There are several surrounding events to this historic event. The first that comes to mind is the conflict between Israel and ALA.
There are several questions that interest me about the conflict:
Why did Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon not enter the Baghdad Pact which resulted in this animosity we have until this day? Did they not see the threat of Communism, or was it rather an anti-american move? Did they realize Americans are going to try to enter the region as they did in BP countries?
Why did Truman recognize Israel despite the future IR damage it would cause with literally every other middle eastern nation? It seemed as if plenty of members of parliament were not in favor of recognizing the existence of Israel, why was Truman so adamant on going forward with a move that set most of the middle east against the US? Why was Israel more important than Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. especially considering the reliance on foreign recourses to defend it from ALA during the Arab - Israeli conflict?
I already gave an answer to Truman's recognition of Israel in this thread: Which factors contributed to Harry Truman recognizing the state of Israel against the advice of the state department?
Given the question's your asking about the subject, I believe that there you'll find the answer to your questions regarding Truman. If you want more, I'd be happy to answer any additional questions you may have.
As for your question about the Baghdad Pact, in the early 50s, the Egyptian nationalist movement mobilized to expel the British, disband parliament, and overthrow the monarchy of King Farouk (backed by the British). Such chaos, Truman feared, was liable to be exploited by the Soviets in order to penetrate Egypt politically. He consequently assigned Kermit Roosevelt and other CIA agents to identify an Egyptian nationalist figure who could restore order in the country and enroll it in a NATO-like Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Their search took them to a cell of self-described Free Officers who were plotting to stage a coup and to their thirty-four-year-old leader, Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser. In short, Nasser did not make truce with Israel as Truman and the US expected. By that time, in 1953, the Republican Eisenhower administration took over. Never adept at foreign policy, Eisenhower ceded responsibility for the Middle East to his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. Dulles was notorious for his lack of pathos. if you want an anecdote Winston Churchill, who again served as British prime minister in the early 1950s, epitomized him in three words: “Dull, Duller, Dulles.” Dulles was convinced that, once freed of Britain, Egypt would willingly join MEDO. But the British believed that Nasser was inherently anti-Western and that by supporting him the United States would undermine, rather than fortify, MEDO. But Egypt did not enter MEDO. Nasser now explained that another obstacle to Egyptian membership in the organization remained: the conflict with Israel. Friction between Egyptian and Israeli forces had spiked in the wake of the British withdrawal and threatened to ignite the entire region. Restrain the Israelis, Nasser informed Dulles, and compel them to forfeit territory as a down payment on peace, and Egypt would surely join MEDO. But Nasser, who was a prominent figure in the Arab world at that time and particularly a figure to which the leaders of Syria and Lebanon looked up to given his stubborn behaviour towards Israel, did not join MEDO. The Egyptian leader had just then embarked on an ambitious project to establish his primacy in inter- Arab politics and his prominence, along with India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, in the nonaligned movement. The first objective vitiated any chance that Nasser would make peace with the Arabs’ ultimate enemy (Isreal), while the second negated the possibility of Egyptian membership in MEDO. Nasser proceeded to oppose Britain’s military alliance with Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq—the so-called Baghdad Pact—and to recognize Red China, who's relation with the USSR was deteriorating.
In short, Nasser, voluntarily choose, along with India, to not ally himself with either of the two fronts of the Cold War (USA vs. USSR). as the name nonaligned movement suggests. I'm roughly summarizing, but Nasser did not want his fellow Arab countrymen to be associated with any of the two fronts as he believed this would not serve the general Arab movement in the long run. One can argue that this is exemplified by Egypt's nationalization of the Suez canal in July 1956.
There are a few books/articles I would recommend about the subject but I'd have to dig a bit to find them for you but here's some suggestion for additional reading if you want.
I'd be happy to answer any additional info you have on the subject.