unfortunate military blunders and political oversight. The officials in Whitehall had given ambiguous orders to the task force deployed to the Dardanelles, and the presence of Ottoman minefields in the strait posed massive problems to the Royal Navy and French Navy. The resulting slaughter on the cliffs of Gallipoli was the result of these naval forces calling for land support, and by the end of 1915 the evacuation of the ANZAC-French force (who fought admirably and remain honoured to this day, alongside their Ottoman-Turkish counterparts) was the only thing the Entente salvaged from the operation. I will not go too in-depth on the minutia of Allied failure and the reasons why they maintained the offensive for months, but further reading is recommended on this area.

The injustice done to the Arabs at the Paris Peace Conference is deserving of its own question on the sub, as the details of that question still haunt our world (geographically and politically) today. What I will say here and now to end this duo of responses is that the political mistakes of the First World War seem like mistakes to us now, when at the time of their enactment they were fairly rational decisions influenced by war aims, imperial sentiments, and overarching precedents.

I hope you found this thread a bit helpful, and let me know if you have any follow-ups!

Further Watching (Excellent series of lectures here, but a bit poor in the actual resolution quality)

Clark, Christopher. "How Europe Went to War in 1914." Delivered 18 November, 2014. Accessible on Youtube here.

Stevenson, David. "The Military History of the First World War: An Overview and Analysis." Delivered 25 November, 2015. Accessible on Youtube here.

Richard, Sir Evans. "Politics and the First World War." Delivered 26 March 2015. Accessible on Youtube here.

Previous Responses on the First World War

• On the royal cousins fighting in the First World War
• Two part response on 19th century colonial war treaties failing to prevent the war
• On countries using World War I as an 'excuse' to continue imperial expansion
• On the fear of socialist revolution as a motivator for war
• On the connection between the Black Hand Gang and the Serbian government