In any case, Dayton itself. I apologize to you for our decision to close down in terms of media access. But everyone of us believes firmly that to the degree we have any chance of success at all, we're going to have to negotiate in a cocoon, in a vacuum, outside daily press flow. The Europeans and the Russians have agreed with us.

The Bosnian War, started in 1992 after the collapse of Yugoslavia, by 1995 was generally a diplomatic nightmare, with 34 failed cease-fires, and the need for a three-way peace (involving Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia).

A final cease-fire was announced on October 5, 1995 by Clinton, with a peace conference scheduled for November. The respective Presidents (Milošević, Izetbegović, Tuđman) had agreed to three conditions

1.) each President comes to the US with the ability to sign agreements without further consultation

2.) each President stays as long as necessary

3.) each President avoids talking to the press while the negotiations were going on

As a site was being decided -- the process starting right after the ceasefire -- it was called Site X.

Richard Holbrooke, the main architect of the deal, laid out requirements: first, he didn't want to be in a large city.

I had said from the beginning that I would never go to a city like Geneva, the ultimate symbol of failed diplomatic missions, a place where people are cynical, cold bureaucrats, and everything leaks to the press and to each other.

It needed to be a site that would hold all the different countries needed together while being able to be sealed off from the press. They also wanted close enough proximity to Washington D.C. for visit from Administration officials (but not too close -- again avoiding the media). The Camp David Accords (the 1978 agreement between Egypt and Israel) was the closest comparison available, and the State Department carefully studied the history of that process as part of selecting Site X. Holbrooke called former President Carter directly to ask for more details. Camp David itself was rejected from consideration for being too closely tied with the aforementioned Egypt-Israel agreement; it also wasn't large enough to hold all the groups involved.

The necessity for a enclosable, isolated place suggested military bases as the answer. There were three candidates:

• the Navy base at Newport, Rhode Island

• Langley Air Force Base in Norfolk, Virginia

• Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio

Wright-Patterson had five visiting officer quarters only a few feet apart; while the rooms would need improvement, the base fit all the requirements the most closely, while the other bases were too spread out.

When Dayton was announced, it did raise eyebrows -- the Europeans in particular didn't know where it was other than "the middle of America" and The Washington Post wrote "Camp David it isn't."

It did most certainly allow the "shuttle diplomacy on foot" that Holbrooke was looking for and served to remove distractions. During the actual Dayton event, talks did (as predicted) break down, and the Americans were able to transfer back and forth between parties quickly. At one point two leaders sat in the same restaurant not willing to talk to each other, but were willing to write notes on napkins as Holbrooke went back and forth.

I [Holbrooke] returned to Milosevic ... "Silajdzic is ready to discuss Gorazde," I reported. Taking out a napkin, Milosevic started drawing a rough map of the area between Sarajevo and the beleaguered enclave. "We can offer safe conduct along these two roads," he said, indicating the two existing routes between the cities, both now under Serb control. Hill and I objected, saying that the Bosnians would not feel that "safe conduct" would be very safe in light of the last four years. "They will need a genuine, defensible corridor," I said. "Okay, then I will given them a kilometer on each side of the road," Milosevic replied.

The efforts of course worked in the end, but it was a near thing. The "lock-in" was needed, as the last few days were a marathon where nearly everything fell apart, and Izetbegović (of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was still a holdout even as 700 journalists awaited. The Bosnians suffered the worst, and Holbrooke and crew made one final appeal--

There was a long, agonizing pause. We watched Izetbegovic carefully. No one spoke. Finally, speaking slowly, Izetbegović said, "It is not a just peace." He paused for what seemed like a minute, but was probably only three seconds. My heart almost stopped. Then: "But my people need peace."

The war had achieved a grim 100,000 deaths, about 4/5 being the "Bosniaks", the Slavic Muslims.

...

Hartwell, L. (2019). Conflict Resolution: Lessons from the Dayton Peace Process. Negotiation Journal, 35(4), 443-469.

Holbrooke, R. (2011). To End a War: The Conflict in Yugoslavia--America's Inside Story--Negotiating with Milosevic. Modern Library.