He further goes to state that this strategy is predicated on American effeteness, so my question is what historical events caused the Japanese military command to view Americans as effete and not willing to stick it through? What specific historical occurrences gave the Japanese the impression that the Americans and by extension western powers were effete to the extent that they were willing to base their entire military strategy of the effeteness of western power. Was the Japanese Russian dealings in the Russo-Japanese wars that lead to this image of an effete western power or were there other accounts that lead to this perception?
Edit: clarified the question
One reason the Japanese held this view was because it had to be true in order for them to win. They were at such a material, industrial capacity, and manpower disparity compared to the US that if it wasn't the case that Americans were soft and effete, then their entire strategy was ruinous. They couldn't have their entire strategy be ruinous, so they believed things that made it seem like attacking the US was anything other than suicidal.
I'd also say that from a certain perspective, they were right. Not because Americans were soft, but that in comparison to the Japanese they were not nearly as hard on an individual level. The Japanese army beat their recruits regularly, often savagely, during training. Beatings would sometimes continue beyond that. The Japanese were drilled intensely to follow orders and not be concerned about their lives, to never surrender. The term surrender was not in the Japanese army field manual. Japanese soldiers routinely put up with extreme deprivations, particularly as the Japanese logistic chains were strained, with thousands dying of starvation and disease from malnutrition.
Comparatively, US citizens and soldiers would not put up with that. So from a very extreme point of view, they weren't necessarily wrong that the US soldiers, airmen, and sailors were "soft" by comparison. Of course because US soldiers and citizens would not routinely put up with these comparatively extreme hardships and demands for sacrifice, American war planners become quite good at making war hell on the other side more than theirs. Rather than relying on the superhuman toughness of the individual soldier, the US uses its vast material strength to deliver overwhelming firepower on the enemy in an attempt to limit the hardships that its troops must face.
More broadly, the US and the UK historically are often portrayed by their enemies as soft. As loving luxury and not able to accept hardship. The UK was allegedly derisively referred to as a nation of shopkeepers by Napoleon. There is a quote from a WW I German official (maybe the Kaiser?) saying that if the British amphibiously invaded Germany during WW I, then they would have their constables arrest them. Hitler joked about his doubts about US toughness in a fight because we couldn't keep control of our women. I think these references stem from the US and UK being geographically protected from their enemies and being very commercially minded and wealthy over the last 300 years. Often with a material superiority over their rivals, which again feeds into this belief, as well as a need to believe, that the wealthier and more powerful foe is a big softy when push comes to shove.
A good source to help answer your question would be the book, Tower of Skulls, a History of the Asia Pacific War, by Frank. It gets into detail on the Japanese mentality, their view of the United States, and their strategic vision of a war with the US.
While I've not read Marston's book, it is roughly accurate in saying that the Japanese intention was to quickly seize the Western colonial territories in the Pacific, defeat whatever naval counterattacks that would be launched, at which point the Western powers would be forced to the negotiating table. Japan would thus be able to negotiate from a position of strength, and come to a peace agreement favorable to Japan. While both the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had extensive plans for how they would expel the Western powers from East Asia and defeat the naval counter attacks, there was little follow up on how the Western powers could be forced to the negotiating table. After all, while the loss of their colonies would no doubt be painful, it was not the kind of victory that could force a power like the UK or the US to the negotiating table. Importantly, the Japanese simply did not have a way to force the Westerners to the negotiating table. A Japanese naval blockade of the British Isles is laughable and a similar blockade of the US similarly fantastical (not to mention useless), nor could the Japanese hope to support an invasion of the mainland US or European homeland territories. Thus, there was almost an unspoken assumption that after the initial Japanese victories, the Western powers would simply accept Japanese dominance in East Asia as a de facto situation, rather than expend the necessary resources to rebuild its naval strength and fight their way across the Pacific.
Quite simply, they would have to if Japan was to have any hope of victory. Japan's industrial base was simply too small to sustain a long war against the Western powers. If Japan's only hope of victory was that the war would be short.
However, while there was undoubtedly at least some perception that the Westerners were "weak" and would be unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices to achieve victory, it was also part of deliberate decision making on the part of the Japanese. Policy makers in the IJA and IJN were both well aware of their material shortcomings vis-a-vis the Americans. While the IJN sought to make up for these deficiencies with greater emphasis on individual superiority in range and an individual ship's firepower, both services strongly embraced the idea of defeating their foe's material superiority with Japanese spiritual superiority. Part of this had roots in the earliest days of Imperial Japan, when rebel samurai armies proved very effective against the supposedly materially superior conscript armies of the new government, instilling a belief that a greater internal will or determination to achieve victory (oft including substantial self-sacrifice) could be a path to victory against a materially superior foe. I've discussed this particular aspect, especially in the self-sacrifice respect more here.
In addition, in their past experience, the Japanese had seen success. The Russo-Japanese War saw the Japanese take on far materially superior power, and--through early successes and decisive naval victories--was able to bring the Russians to the negotiating table, where the Japanese were able to negotiate from a position of strength and come to a settlement that was decidedly in Japan's favor. It's important to remember just how close run a thing Japan's victory was. While the IJN had won decisive victories against the Russians at sea, on land the IJA had suffered very heavy casualties in both the Siege of Port Arthur and in the more mobile warfare in Manchuria. Financially, the Japanese were on their last legs as well, and would likely not be able to sustain the war effort much longer. Yet, by being willing to endure the sacrifices required, and making great sacrifices on the battlefield (as an example of Japanese spiritual superiority) the Japanese were able to secure a victory in the war.
Thus, I would argue that the biggest emphasis is not necessarily that the American's were effete, but rather that the Japanese thought they could achieve great things by matching their foes material superiority with Japanese spiritual superiority. This was driven more by past Japanese experience both in the conflicts that established the Imperial government over all of Japan and the Russo-Japanese War.