Although accepting the Frankfurt Proposals appears to be the prudent course for Napoleon in hindsight, they represented a far more complicated case than an straightforward offer of peace for France's natural frontiers. The proposals were part of a complex diplomatic game played by Metternich and had only the conditional support of the Coalition's main allies, Prussia and Russia. Additionally, the British envoy George Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, likely exceeded his government's instructions when he countenanced them. This highly confused and uncertain environment helped play into some of Napoleon's worst instincts as a diplomat and led to the Frankfurt Proposals becoming a stillborn initiative.

The fundamental problem of the Frankfurt Proposals was that while Metternich perceived the natural frontiers and French control of Belgium and its ports to be the maximum concessions, Napoleon took these positions as a starting point for further negotiations. When the Frankfurt Proposals first reached Napoleon, he along with the pro-war duc de Bassano crafted a very circumspect acceptance of the Proposals for the basis of a peace conference in Mannheim on 16 November. The Emperor's lukewarm response to the proposals seriously damaged French credibility both inside France, where a pro-peace faction was gathering around Talleyrand, and among Metternich's entourage. Metternich responded to Napoleon with a terse note that the Proposals were not up for negotiation. Napoleon instituted a form of damage control by replacing Bassano with the pro-negotiation Caulaincourt and announced on 2 December that France had agreed to the "general and summary bases" of the Coalition's peace proposal.

The problem was still that Napoleon steadfastly clung to trying to wring far more concessions than Metternich was willing, or able, to deliver. Caulaincourt operated under instructions that France not only wanted natural frontiers, but also guarantees for the Kingdom of Westphalia and a slightly truncated Kingdom of Italy, both of which would retain their Bonapartist rulers. Furthermore, Napoleon also pushed for the retention of Murat's throne in Sicily. To make matters worse, Napoleon instructed Caulaincourt to push for the sovereignty and independence of all nations. Not only would this lead to a restoration of French and Dutch colonies, but also that no replacement for the Rheinbund would be imposed upon Germany. In this context, Napoleon's acceptance of the Rheinbund's dissolution was in reality a non-concession; the Central European states would have been free to again chose to become French client states. Napoleon's insistence on retaining complete control over the Rhine and three strategic bastions (Kehl, Kastel, and Wesl) on the right bank of the river would allow the French to easily breach this great barrier. Such a position ran counter to Metternich's own plans for the German Confederation in which Austria possessed a great deal of power over Third Germany. Napoleon's counter-proposals also championed "Freedom of the Seas," a position that would obviously inflame British opinion.

There were multiple rationales behind Napoleon's excessive demands and modifications of the Frankfurt Proposals. For one thing, neither the Proposals nor their negotiations ended the Coalition's military preparations for an invasion of France. Napoleon would accuse the Coalition of engaging in diplomacy in bad faith:

Europe seems to offer peace, but she does not sincerely wish it. You believe that by humiliating ourselves we shall disarm her; you are mistaken. The more yielding we are, the more exacting she will become, and from demand to demand she will lead us to terms of peace we cannot accept.

By stringing negotiations along, it does fit into a strategy of trying to split the Austrians away from the Coalition and drive it apart. Napoleon's disparagement of the Coalition's diplomacy also had a clear domestic component to it as well. As Talleyrand's faction gained ground in the salon culture of Paris, Napoleon was aware that his hold on domestic politics was shaky. A bad or costly peace to France could destroy his hold on French politics. Caulaincourt's memoirs perceptively noted that for Napoleon, preserving the First Republic's military gains, including its sister republics, was the minimum Napoleon would accept for peace. According ot the French diplomat, Napoleon launched the war in 1813 with the intent of:

making war with all his resources, and finally, if the war went badly, he was determined to sacrifice himself and his army on the frontiers that the Republic had bequeathed to the Empire.

For Napoleon for France to end with less territory and satellite states than what it possessed prior to Brumaire would have been a massive loss to his prestige. Negotiation rather than acceptance of the Frankfurt Proposals was the path of least resistance for Napoleon. It allowed him the potential of achieving a bloodless victory while stalling the Coalition long enough for the French military to recover.

Yet this hope was ultimately chimerical and based upon a fundamental misreading of the diplomatic situation by Napoleon in late 1813. Like many lapses in judgement among statesmen, there were elements of truth in Napoleon's interpretation of the international situation. The Coalition was incredibly fragile and quite divided over issues like Galicia and Krakow. Metternich's willingness to offer a peace that likely would have greatly weakened Castlereagh's government speaks much to the unity of the Coalition.

Napoleon however overplayed his hand with his highly conditional acceptance of the Frankfurt Proposals. The tardiness of the Emperor's replies and the unacceptable nature of his counter-proposals helped to drive the Coalition together rather than pushing it apart. The rejection of the Frankfurt Proposals by Napoleon became one of the propaganda tools employed by the Coalition when invading France in the winter of 1813/14 when they were printed in broadsheets and distributed in France. This move by the Coalition helped cement an image of a Napoleon patently unwilling to negotiate and instead rely upon his sword to achieve his aims, a charge that had more than just a little truth about it.

Sources

Leggiere, Michael V. The Fall of Napoleon. Vol. 1. The Allied Invasion of France 1813-1814. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Price, Munro. Napoleon: The End of Glory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Hey there,

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