The Japanese navy held the American navy in particular in high regard before the start of hostilities. Not only was the Japanese admiralty more than aware of the need for a quick defensive war where the Japanese needed to dictate the tempo of battle at all times. The Japanese Kantai Kessen doctrine was derived from the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan (an american) who's ideas were praised world wide but debatably taken more seriously by Japan than most. The Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese war cemented the doctrine in the minds of the Admiralty.

Before the war the Japanese were aware of the might of the American navy. While the Washington and later London naval treaties allowed some breathing space for Japan and maintain parity over local American forces. The Japanese were still in awe of the numbers of ships produced by the Americans during this period and during ww1. The Japanese were barely 20 decades into their own ship building industry and faced hardships at every turn. The Americans meanwhile could easily lose a destroyer squadron to a storm during training and then promptly dust off another destroyer squadron from their naval reserves in no time at all. The Japanese also extensively trained in night fighting to further diminish the US technological and numerical Superiority. Apart from that the Japanese also extensively cheated the naval treaties of the inter war years introducing ships into their fleet that were clear violations or could be made into violations at a moments notice. In their minds, if they could not match the Americans ship for ship then they would build ships of a greater overall quality than their enemies. All these preparations show that the Japanese considered the US navy an existencial threat to their expansion into the pacific.

There is a general lull in demeanor against western militaries in general from the day of the pearl harbor attacks until the battle of Midway. As the Japanese found themselves winning again and again in naval/ground engagements. The destruction of allied forces at the battle of the java sea for example simply cemented the Japanese doctrine even further as their ships were not only individually superior to the allied naval forces but the bad weather allowed the Japanese to easily defeat their enemy as their night fighting training was also useful in low visibility weather.

The air of superiority seemed to reach most of the Admiralty with the exception of Admiral Yamamoto which completely expected to win the naval war for 6 months to a year. By a years end the Japanese would be too logistically extended to advance further. However the American navy and its aircraft carriers in particular were still to be if not feared then at least respected. The raids by carrier task forces and the famous Doolittle raid served as a constant reminder the Americans were down but not out. The air of Superiority ended with the battle of Midway. After such a devastating defeat the Japanese could no longer afford to disregard their enemies and maintain overconfidence.

During the war the American navy was respected and at a latter point feared. It was considered suicidal to attack the Americans in pitched battle and for good reason. The only other time the Japanese attempted a pitched battle was during the battle for the Philipines. The Japanese were soundly defeated but it bears mentioning that even if the Japanese had decisively won that battle the US navy would have not lost a single fast battleship or fleet carrier, effectively the Americans would still have had numerical and technological superiority at that point. The Kamikaze attacks were mathematically less suicidal than convetional air attacks against the american navy later in the war.

In short the Japanese thought of the American navy as powerful and not to be dismissed.